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Abstract
This thesis provides some evidence of variability in cognitive style, and refutes the notion of it
being a stable, generalisable personality trait. The study is statistical in nature and uses the cognitive
style construct tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity as the main dependent variable. The main
independent variables are context, content, ideological conservatism and ideological commitment.
The theoretical context for this thesis is the long.,.standing debate about the nature of cognitive style
within the field of social psychological research. The four major theories constituting this context
are the theory of authoritarianism, the theory of extremism, context theory and value pluralism
theory. However, these appear to be inadequate to explain the contextual variability of value
conflict. Hence an attempt has been made to develop a new theory, tentatively named the
contextual value conflict theory.
The founding hypothesis of contextual value conflict theory is that the different characteristics of
the manipulated contexts would present subjects with different levels of contextual value conflict,
thus resulting in the expression of different levels of tolerance of ambiguity. The assumption was
that higher conflict leads to higher attitudinal ambiguity tolerance and lower conflict to lower
attitudinal ambiguity tolerance.
The quantitative part of the research is constituted by two studies in which the Attitudinal
Ambiguity Tolerance (AAT) Scale (Durrheim, 1995) was used to measure cross-context and cross-
content variations in tolerancelintolerance of ambiguity. This was done by first administering the
scale across two different contexts with a fixed university student sample. This procedure was
repeated in a follow-up study in two different contexts with a fixed church sample. The AAT scale
was used in conjunction with 3 scales measuring ideological conservatism/ideological belief, and
two scales measuring ideological commitment. These were the Subtle Racism scale (Duckitt,
1991), the Conservatism scale (Durrheim & Foster, 1997) and the Right-Wing Authoritarian Scale
(Duckitt, 1990). Scales measuring ideological commitment included the Religiosity Scale
(Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975) and the Political Interest scale (an adaptation of the one used by
Sidanius, 1988b).
Results have indicated that it is important to distinguish between the various dimensions of
ideological conservatism as the shape and direction of the relationship with attitudinal ambiguity
tolerance depend on these dimensions.
Although contextual value conflict has managed to better account for the vast variability in patterns
of associations than any of the four other theories mentioned above, it too has its limitations. It was
found that conflict caused by context is difficult to control and pre-define, and future studies need to
address this shortfall by finding ways of determining more efficiently the level of contextual value
conflict inherent in different situations. A recommendation for further research is that an attempt be
made to develop an instrument for quantifying the level of contextual value conflict present in a
particular situation. These shortfalls resulted in the major limitation of this study, i.e. the post hoc
nature of explanations offered for the results. Thus, although contextual value conflict theory was
not confirmed without contradiction, this thesis did uncover a degree of support for it. Due to the
small sample size in both studies, but in particular that of the church study it is important, however,
to treat the findings with caution.
In conclusion, although the support for contextual value conflict was not conclusive, some
confIrmation was found. What was most strongly evidenced though, was that tolerance of
ambiguity cannot be seen as a stable, generalisable personality trait, but should rather be seen as
performance in context that is fluid in nature.
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This chapter gives a brief background to the field of study, which serves as orientation to the
research undertaken. The rationale and aims of the research are stated, followed by a brief
explanation of the variations in context that was the unique feature and formed the central focus
of the study. The chapter concludes with an outline ofthe rest of the thesis.
1.1 Brief background to the field of study
In the social psychological research field of cognition there is a long-standing debate about the
nature of cognitive style. This debate centres on the question of whether cognitive style and its
various constructs can be regarded as personality traits or not. These different constructs include
tolerance ofambiguity, dogmatism, rigidity and cognitive or integrative complexity, to name but
a few. If these were to be personality traits they would be stable and their influence would be a
generalised phenomenon over time, context and content domain. If they were not personality
traits, they would exhibit changes across different contexts and content domains. We mean here
by context the particular circumstances prevailing that may influence an individual's response (in
this study to a questionnaire). The circumstances here are predominantly social situations that
vary in the degree of overt ideology inherent to them. This is a preliminary definition, which
will be explicated further as the situations are described in detail. By content domain we mean
differing areas such as the religious and political which will also be explicated in detail later on.
Furthermore, a direct, isomorphic relationship between cognitive style constructs and
ideological beliefs would imply that cognitive style and cognitive content are closely linked.
Cognitive content in this instance therefore refers to ideological belief. This might, for instance,
be seen if people with the same ideological beliefs (e.g. fascism) were found to use a similar
cognitive style (e.g. intolerance ofambiguity). But this too is a contentious issue.
The debates on these issues have given birth to four major theories, each leading to a different
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fonnulation of the nature of these constructs.
Three of these are essentially personality-based theories. They are the theory of authoritarianism
(Adomo, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), the theory of extremism (Rokeach,
1956, 1960) and the context theory (Sidanius, 1978a, 1978b, 1985; Sidanius & Lau, 1989). A
fourth theory, the value pluralism theory (Tetlock, 1983b, 1984, 1986), seeks to move away
from the personality-based position. It focuses on variability in the expressions of cognitive
style constructs and claims that these constructs cannot be seen as stable personality traits. This
latter theory contains two sub-sections; namely (1) value pluralism and (2) value conflict. These
will be discussed separately, and the section on value conflict will fonn part of the central focus
of this thesis.
Durrheim (1995, 1998) has critiqued all four theories. Durrheim found variability in expressions
of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity that was complex and that could not be adequately
explained by any of these theories. He proposed extending the value conflict concept and
developing a new theory to deal with the nature of cognitive style, and in particular tolerance of
ambiguity. Durrheim argues that by combining Tetlock's (1993, 1994) ideas on value conflict
and accountability with those of Billig (1985, 1988, 1996) on value conflict and audience effect
the complexity of variation would be more effectively addressed, since it would emphasise the
contextual nature of value conflict. The writer attempts to find more support for Durrheim's
proposal in the studies that follow.
1.2 Rationale for this Research
Current South African society is undergoing a transfonnation of attitudes and underlying value
systems. Under apartheid, value judgements based on race were sanctioned and reflected in
many laws, whereas the new society is operating in a free market of values in which judgements
about socio-economic realities are more complex than before.
Because of the complications of our particular history, transfonnation is slow and conflicted.
This offers the challenge to investigate how the introduction of a different underlying value
2
system could challenge and ultimately impact on people's attitudes. The new society therefore
offers an exciting laboratory in which to examine these theories and come to an understanding of
the theoretical underpinning.
Durrheim's work was exploratory and his development of a new understanding tentative. The
writer's research finds support for his proposal. Like Durrheim's studies, it incorporates some of
Billig's (1996) ideas on value conflict to synthesise an emerging theory. It also includes Billig's
(1985, 1988) ideas on audience effect. In accordance with developing theory the presence of
varying levels of contextual value conflict in different situations (contexts) or content domains
(i.e. religious and political domains) is examined, and their impact on the expression of
tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity is investigated. Since this study extends the investigation of
the issues raised in Durrheim's (1995) study, the same scales have been used so as to achieve
comparibility.
1.3 Aims of the Research
This study attempts to provide evidence of variability in cognitive style, thus refuting the notion
of it being a stable, generalised personality trait. The cognitive style construct of
tolerance/intolerance ofambiguity has been used as the main area of focus.
Whereas the main theme for Durrheim was to explore variability in ambiguity tolerance across
content domains, the present study extends his work by exploring variability across context, thus
undertaking one of his recommendations for further study. This specific angle renders the
current study different from previous studies since context in this field of study has not been
used as the central independent variable. Context is manipulated in order to determine whether
or not variability in expressed levels of tolerance of ambiguity would manifest across different
situations (contexts) with different characteristics, and in particular where different hypothesised
levels of value conflict are present for subjects. If variability does occur, support against a
personality-based view ofcognitive style would be found.
Further support is sought in the second aim, which is to determine whether expressions of
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tolerance of ambiguity vary across content domain. This is achieved by examining whether
there are variations across different content domains, such as political and religious domains.
For example, people might be intolerant of ambiguity as far as political content is concerned,
while exhibiting tolerance of ambiguity in the religious sphere.
Another aim is to investigate the relationship between cognitive style and ideological belief,
with the measure again being tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. This is achieved by examining
the relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological conservatism. If a direct
isomorphic relationship does exist, a single relationship between attitudinal conservatism and
tolerance of ambiguity would be noticed in all content domains used in the two studies
undertaken by the researcher. If no such a relationship exists, the studies would yield different
associations across different content domains.
A last aim is to investigate ideological commitment as a mediating factor between cognitive
style and cognitive content (ideological beliefs) to see if it does play a role across all content
domains. If it does, ideological commitment would mediate in both the political and the
religious domain. Ifnot, it might mediate in either (or none) of the domains.
As mentioned above, the umque feature of the research undertaken in the study is the
manipulation in context that was carried out. These variations in context will be discussed in
more detail below.
1.4 Variations in Context
In order to achieve the above aims, two different studies with different sample groups were
undertaken.
The first study, to be referred to as the "University study" took place at the Potchefstroomse
Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys. The second study, to be referred to as the "Church
study" was done at two Dutch Reformed Church congregations in Johannesburg. One of the
congregations, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, Johannesburg Noord is a predominantly
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Afrikaans- speaking congregation, while the other, the Andrew Murray Dutch Reformed Church
is predominantly English-speaking. These two congregations are in essence amalgamated, but
separate services are held in the two different languages.
Both studies utilised two different contexts; one overtly "ideological" and the other
supposedly more "neutral", in a repeated measure design. It was hypothesised that the
different characteristics of the manipulated contexts would present subjects with different
levels of value conflict, thus resulting in the expression of different levels of tolerance of
ambiguity. Bible study groups in different residences were used as the ideological (formal)
context in the university study, while one session of the Alpha course (discussed in Chapter 4)
played this role in the church study. The "neutral" (informal) context was a university rag
preparation situation in the university study and the home situation in the church study.
The assumption was that a context that is in line with the beliefs of subjects would pose less
value conflict to the subject than would a context that would differ from or challenge their
beliefs. In a context where their beliefs differed from others, or were opposed, higher levels of
value conflict would be present, and this in turn would result in higher levels of tolerance of
ambiguity.
The same sample was used in each context, but different subjects were used in the university and
church study. Quantitative measures were used in both studies. Subjects had to complete a
separate questionnaire in each of the different contexts. The only measurement instrument used
in both context questionnaires was the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (Durrheim, 1995).
Other scales, such as the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, the SA Conservatism Scale the
Subtle Racism Scale, the Religiosity Scale and the Political Interest Scale were used in one of
the questionnaires only. Analyses of this scale were done in conjunction with the other scales in
order to test the expectations ofthe studies.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 1 provides a brief background to the study, its rationale as well as its aims and unique
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feature, with specific emphasis on the variations in context in the two different studies that were
undertaken.
Chapter 2 covers a review of the relevant literature. Here a more detailed background and
history of the field is provided, and central concepts are explained in finer detail. The four major
theories that have attempted to address issues in this field are then discussed: the theory of
authoritarianism, extremism theory, context theory and value pluralism theory. A critique of the
four theories follows, which in essence holds that none of these theories can adequately explain
the level ofvariability in tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity found in Durrheim's study as well as
in the two studies that were conducted by the researcher. Some aspects ofBillig's (1985, 1988,
1996) work, notably his concepts of value conflict and audience effect, are then dealt with. After
this discussion the researcher advances Durrheim's argument for the merging of Tetlock's
concept of value conflict with that of Billig to provide a different theoretical understanding of
the findings. This understanding focuses on the contextual nature of value conflict and its
influence on ambiguity tolerance.
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology used in the university study. Main objectives and
expectations are explained. A discussion of the sample, the two different contexts used for this
sample group and the procedure that was applied then follow, and the different measures that
were used in both the university and the church study are discussed. The chapter concludes with
the results found in the university study, and brief preliminary explanations for these findings.
The results yield such a variety of results across context and content domain that none of the
four major theories can adequately explain the variation. The extended theory that has been
proposed seems to explain the variability much better, but it too has its shortcomings.
Chapter 4 follows the same format, except that it now deals with the second study, the church
study. The rationale for the second study is given. The measures used in this study are not
discussed again since they are similar to those used in the university study and were dealt with in
the previous chapter. The only measures that were not utilised in this study were those
concerning the aspect of ideological commitment. Reasons for this are provided in the chapter.
The findings in the church study yielded similar results to those found in the university study.
Despite its limitations the proposed contextual value conflict theory provides the most
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satisfactory explanation of the results.
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the fmdings of both the studies. The issue of context and the
presence ofdifferent levels ofcontextual value conflict are discussed again. The results are dealt
with in the light of the different research questions posed in the study. Firstly, whether tolerance
of ambiguity is personality-based or not. The findings do not support a personality-based
stance, as variability across both context and content domains was observed. Secondly, no
isomorphic relationship between cognitive style and cognitive content was evidenced, as
multiple associations between these were found. Thirdly, support for Durrheim's findings about
variability across content domain was obtained.
A summary of the major findings of the thesis, and a section on its limitations as well as
recommendations for future studies are also included in this chapter. The chapter concludes
by attempting to indicate in which ways the research reported here has contributed to the
social psychological research field of cognition, and in particular, what its contributions to an





The first theme of this research is an investigation of whether tolerance of ambiguity is a
predictable, stable personality trait. Much of the literature in this field has proposed that it is, and
as such that it can be generalised and predicted, while other findings have challenged this notion.
Another theme is an investigation into the relationship between cognitive style and cognitive
content in order to determine whether there is a direct, isomorphic relationship between these
two aspects of cognitive functioning. This will be examined by investigating whether tolerance
of ambiguity is linked to certain ideological beliefs and/or ideological commitment. Some
previous work in this field has suggested causality between ideological beliefs and cognitive
style, postulating that certain beliefs (e.g. fascism) are always characterised by certain
cognitive styles (e.g. rigidity). However, other results have yielded contradictory findings.
The most important focus, however, explores whether different contextual conditions lead to
variability in tolerance of ambiguity. The research in this field has not previously explored the
consequences of manipulating the context. The latter is thus a unique feature of this study. The
focus falls specifically on the level of contextual value conflict present in each different context,
and how this affects the expression of tolerance ofambiguity across context.
2.2 Brief Background
For a long period, psychological theories of cognitive style have had as their major thrust an
attempt to establish causality between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. In order to achieve
this, the theories have been grounded mainly in personality theory. One reason for this thrust has
been "to sustain moraVpolitical arguments" (Durrheim, 1995, p.4, Durrheim, 1997). Linking
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certain types of beliefs with a rigid cognitive style, and others with a flexible and complex
cognitive style contains a value judgement about those beliefs, as it renders certain beliefs
"irrational" (Adomo, et al., 1950; Durrheim, 1995; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949).
Research into cognitive style has its roots in the work of Jaensch, a Nazi psychologist, who
hypothesised that elements of perception play an important role in personality (in Knutson,
1973). His research linked liberalism with an overly flexible cognitive style that was not tied to
reality, and therefore was regarded as "irrational", while the "ideal Nazi personality...was
characterized by precise and orderly perceptual abilities" (Ray, 1988, p. 303). Although Frenkel-
Brunswik (1948b, 1949) was spurred on to disprove these findings, she took over virtually
unchanged the underlying theory. The most significant change that she introduced was to
propose a different, in fact totally opposite value judgement regarding "an irrational cognitive
style". Her work led to the ensuing research by Adomo and colleagues (1950), who examined in
detail the "authoritarian personality" (Eckhardt, 1991). They postulated that it was rigidity, rather
than flexibility, that was "irrational" and linked this rigid cognitive style to the authoritarian
personality style (Adomo et al., 1950). The work of Frenkel-Brunswik as well as Adomo and
colleagues attempted not only to understand anti-Semitism, but also to eradicate it (Adomo, et
al., 1950).
Ensuing research has used the landmark work of these authors as a central point of departure.
Three major theories that were developed in reaction to the theory of authoritarianism are
extremism theory, context theory and value pluralism theory.
2.3 Definitions of Key Concepts
2.3.1 General Constructs
A number of the assumptions and definitions of concepts in the ground breaking research by
Adomo and colleagues (1950) have formed the basis of many subsequent studies, whether for or
against the theory. However, the different interpretations and explanations that have been made
in these studies resulted partially from different definitions and operational measures of concepts
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such as intolerance of ambiguity (Sidanius, 1978b). Other reasons that have been given for these
differences have included ideological bias, flawed methodology and external historical, cultural
and social factors (Durrheim, 1995). These factors will be discussed in more detail under
"Measures" in Chapter 3. Evidence exists that cognitive functioning does not constitute a unique
trait, and that various, independent types may exist for different circumstances, interests and
topics (Furnham, 1994; Kaplan, 1972; Rigby & Rump, 1982; Vannoy, 1965).
Despite the varying conceptual descriptions, methodologies and experimental procedures
designed to measure cognitive style constructs, there seems to be enough overlap between them
to argue that the multiple studies with different theoretical arguments and measures are trying to
address the same phenomenon (Durrheim, 1997, 1998). The similarities between the different
cognitive constructs used in the theories reviewed below will follow after the definitions of these
concepts.
It is important to note that, for the purposes of this thesis, cognitive content refers to ideological
beliefs, such as fascism, socialism, etc. Content domain, on the other hand, refers to the specific
domains of religion and politics that were investigated in the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance
(AAT) Scale (Durrheim, 1995).
2.3.1.1 Personality
Although there is no single definition for the concept of personality, a few central assumptions
underlie most views thereof Firstly, it is generally accepted to refer to the organisation of a
person's internal dispositions. Secondly, it refers to the stability or consistency of an
individual's attributes over time. Thirdly, it assumes that behaviour is related to intrapsychic
components which interact in predictable ways that change in interaction with the parameters of
the external environment (Knutson, 1973).
According to Adorno and colleagues (1950) personality is "a more or less enduring organisation
of forces within the individual... which help to determine responses in various situations" (p.5)
and therefore leads to consistency in behaviour. Since their basic assumption stems from
psychoanalytic personality theory, the basic forces of personality are "primarily primitive
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emotional needs" which include "drives, wishes, emotional impulses" and which "are not
responses but readinessesfor response" (Adomo et al., 1950, p. 5, italics in the original).
2.3.1.2 Cognition and Cognitive Functioning
Cognition refers to the set of activities used by a psychic system to process all the information
which people are confronted with on a daily basis, and as such it has an adaptive and regulatory
function (Leyens & Codol, 1988). For others cognition is "synonymous with opinion, belief and
attitude" (Festinger in Leyens & Codol, 1988, p.91) and therefore refers more to content than
structure. Cognitive functioning is defined as a vast construct encompassing the way in which
information from the environment is structured, organised and processed by people (Tetlock,
1983b, 1984; Sidanius, 1978b).
2.3.1.3 Cognitive Style
Reber (1985) defines cognitive style as "the characteristic style or manner in which cognitive
tasks are approached or handled". He states further that "several dimensions have been identified
along which individuals' cognitive styles can be shown to differ" (p. 130).
There are two mam theoretical conceptions of cognitive style prevalent in the social
psychological literature. The first is personality-based and has informed the work of Frenkel-
Brunswik and Adomo and colleagues. The second is cognitive-centred and has been used by
Sidanius and Tetlock.
Frenkel-Brunswik's work is grounded in psychodynamic personality theory. She postulated that
"prejudice and its wide range of perceptual and cognitive correlates were seen as surface
manifestations of the ego defences...by which authoritarians screened out threatening emotional
ambivalence" (Durrheim, 1995, p.62). These ego defences are mobilised by threatening cognitive
contents and extemal situations and as such the concept allows for individual variability. Content
and structure of cognition are closely intertwined in this view as it postulates that a direct causal
link exists between these two aspects: if a person has this type ofunderlying ego-weakness, they
will resort to a rigid cognitive style whenever they are confronted by threatening content.
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Similarly, the ego weakness will predispose the authoritarian to a conservative political ideology.
This predisposition is motivated psychodynamically because of the need to submit to a
"supreme" authority. The personality-centred approach therefore stresses the connection between
cognitive style and psychodynamic. motivation. Furthermore, it also emphasises the emotive
aspects of ambivalence (Durrheim, 1995).
The cognitive-centred approach considers cognitive style as "a formal, structural property of
cognition which underlies all information-processing...and determines the way a person
combines information perceived from the outside world, as well as internally generated
information for adaptive purposes" (Schroder, et al., 1967 in Durrheim, 1995, p. 67). Schroder
and colleagues state that an adaptive orientation selects "certain kinds of information from the
environment and...(acts) like a program or set of rules which combines these items of
information in specific ways" (Schroder et al., 1967, p. 4). This approach severs cognitive
structure from cognitive content, as it proposes that this "structural property" would not
necessarily change according to the content of the information that it processes. Furthermore,
cognitive style is learnt through experience, training or conditioning and as such is seen as a
"learned disposition" (Harvey & Schroder, 1963). The other difference from the personality-
centred approach is that it rejects the notion of emotional ambivalence and severs cognitive style
from any "psychodynamic motivational links" (Durrheim, 1995, p. 63). The separation here
between content and style, seen in the fact that one structure is regarded as processing all content
domains, imply that cognitive style can be considered a stable and generalised aspect of
individual psychology. Any emotive element linked to cognitive style is therefore also discarded.
In short, then, personality-centred theorists attribute a rigid cognitive style to psychodynamic
defences, while cognitive-centred theorists attribute it to structural opposition to changes in
cognition (Durrheim, 1995).
The debate about whether cognitive style and cognitive content should be separated or not is an
important one, as it has several implications for the work undertaken by the researcher. This
aspect will be dealt with in more detail under the theory ofTetlock.
12
2.3.2 Cognitive Style Constructs
There are a number of constructs of cognitive style, such as tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity
(Adorno, et al., 1950), dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), rigidity/flexibility (Sidanius & Ekehammar,
1977) and integrative complexity/simplicity (Tetlock, 1983a, 1983b, 1984) that are dealt with in
the major theoretical perspectives relevant to this study. As seen in the polarised definitions (e.g.
tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity and integrative complexity-simplicity), most of these
constructs can manifest either of these extremes, the one more towards the flexible and the other
more towards the rigid side of a continuum.
Rigid styles imply that people utilise a few fixed, one-dimensional categories when they interpret
events, reject inconsistent information and do not have tolerance for alternative perspectives. In
contrast, flexible cognitive styles allow a person to perceive situations in various,
multidimensional ways. Individuals with such cognitive styles try to synthesise viewpoints that
are integrative of several alternative values and facts (Rokeach, 1960; Sidanius, 1984, 1985;
Tetlock, 1984; Tetlock, et aI., 1985). Brief definitions for some of these constructs will be
discussed below, with a more detailed discussion of tolerance/ intolerance of ambiguity after the
definitions of the other constructs. Specific issues pertaining to the measurement of tolerance of
ambiguity will be discussed in Chapter 3.
2.3.2.1 Dogmatism
Rokeach (1960) examined this construct in detail. According to Knutson (1973) dogmatism is
related to the structure, and not the content, of belief systems. Rokeach showed that people fall
on a continuum ranging from closed-mindedness to open-mindedness. High levels of anxiety
hinder closed-minded individuals from assimilating new information that is contrary to their own
views or beliefs. Consequently they may have one of four reactions: (1) they may reject
information outright if it conflicts with their beliefs; (2) they may perceptually distort the
information so that they can accept it; (3) they may accept - but not integrate - the new
information if it comes from a valued authority, or (4) if the change in beliefs required by
information from a positive authority is too great, they may devalue the authority. Furthermore
they are likely, without analysis, to accept and act on new information which appeals to them. In
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contrast, open-minded individuals have a need to examme and analyse this kind of new
information carefully before accepting it (Knutson, 1973).
2.3.2.2 Rigidity
The construct of rigidity has been defined by Sidanius (1978b) as "the (lack of) ease with which
an individual can reorganise his (sic) cognitive structure and information-processing strategy in
accordance with the demands ofchanging environmental situations" (p. 516). If cognitive style is
rigid it implies that the person is not able to easily reorganise their information-processing
strategies in order to meet the demands of changing situations or stimuli in their environment
(Sidanius, 1978a). They utilise only a few generalised principles when perceiving and
interpreting events or situations and find it difficult to tolerate other ideas. They also reject
conflicting or inconsistent evidence (Tetlock, 1984). On the other hand, individuals who have a
flexible cognitive style do not compartmentalise functions, and therefore relate to new ideas, etc.
with ease (Kounin, 1941).
2.3.2.3 Integrative complexity
Integrative complexity, is defined as encompassing two structural cognitive variables namely
that of differentiation and integration (Tetlock, 1983a). Differentiation is the number of diverse
dimensions that a person considers when dealing with a problem (Tetlock, 1983a, 1984, 1989;
Tetlock, et al., 1985), while cognitive integration is reached when complex, conceptual
associations among differentiated characteristics have been developed (Tetlock, 1983b, 1986).
Differentiation is therefore required before integration can develop (Tetlock, 1984). People who
are more integratively complex will use a combination of complex levels of both differentiation
and integration as cognitive style strategies to process information presented to them. The
opposite would be true for those people using cognitively simple strategies.
2.3.3 Similarities between Different Cognitive Constructs
Despite the differences between the personality-centred and the cognitive-centred approaches,
they have many aspects in common. The first similarity is that bipolar cognitive constructs
14
(e.g. tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity, integrative complexity/simplicity) all cast a value
judgement on the rigid styles (e.g. intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive simplicity) by rendering
them "non-functional" and "irrational" (Durrheim, 1995). In this way they have similar
evaluative connotations.
Secondly, all constructs on the rigid side of the continuum utilise a few broad, inflexible
categories when processing information, whereas the flexible constructs use multiple, complex
methods to assimilate information (see the definitions of the constructs).
Furthermore, all these constructs are concerned with investigating an ambiguous versus an
unambiguous evaluation of social objects such as authorities and groups. Ambiguous or
ambivalent evaluations would be seen in the more flexible styles (tolerance of ambiguity,
integrative complexity) whereas an unambiguous evaluation would be characteristic of more
rigid styles such as intolerance of ambiguity. Inherent in the ambiguous/unambiguous evaluation
is also an emotive element.
These similarities have enabled researchers to compare these constructs and to find alternative
explanations pertaining to aspects of these constructs.
Tolerance of ambiguity seems to be the one construct that brings together the most important
elements from all the various constructs examined in this study, as it is bipolar in nature, it has a
flexible and rigid manifestation, and is concerned with the ambiguous and unambiguous
evaluation. It is also emotive in nature.
This construct, which is grounded in the personality-based orientation forms one of the main
focal points of this research, and a more detailed account of it will be presented next. More
information about its measurement and other aspects will follow in Chapter 3.
2.4 Tolerance/Intolerance of Ambiguity
Despite extensive research into the cognitive style construct of ambiguity tolerance, no clear
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and unambiguous definition yet exists for it. Frenkel-Brunswik (1948a, 1948b, 1949), who
was the first to introduce and define the concept, described it as an attitudinal variable that was
social and evaluative in nature, manifest in the level of ambivalence towards values, groups
and authorities. The ability to tolerate ambiguity enables an individual to identify and integrate
the presence of both positive and negative qualities in one object or person, whereas
intolerance of ambiguity would lead people to evaluate social objects in such a way that they
either totally accept or totally reject the object.
Bochner states that "the concept of intolerance of ambiguity has been employed...either as a
descriptive device, where personalities are classified as falling along a tolerance-intolerance
continuum, or in a causal sense, where some observable facet of behaviour is deemed to be a
function ofthe person's cognitive style with respect to ambiguity" (Bochner, 1965, p. 394).
Frenkel-Brunswik regarded the concept as a personality trait indicative of a broader, general
type of ambiguity located in the person and as such penetrating every aspect of their
functioning, including the social, behavioural and emotional spheres (Bochner, 1965;
Durrheim & Foster, 1997). According to Durrheim (1995) "the construct was associated with
personal and social identity, as well as political beliefs" (p. 64).
As will be discussed later in more detail, Frenkel-Brunswik's (1948b, 1949) work was rooted
specifically in psychodynamic personality theory, and cognitive style was seen to manifest in
reactions to threatening emotional content.
The theory of authoritarianism attempted to link intolerance of ambiguity to conservative,
prejudiced political ideologies (Adomo, et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). It is precisely
because they regarded intolerance of ambiguity to be a personality trait that they could
postulate such a link, since this personality trait would permeate all aspects of a person's
functioning and would thus predispose them to certain types of ideologies.
Budner's definition of the concept describes intolerance of ambiguity as "the tendency to
perceive ambiguous situations as sources of threat" while tolerance of ambiguity is seen as
"the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as desirable" (Budner, 1962, p. 29).
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Despite support for the original view that regards it a personality trait (Allport, 1954; Kohn,
1974; Rokeach, 1960; Sidanius, 1978a; Trapnell, 1994), other theoretical findings have
contradicted this stance (Durrheim, 1995, 1998; Scott et a!., 1979; Suedfield, 1971; Tetlock,
1993; Tetlock et al., 1985).
Durrheim & Foster (1997) point out that these conflicting results indicate that intolerance of
ambiguity is not a stable generalised personality trait. Ray (1988) postulates that intolerance of
ambiguity is not a trait, but a situational response. Rigby & Rump (1982) state that research has
shown that there is no such trait as intolerance of ambiguity, but rather that there are many
different types of intolerance of ambiguity that emerge on different occasions· and in different
circumstances. In their research Sidanius & Ekehammar (1977) state that the multidimensional
methods of analysis that are currently utilised have described various possible dimensions of
cognition informing ideologies. This has led Sidanius (1978b) to conclude that "a singular,
unitary trait of cognitive functioning underlying cognitive behaviour is quite difficult to
establish, even within the same content domain" (p. 528). Other studies that support Sidanius on
this matter include Fumham (1994), Kaplan (1972), Rigby & Rump (1982) and Vannoy (1965).
Scott and colleagues (1979) examined cross-content variability in cognitive style and found that
object-ambivalence has very little cross-content stability. Durrheim (1995) took their research
further and developed a measure for ambiguity tolerance that meets Rokeach's "first
requirement", namely measuring the underlying structure, rather than the content of cognitive
style. His research suggests that ambiguity tolerance is a multidimensional construct that is
content specific, rather than a stable personality trait. He states that " ...at best, tolerance of
ambiguity is a diffuse correlate ofonly one dimension ofpersonality" (Durrheim & Foster, 1997,
p.742).
These conflicting findings are partly based on the various definitions, measures and experimental
procedures resulting from misinterpretations of the original concept (Durrheim & Foster, 1997).
These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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2.5 Theories
Four major theories are relevant to the questions raised in this study. Three of these theories are
essentially personality-based positions. These are the theory of authoritarianism (Adomo, et al.,
1950), extremism theory (Rokeach, 1956, 1960) and context theory (Sidanius, 1978a, 1978b,
1985; Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1977; Sidanius & Lau, 1989). The fourth, the value pluralism
theory of Tetlock (1983a, 1983b, 1984, 1986; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) is not a "pure"
personality-based theory but is an attempt to move away from this position. The two subsections
of this theory are (1) value pluralism and (2) value conflict.
After the discussion of the above theories, an introduction to the work of Bi1lig (1985, 1987,
1988, 1996) will follow: An argument is advanced for the expansion of the value conflict theory
(by incorporating Billig's ideas) as a step towards a new theoretical understanding of the findings
of this study. This proposal follows from the work of Durrheim (1995, 1998) in which tentative
support for a new understanding was found. Durrheim suggested that Tetlock's concept of value
conflict be combined with that of Billig's in order to arrive at a different interpretation of the
findings.
2.5.1 The Theory of Authoritarianism
The work of Frenke1-Brunswik (1948b, 1949) laid the groundwork from which subsequent
research in this field takes its departure. She was the first person in the social psychological field
to explicitly postulate that characteristic means of perception and cognition are a reflection of a
broader personality picture and to link this field with that of political psychology (Durrheim,
1997, 1998). She was also the first to define and introduce the cognitive style concept of
intolerance of ambiguity. According to her, this construct is a personality trait reflecting a much
broader intolerance of ambiguity that she linked to prejudiced (conservative) ideological beliefs
(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948b, 1949).
Using her work as a starting point, Adomo and colleagues (1950) investigated in much detail the
authoritarian personality and aspects related to this personality style. The aim was to identify the
relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. This work is very significant and in
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turn fonns a central point ofdeparture in ensuing research.
The research into the authoritarian personality was grounded in psychodynamic theory and
postulated that the rigid kind of cognitive style associated with this personality type originates in
early, authoritarian parent-child relationships in which ambivalence (i.e. emotional ambiguity)
towards parental figures is taboo (Adorno, et al., 1950; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). As such the
ambivalence is experienced as risky behaviour, and becomes a threat which causes anxiety (in
Sidanius, 1978a).
This type of upbringing results in ego-weakness as the person does not learn to integrate
primitive id drives with the punitive superego and therefore represses any ambiguity they may
experience. In turn, this ego weakness predisposes the authoritarian to a conservative political
ideology that satisfies the psychological need to submit to an ultimate authority. Furthennore, it
also results in "the displacement of a repressed antagonism... toward outgroups" such as
minorities and deviants (Adorno, et al., 1950, p 482).
Frenkel-Brunswik points out that, despite a "surface submission to authority...there is often, at
the same time, an underlying resentment against authority" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948b, p. 300).
The taboo against ambivalence towards parents, presents "an underlying emotional conflict
between glorification and hostility in the attitude toward parents, sex and one's own social
identity" (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p.140).
This ego weakness is seen in the absolutist, value-laden patterns ofthinking and beliefs about the
world, which are characteristics of this personality type. Cognitive variables characteristic of
such a cognitive style include, among others, rigidity, premature closure and intolerance of
ambiguity, while typical beliefs associated with it are political and economic conservatism,
ethnocentrism and anti-democratic views (Tetlock, 1983b). As such Adorno and colleagues
theorised a fixed, linear relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs, and
therefore between the structure and content of beliefs (Sidanius, 1978a). Both are therefore seen
as manifestations of the same ego weakness. More specifically, the findings linked fascist
beliefs directly to the rigid cognitive style construct of intolerance of ambiguity (Adorno, et al.,
1950).
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The view of the ego-wealmess predisposing people to conservative ideologies so that they can
submit to a "supreme" authority is supported by another point of view on the role conservatism
plays in people's lives. Wilson (1973) posits that conservatism serves the ego-defensive function
of providing a sense of security, order and control to an individual's inner world, thereby
reducing the threat that ambiguity poses to them. This in turn leads them to use simplistic, rigid
patterns of behaviour. A conservative person would thus be less tolerant of ambiguity than a
liberal one (Durrheim, 1998; Eckhardt, 1991; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949).
According to Stone (1980) many of the research findings over the years have confirmed
important relationships hypothesised by the theory of authoritarianism (Sidanius, 1985, 1986;
Stone, 1980; Tetlock, 1983b). The interrelationship between conservative political ideological
stances and authoritarianism has been one of the assumptions for which evidence has been found
most consistently (in Sidanius, 1978b).
However, certain researchers have presented conflicting results (Knutson, 1973). Consequently
an irrational cognitive style has been connected with a variety of ideological beliefs, such as
conservatism (Adorno et al., 1950), extremism (Rokeach, 1960) and moderatism (Sidanius,
1984, 1985, 1988a, 1988b). Various criticisms have been raised against the theory of
authoritarianism. Central to these is the theory's insensitivity to and disregard for
authoritarianism ofthe left (Sidanius, 1988a).
In reaction to the theory of authoritarianism Rokeach (1956, 1960) proposed an alternative stance
which hypothesised that cognitive style is not directly linked to the content of ideological beliefs,
but rather to the underlying dynamics of extremism (in Sidanius, 1978a). He also claimed that
his scale, the Dogmatism scale, was independent of the "left-right" continuum.
2.5.2 Extremism or Ideologue Theory
Rokeach advanced a "general theory of authoritarianism which does not require that particular
ideological contents are psychodynamically bound up with a characteristic cognitive style"
(Durrheim, 1998, p.732). According to him there are more similarities than differences between
the cognitive style of left wing and right-wing extremists. Moreover, the typical cognitive style
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of the two poles of extremism have more in common with each other than with that of
moderatism (Rokeach, 1956; Tetlock, 1983b). His hypothesis therefore postulates that the
relationship between intolerance of ambiguity and the spectrum of political ideology will be
curvilinear in nature. Extreme conservatives and liberals will be more authoritarian and more
intolerant of ambiguity than moderate individuals (Sidanius, 1978a). Furthermore, they will be
prone to think in simplistic, dichotomous and value-laden ways (Tetlock, 1984; Tetlock et al.,
1989). In contrast, the cognitive style of moderates will be more complex, flexible and open-
minded (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1977).
The reason for the similarity in cognitive styles of extremists can be found in the assumption that
cognitive style is correlated with the underlying dynamics of extremism. This in turn implies
that there is only an indirect relationship between the style of thinking and the actual content of
the ideology that a person follows. Rokeach suggested that it is important to meet the "first
requirement" of severing, both methodologically and theoretically, the content of beliefs from
their structure. He states that there is a need to make "a sharp distinction in theory between the
structure and content of ideological systems" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 13). In the field of empirical
research it is essential "to formulate the formal and structural properties of belief systems apart
from specific content. .. in such a way that they can be measured" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 14).
The measure that Rokeach designed to achieve this "first requirement" was the Dogmatism scale
(1956, 1960). He maintained that this scale is independent of ideological content, and that it
measures general authoritarianism. The scale places the underlying structure of the individual's
belief system on a continuum ranging from open-mindedness to closed-mindedness (Knutson,
1973; Rokeach, 1960).
People on the open-minded end of the scale would analyse and examine new, conflicting
information before assimilating or rejecting it, whereas closed-minded ones would either accept
or reject it without analysis. Other strategies of close-mindedness would be to distort
information perceptually so that it could become acceptable, especially if it has come from a
positive authority with whom the person is overidentified (Knutson, 1973). Itis precisely this
overidentification with a supreme authority that informs a person's inclination to extremist
ideologies. Ego-weakness is linked with the urge to submit to an absolute authority, which in
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turn predisposes individuals to extremism in one or other form (Durrheim, 1995, 1998).
According to Rokeach, the psychological process of commitment is the central factor that
underlies the leaning towards extremism. The reason for this is that the "ultimate source of
truth" often inherent in extreme ideologies fulfils the "defences of an underlying dogmatic
personality" (Durrheim, 1998, p. 736), and satisfies the need to commit oneself to an absolute
authority or ideology. This implies a personality-based view of commitment. Strong religious
commitment, for instance, has been associated with dogmatism in a number of studies
(Kilpatrick, et aI., 1970).
Despite some evidence supportive of Rokeach's ideologue position (Eysenck, 1981; McClosky
& Chong, 1985; Rokeach, 1956, 1960), the majority of investigations contradict this stance.
Many of the findings actually support the theory of authoritarianism, as there is evidence that
links dogmatism with conservatism (Sidanius, 1978a, 1978b; Stone, 1980; Tetlock, 1983b).
Therefore, although efforts were made to devise an "ideology-free" psychological measure
(Tetlock, 1983b), evidence pointed towards dogmatism being a "personality and attitudinal
syndrome characteristic of right-wingers alone" (Stone, 1980, p. 14). However, for several
reasons, Durrheim (1997) cautions that this statement may be premature, and that an uncritical
acceptance thereof should be avoided.
Eysenck (1981) points out that the limited evidence for left-wing authoritarianism does not
suggest that authoritarianism in liberals does not exist. "These findings .. .indicate only that in
20th-century Western democracies ...certain cognitive stylistic traits occur more frequently
among members of the public conventionally classified as being on the socio-political right" (in
Tetlock, 1984, p. 366).
Some indications of a link between conservatism and dogmatism were also found in Rokeach's
own research. He explains this by suggesting that the same drives that direct a person towards
antihumanitarian (conservative) ideologies could also steer them towards dogmatism (Rokeach,
1956). This explanation has been criticised as it implies a causal link between personality,
dogmatism and conservatism, thus opposing his "first requirement" of severing the content and
structure ofbeliefs.
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The third theory concerning the relationship between ideology and cognitive style is that of
Sidanius. The context theory of Sidanius achieved Rokeach's "first requirement" both on a
theoretical and a methodological level (Durrheim, 1997). However, it stands in complete
opposition to the extremism theory, as it postulates rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity in
moderates rather than in extremists.
2.5.3 Context theory
From the outset Sidanius (l978a, 1978b, 1984, 1985) makes it clear that his theory attempts to
provide an alternative position to that ofthe authoritarianism theory and extremism theory.
One of the most important accomplishments of this theory is that it managed to sever cognitive
content from cognitive style. This was attained through taking a completely apolitical
perspective, one that was disinterested in critiquing any political ideology, but had as its main
aim "to build a model ofthe relationship between cognition and belief' (Durrheim, 1997, p.637).
Here extremism is examined in a completely relative sense, giving it no specific, absolute
content. Sidanius (1988a, 1988b) defines a certain position as extreme according to the relative
extent to which it deviates from modal beliefs within a specific historical/cultural setting. This
implies that an ideology can be regarded as liberal in one time/space frame and moderate or even
conservative in another. An example would be the concept of the human rights agenda which, in
an apartheid era was seen as liberal, and which has become mainstream in the new South Africa.
Another example would be the acceptance ofwomen's equality or gay rights.
This stance also acknowledges the existence of more than one socio-political dimension or
radicalism-conservatism continuum. This is a distinct move away from the limitations of
previous research regarding this issue (Sidanius 1978a). Eysenck (1975) states that examples of
different types of socio-political dimensions include general attitudes (e.g. freedom of
expression, international co-operation and racial prejudice) and economic concerns (e.g.
expenditure of the national budget and social welfare).
Sidanius proposes a curvilinear relationship between certain cognitive constructs and the
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radicalism-conservatism political dimension (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1977; Sidanius & Lau,
1989). He states that non-dogmatism, flexibility, tolerance of ambiguity and complexity of
thought, are facets to be found in extremists, rather than in moderates (Sidanius, 1978a, 1978b).
The basis of the argument is the concept of "modal conformity and acquiescence response
tendency" (Sidanius 1978a, p. 217). This "conformity" model proposes that individuals generally
prefer to comply with the prevailing beliefs in their social environment in order to be accepted by
their community (Sidanius 1988a, 1988b; Sidanius & Lau, 1989). The desire for acceptance
reflects a rigid, dogmatic cognitive style, which is intolerant of ambiguity. This model differs
from "dissonance" models, which suggest either that people seek to decrease tension between
opposing ideological beliefs or that they expect a significant ideological authority to reduce
. attitudinal discrepancy. Sidanius (1984) posits that only through cognitive traits such as tolerance
of ambiguity and complexity of thought, can a person defy the "modal pressure" and adopt non-
conformative, extreme ideological beliefs. Attributes such as ego strength and self-confidence
are also associated with individuals following an aberrant ideology (Sidanius, 1985). Extremists
are seen to be intellectually "stronger" than their moderate counterparts, since an extreme point
of view necessitates the intellectual ability to offer commanding, convincing arguments in
defence of their position (Durrheim, 1995, 1997, 1998). The concept of commitment plays an
important role in the adherence to extremist positions, as it is only through commitment and a
heightened investment in the ideology that people can defend their positions successfully.
Sidanius suggests that an increased level of experience and interest in a particular content
domain will result in an increased level of commitment in that field and thus he subscribes to an
experientially-based theory ofcommitment.
The instruments measuring cognitive functioning were a most effective part of this research.
Sidanius employed "active, direct and multiple tests of cognitive processing, rather than relying
solely on passive survey responses" (Ward, 1986, p. 142). These instruments researched
specifically the processing of information and the structure of cognition, thus enabling Sidanius
to separate content from structure. This separation removes the necessary relationship "between
either the content and style of a particular belief, or the content and extremeness of the belief'
(Durrheim, 1997, p. 638).
Since extremism is relative and any ideology can be rendered extreme in a given context, context
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theory has no interest in critiquing a specific ideology. The distance of any belief from the norm
depends on context. Context theory therefore focuses on individual rationality in either
conforming to or deviating from the social norm.
Because Sidanius has separated cognitive style and content, he is able to predict that individuals
may use the same cognitive style, e.g. intolerance of ambiguity, across different content domains,
but only in conformity with the prevailing norms of a specific context. An example would be if,
within a given context, it were the social norm for people,· to be politically conservative and
liberal in the religious domain.
Although Sidanius succeeded in distinguishing cognitive style from cognitive content, it was
Tetlock's work that moved away from a personality-based theorising over political cognition.
2.5.4 Value Pluralism Theory
2.5.4.1 Introduction
Tetlock's (1983a, 1983b, 1984; Tetlock & Mansfield, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989) value
pluralism theory postulates that two aspects influence political cognition: the specific beliefs
prevalent at the time, and both the ideological system and the context within which cognition
operates. Consequently he moves away from the notion of linking cognitive style with
generalised personality traits and underlying psychodynamic forces (Durrheim, 1997, 1998).
This enables him to acknowledge individual, intra-individual cross-content variability in
cognitive style, and reflects his most important contribution to the field (Durrheim, 1995, 1998).
Furthermore, this is congruent with his aim of developing a "value-neutral, value pluralism
theory which simply attempts to explain a functional relationship between value conflict and
cognitive coping responses" (Tetlock, 1994, p.524). His model is also a move away from
presuming causality between cognitive style and specific ideologies.
Tetlock (1986) rejects the notion that the content and structure of cognition should be studied
separately. According to him, incorrect conclusions can be reached when examining separately
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two concepts that are so closely related. In this respect he refers specifically to a theoretical
examination of the two aspects and proposes a contextualised examination of cognition
(Durrheim,1995).
It is important to understand the difference between Rokeach's and Tetlock's position on the
separation between cognitive content and structure. Both Rokeach and Tetlock stress the
importance of separating content from structure methodologically, i.e. they state that measuring
instruments should be designed in such a way that they do not measure content and style
simultaneously. For example, an item from the Budner scale (1960) requests a response to the
statement "We should all have the same ideas". Although it claims to measure personality, the
item is clearly loaded with political content and as such measures content and personality
simultaneously. Both Rokeach and Tetlock regard this type of measurement as problematic and
propose the use of an instrument that would make a clear distinction between these and that
would measure either cognitive content or cognitive structure.
Rokeach differs from Tetlock as far as the theor~tical interpretation of the findings is concerned.,
Rokeach states that cognitive style and cognitive content are theoretical independent and believes
that it is the underlying dynamics of extremism that would infonn the cognitive style, and not the
specific content of an ideological belief. In this respect he proposes that both extreme
conservatives and extreme liberals would use similar cognitive styles, whereas moderates would
use a different kind ofcognitive style. As such the content (liberal vs. conservative views) differ,
but the cognitive style remains the same.
Tetlock, on the other hand, insists that cognitive style is not independent of content and the two
should be examined together, as the content will infonn the cognitive style that is used. Intra-
individual variation is examined by looking at content together with style, since one type of
cognitive style may be used to defend a stance on a certain issue, such as national defence while
a different cognitive style may be used when arguing another issue, such as social welfare.
Ideology-by-issue content also needs to be considered in conjunction with cognitive style.
Cognitive strategies used in debates about the issues of tax and public health may differ from
those used in discussions about tax and national defence.
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Tetlock's theory views cognitive style in terms of integrative cognitive complexity, rather than in
terms of tolerance of ambiguity. Although the two concepts are very similar in nature, his stance
is more closely linked to the information-processing position of Schroder and colleagues (1967)
than to the psychodynamic personality approach (Durrheim, 1998).
Tetlock draws on the work of two authors for developing the two different subsections of his
theory, namely Rokeach's (1973, 1979) two-value analysis and Abelson's (1959) ideas on
cognitive miserliness.
2.5.4.2 Value Pluralism
The fIrst work that informs Tetlock's theory concerns the ideological system in which cognition
takes place and forms the basis of value pluralism. It is the two-value analysis that Rokeach
(1973, 1979) employs when examining political ideology and which attempts to explain the link
between cognitive style and political belief.
According to Rokeach, all the major 20th century ideologies differ in the importance they assign
to the core values of social equality and individual freedom. These two values are frequently in
conflict with each other as they often require opposing actions (Tetlock, 1984). For instance, in
order to improve the social welfare (to achieve greater social equality) personal tax may have to
be raised (which tampers with individual freedom).
Monistic or single-value ideologies have a clear prioritisation of the different values. In contrast,
pluralistic or multi-value ideologies acknowledge the conflict between different values (Rokeach,
1973, 1979). Rokeach's thinking suggests that contemporary extremist ideologies tend to be
monistic, while moderate ideologies are pluralistic. Socialism, for instance, is pluralistic as it
values both freedom and equality. Communism, on the other hand, values equality above
freedom and is therefore monistic (Tetlock, 1993). The value conflict that is activated in
pluralistic ideologies will be discussed in more detail under "Value Conflict".
Tetlock has refIned the work of Rokeach by attempting to develop a "more sophisticated
taxonomy of political ideologies than the simple left-right continuum" (Tetlock, 1983b, p.123).
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Predicted by this theory is that individuals use cognitive strategies according to the monistic or
pluralistic nature of their ideologies (Tetlock, 1984). Acco~ding to Tetlock individual thinking is
therefore constrained by the person's ideological orientation. Pluralistic ideologies, for instance,
entail the use of integrative complexity. Tetlock hypothesises a curvilinear relationship between
cognitive style and the ideologies of the political left-right continuum. He is, however, not
consistent about the prediction of this relationship, as will be seen below.
Research has suggested that the point of maximum integrative complexity is somewhat left-of-
centre on the liberalism-conservatism political continuum, as "this seems to be the point of
maximum value pluralism on a whole range of issues" (Tetlock, et al., 1985, p. 1237). He
proposes that these political belief systems are multidimensional in nature since they are
ambivalent about the absolute and relative importance they attach to different values within the
ideology. Furthermore, within one ideology intra-individual variations on different issues may
also occur. It is therefore not possible to link integrative complexity with one particular ideology,
as ideology-by-issue interactions affect the level of complexity or simplicity used by an
individual at a particular time. These matters will be dealt with again under "Value Conflict".
Although value conflict is related to the monistic or pluralistic nature ofpolitical ideologies, it is
also related to many other situational variables that are independent of political ideology
(Tetlock, 1993). Tetlock's assumptions about individual variability are drawn from the field of
social learning theory, which focuses on the influence of social processes and social dynamics on
cognitive style. Consequently it moves away from the link between cognitive style and ideology
and instead examines contextual influences, such as accountability.
The discussion that follows will first examine the value conflict related to pluralistic ideologies
and will then concentrate on accountability.
2.5.4.3 Value Conflict
Abelson's (1959) ideas on cognitive miserliness are used as a basis for value conflict theory.
Value conflict theory does not aim to explain the link between cognitive style and political
ideology, but rather concentrates on situational variations of cognitive style which is not related
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to any particular political ideology such as conservatism or liberalism.
Abelson proposed that people are "cognitive misers" who avoid mental exertion and unnecessary
cognitive work wherever possible. They will therefore opt to use simple or least-effort modes
when trying to resolve cognitive inconsistency or conflict. When two conflicting values are of
unequal strength it is easy to resort to simple cognitive strategies when addressing the issue.
However, "when the competing values are approximately equally ranked and ranked very highly
in the individual's value system", cognitive complexity is activated (Tetlock, 1986, p. 821).
Tetlock extends the work of Abelson by acknowledging the important influence of the context in
which cognitive strategies are utilised. He proposes that both value pluralism and in particular
value conflict activate complex cognitive strategies. "How people think depends in part on why
people think" (Tetlock, et al., 1989, p. 640).
Tetlock's model proposes that tension between the two terminal values of freedom and equality
is likely to lead to more integratively complex arguments. Both the regularity with which a
person encounters cognitive inconsistency and the complexity of the cognitive strategy used in
dealing with this inconsistency will be determined by the degree of value pluralism in the given
ideology (Tetlock, 1984). When the conflicting core values are not of equal importance, as in
single-value or monistic ideologies, it is viable to resort to simple, "black-white" strategies by
bolstering the prominence of the one and denying the importance of the other value. However,
in the case of pluralistic or multi-value ideologies, when core values are approximately matched
in importance, people have to employ more complex, multi-faceted strategies, such as
differentiation, integration or transcendence to reduce the conflict between the values (Tetlock,
1986). Cognitive complexity is therefore not a function of an individual's unique psychological
qualities, but of the nature ofthe ideology that the person supports (Durrheim, 1995).
Tetlock, however, cautions against the presumption that certain ideological groups would
necessarily always be more integratively complex than other groups regardless of the topic at
hand. He suggests "at the most abstract level. ..people are likely to think.. .in complex ways to
the degree that two or more approximately equally important values imply contradictory courses
ofaction" (Tetlock, 1984, p. 373).
29
The influence of the ideological system and broader context within which cognitive style
operates is an important factor to consider, because people do not operate in isolation from their
environment and the ideological system surrounding them (Tetlock, 1983a). "Cognitive
tendencies" interact with both interpersonal and environmentaVsocial aspects to influence the
way in which people make decisions and determine their position on issues (Tetlock, et a!.,
1989).
One such contextual factor that may influence people to use different cognitive strategies
according to the level of value conflict that it activates, is accountability. Accountability as used
in Tetlock's studies, refers to the need to justify one's views to others, particularly with regards to
controversial social issues (Tetlock, 1983a). In his research into accountability Tetlock (1983a;
Tetlock et al., 1989) found that, depending on the situation, people use different cognitive
strategies when they have to justify their opinions on controversial topics. Reasons for using the
different strategies range from cognitive miserliness to the protection of one's self-image or
social image (impression management). These aims could be achieved by using a whole range of
varying levels of integrative complexity.
When examining in more detail these changes in level of complexity, there seem to be three
important strategies that are used either on their own or in combination with each other. The first
option is to express views that they are confident will gain the approval of the audience. For
instance, when accountable to someone with known, well-defined liberal or conservative views,
subjects tend to rely on the "lazy" choice of acceptability heuristics. The latter presupposes that
the audience do not have advance knowledge of the subject's views and entails strategic shifting
ofopinions to match that of the audience (Tetlock, 1983a). This is a cognitive1y simple strategy.
However, when the views of an audience are not known, subjects often resort to pre-emptive
self-criticism by anticipating "a variety of potential. ..objections" (Tetlock, 1993, p. 399). The
strategies used to achieve this are more complex than those utilised by the cognitive miser, as the
individual must contemplate views that oppose or challenge their stances. Also, when
constrained by pre-commitment, subjects tend to use the strategy of retrospective rationality or
defensive bolstering, where they generate thoughts that justify their position to the audience
concerned (Tetlock, et al., 1989). Again, in attempting to achieve this, people may resort to more
complex cognitive strategies than the cognitive miser, as they may have to develop convincing
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arguments that could challenge the use of a simplistic or rigid cognitive style.
Tetlock's work on cognitive processing under uncertainty and value conflict is of particular
importance for the present study. Both this and the work of Billig are used to move towards a
new understanding ofcomplex research findings in the field ofcognitive style.
The reason for such a move is found in the work of Durrheim (1995, 1998; Durrheim & Foster,
1997). For a better understanding of the shortcomings of preceding theories, Durrheim's
findings are mentioned very briefly, followed by a discussion of why none of the four earlier
theories could give a satisfactory explanation of the results.
2.6 Critique of the four theories
The results of Durrheim's studies (1995, 1998; Durrheim & Foster, 1997) yielded multiple
individual patterns of cross-cultural and cross-content variability. No isomorphic or invariant
relationship was found between cognitive style and ideological belief across different content
domains (i.e. religion and politics). The content domain appeared to influence both the
strength and direction of the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs. His
findings reiterate that cognitive style and in particular tolerance of ambiguity should not be
seen as a stable, generalised personality trait. Furthermore, cross-cultural variability was also
apparent in the results, suggesting that contextual and social factors mediate' the relationship
between cognitive content and structure. Another important finding was that of a variable
relationship between ideological commitment and ideological beliefs across content domain.
None ofthe four theories reviewed above was able to adequately explain the complex pattern of
variability in his findings.
Cross-content variability in ambiguity tolerance was evident in the fact that subjects had made
a clear distinction between and evaluated differently the various content or authority domains
(i.e. familial, religious and political). Factor analysis suggested that subjects expressed
different levels of tolerance of ambiguity across content domain.
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Ideological commitment was not found to be associated consistently with ideological
orientation across different content domains. Whereas a relationship was evident between
commitment and the political domain, such a relationship did not exist in the religious content
domain.
The first objection to the previous theories is the view of cognitive style as a stable, generalised
personality trait. This assumes that individual expressions. are dependent on factors located
purely within the individual and as such the influence of context would be disregarded or
dismissed.
Authoritarianism, extremism, and context theory all support this view and propose that cognitive
style has a single dimension that manifest in an invariant relationship across all content domains.
None of these can therefore explain the variability across content domain that was observed in
Durrheim's studies. Furthermore, both authoritarianism and extremism propose a close link
between specific ideologies and cognitive style. This link was not evidenced in Durrheim's
fmdings.
Tetlock is not consistent about the nature of the relationship between cognitive style and
cognitive content. He alternates between regarding cognitive style as a personality trait and on
the contrary proposing cross-content variability in cognitive complexity. In terms of the value
pluralism section of his theory, he cannot offer a valid explanation for the varying relationships.
However, he is better able to explain this in terms of conflict between different core values, but
this has limited explanatory power, because the authorities in Durrheim's AAT scale do not
necessarily evoke such conflict (Durrheim, 1995). His later work, specifically that on
accountability, is still better able to explain the results. But on its own it remains an incomplete
explanation.
A second criticism is linked to the first and deals with the direction of the relationship between
cognitive style and cognitive content as predicted by each theory. The theory of authoritarianism
proposes a direct negative relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological
conservatism, where very conservative subjects would be more intolerant of ambiguity than
liberal subjects. The theory of extremism hypothesises a curvilinear, n-shaped relationship
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between ambiguity tolerance and ideological radicalism-conservatism, with extremists being less
tolerant of ambiguity than moderates. Context theory anticipates a curvi-linear, v-shaped
relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and radicalism-conservatism, with extremists on
both ends of the spectrum displaying greater tolerance of ambiguity, political sophistication and
ideological interest and commitment (Durrheim, 1995).
Tetlock vacillates between regarding cognitive style as personality trait and proposing cross-
content variability in cognitive complexity. The former is illustrated by his postulate that
individuals have a characteristic cognitive style as determined by their monistic/pluralistic
ideological orientation (value pluralism). Value pluralism predicts an n-shaped curvilinear
relationship between integrative complexity and radicalism-conservatism. The latter position is
reflected in his proposition that the relationship between cognitive style and cognitive content is
dependent on the particular contents under cognition (value conflict). Value conflict, on the other
hand, anticipates a variable relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs over
issues where different values are drawn into conflict (Durrheim, 1995). None of these
predictions, including those of value conflict, were consistently compatible with the findings in
the studies done by Durrheim.
A third criticism concerns the underlying reasons for the existence of a relationship between
cognitive style and cogntive content. Authoritarianism, extremism and context theory provide
psychodynamic explanations for this relationship. While Adorno and colleagues attribute it to
defences emanating from a deep-seated emotional ambivalence, Rokeach proposes that it
stems more from an ideological commitment satisfying a need for submission to an ultimate
authority.
Sidanius also emphasises the issue of ideological commitment, but differently so than
Rokeach. He postulates that extremists on both ends of the continuum would have to be more
tolerant of ambiguity to have chosen non-conformist stances. They would also need to offer
more sophisticated arguments in defence of their own views, and consequently would exhibit
more ideological commitment than would moderates. As such he proposes an experientially
based theory rather than a psychodynamic account of commitment (Durrheim, 1995).
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A psychodynamically based emotional ambivalence would manifest in an invariant relationship
between cognitive content and style, a phenomenon that was not observed in Durrheim's studies.
Furthermore, both Rokeach and Sidanius are found to be incorrect in their assumption that
ideological commitment would mediate this relationship across all content domains. This was
illustrated in the fact that such a relationship was found only in the political, and not in the
religious domain (Durrheim, 1995, 1998).
Tetlock differs from all three of the above as he focuses more on contextual factors influencing
cognitive style. Even when he treats cognitive style as a personality trait, he does not offer a
psychodynamic explanation. Furthermore, he does not suggest that ideological commitment
would mediate the relationship between cognitive style and ideological belief. In this sense he
has a more convincing explanation, but his suggestion of cognitive style as personality trait
remains problematic (Durrheim, 1995).
The separation of cognitive content from cognitive style is another area of criticism.
Authoritarianism examines content and style together, both on a theoretical and a methodological
level. Since such methodology leads to confusion about which construct is measured it leads to
problematic interpretations. Both extremism and context theory sever the two methodologically
and theoretically, whereas Tetlock's theory proposes that they be separated methodologically but
not theoretically. The individual cross-content variability that was found in Durrheim's work
suggests that the content and structure of cognition are closely linked and as such should not
be severed theoretically. This is in line only with Tetlock's stance regarding the relationship
between these two components of cognition (Durrheim, 1995).
From the above discussion it is clear that all theories, to a greater or lesser extent were unable
to interpret the findings effectively.
In the quest for a more adequate theoretical understanding, Durrheim turned to some of the
ideas of Billig (1985, 1988), and suggested that these ideas be merged with Tetlock's ideas on
value conflict. On the basis of this suggestion he proposed a different interpretation.
Durrheim (1995, 1998; Durrheim & Foster, 1997) postulates that the variable relationship
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between cognitive style and ideological content stems from contextual and social factors
resulting in certain content domains having differential meanings for subjects in the
ideologically-charged context of the study. Not only did the various content domains present
different levels of value conflict to the various cultural groups represented in the studies; intra-
individual variations also occurred. These differential meanings and levels of value conflict
impacted on the style that subject had used to evaluate the different domains of authority.
For a better understanding of Durrheim's proposal the relevant aspects of Billig's work will be
discussed below, after which the way towards a new understanding will follow.
2.7 Billig (on Audience Effect and Value Conflict)
The rhetorical approach as seen, for instance, in the dialogical theory of Billig (1985, 1996;
Billig, et aI., 1988) emphasises the importance of the context in which cognition takes place, and
in particular the social relations that function in a given context. Cognitive style is seen to
emerge from these contextual interactions and as such the approach focuses on the social nature
of cognition. As such it shifts the focus away from locating cognitive style within the individual
as part of personality and towards social and contextual factors impacting on the person's use of
a particular cognitive style.
Within this broader rhetorical approach, Billig's dialogical theory proposes a move from a
monologic to a dialogic approach where the emphasis falls on the social context of culture. He
argues that attitudes are essentially controversial in nature. They are either shared - or not
shared - by others who, in the case of the latter, present an oppositional stance on the matter in
question. In order to determine their own position on these controversies, people need to use
their argumentative skills that form an integral part of thinking (Billig, 1987, 1988). In their
considerations ofthese matters they argue explicitly or implicitly, with other people or through
silent self-argumentation (Billig, 1996).
Apart from an individual personality people also have social identities that are inextricably
bound with the context in which they operate at the time. Arguing one's position is detennined
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to a large extent by the audience of that context. Attitudes can therefore not be seen solely as
singular statements reflecting individual personality traits. On the contrary, they are rhetorically
complex (Billig, 1985, 1987, 1988).
Billig (1996) states that if orators want to persuade an audience they need to have an
understanding of how their audience thinks and what its opinions (prejudices) are. Within
this context they should then "try to slide their controversial views into categories which are
familiar and well-valued by the audience" (p. 224). By highlighting common ground between
them and their audience they stress communal links with the audience. This idea could also be
broadened to the everyday general social context within which people operate and in which
they air their views.
Billig (1996) agrees with Cialdini and colleagues (1976) when they state that people may choose
to express their views in an uncompromising, one-sided and unqualified way when they are
confronted by opposing views on matters that are very important to them and about which they
feel strongly. In accordance with Tetlock's views, Cialdini et al. (1973) focus on accountability
and postulate that each audience has special interests to which the individual needs to adapt.
They also agree that individuals have a situational identity that is fluid and changing across
context. Billig endorses these ideas.
This concept of social, contextual identity can further aid the understanding of individual
behaviour (and cognition) in different situations, as changes in rhetorical context and audience
will generate shifts in the expression of opinions. It is therefore possible that certain arguments
may be used with one audience and an entirely different, contradictory set of arguments with
another audience (Billig, et aI., 1988). An example would be a middle-aged parent who has a
radical argument with their parents, and later on has a conservative discussion with their own
children. Another example would be where Mugabe encourages war veterans to take over the
farms of white farmers in a pre-election bid, and then promises the commonwealth that
elections will be conducted within the rule of law.
People may therefore at times seem to contradict themselves or to alter their positions entirely.
Not only that, their behaviour and attitudes could also contradict each other at times. An
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example here would be a racist who deals with a specific black person in a tolerant manner.
A rhetorical approach investigates the circumstances in which one set of arguments is more
likely to be activated than another and as such focuses on issues relating to the fluid nature of
thought (Billig, 1987, 1988, 1996; Billig et aI., 1988).
Changes in the rhetorical context will result in different expressions of attitudes, and will alter
according to the changes in the context of controversy. Social norms, for instance, which is a
very important contextual factor, vary from context to context. Billig, however, does not
regard them only as contextual or external to an individual (1985, 1988). Instead, these social
norms need to be internalised by the individual to form part of the individual's belief system
otherwise they would not operate as social pressures (Billig, 1996). In this way
"cognitive/ideological contents and situation are, at once, both internal and external to the
individual"(Durrheim, 1995, p. 93).
Central to Billig's work is the concept ofvalue or cognitive conflict that influences the use of a
particular cognitive style. According to him "values comprise a small number of core ideas or
cognitions present in every society about desirable end-states" (Billig, 1996, p. 239). Despite
a general understanding about common values these values can also be the source of
controversy. The main potential for controversy emanates from two sources. Billig (1996)
states that "there may be disputes about the interpretation of a value or there may be
controversy about which value is appropriate to the case in hand" (p. 240). This multiplicity
of values and the conflict between them underlie the dilemmas that people face in the
practicality of daily living when they are confronted with making choices.
As such, value conflict is rooted in context and different contexts can activate different levels
of value conflict with regards to different content domains. For instance, the values of a
particular group may influence an individual's expression of tolerance (or intolerance) of
ambiguity. People may have to select "counter-themes" of common sense (or socially shared
beliefs) in order to present an idea in a specific way (Billig, et al., 1988). A conservative person
in a liberal context may express their views more ambiguously than in the presence of other
conservatives and use "contrary themes" in their arguments. This may result in them using
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more flexible cognitive strategies manifesting in higher levels of expressed tolerance of
ambiguity. This complex interaction of different principles causes the value conflict
experienced by an individual.
This idea of value conflict requiring the utilisation of more complex and flexible cognitive
strategies and inducing higher levels of tolerance of ambiguity is crucial for a more
comprehensive understanding of cross content and cross context variability in cognitive style.
Billig's views also suggest that a relationship between cognitive content and style does exist,
as content will influence the style that is used at the time.
The context of cognitive style in which individuals give their opinion either in the form of
persuasion or criticism is innately evaluative and emotive. This is especially true when an
individual is expressing opinions that deviate from the norms of the given (cultural) context.
Not only do social norms "locate one in a culture" they also place restraints on "the
organisation of the self' (Durrheim, 1995, p. 96).
Cognitive style associated with ambivalent and unambivalent categorisations is also seen by
Billig as evaluative and emotive in nature. However, he differs from Frenkel-Brunswik who
holds that the evaluative and emotive elements stem from underlying psychodynamic processes
(Durrheim, 1995). Instead he proposes that they emanate from the social interactions, norms and
arguments specific to the context at hand (Billig, 1988, 1996).
In the above discussion it has become clear that there are many commonalities between the ideas
of Tetlock and those ofBillig. The argument for the proposed merger between these will begin
with a brief statement about the congruences and differences between them, followed by a
proposal for their synthesis.
2.8 Towards a new understanding: Contextual Value Conflict
According to Durrheirn (1995), the rhetorical approach may provide "an appropriate structural
and relational model for studying the dynamic features of cognition" (p.119). It facilitates the
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conception of structure as being in relation to societal needs.
For a more comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding his results, Durrheim
suggested that Tetlock's ideas should be combined with those of Billig, as this combination may
fill the void that currently exists.
Billig agrees with Tetlock on the concept of value conflict, but proposes a broader approach to
value conflict than that of Tetlock. Rather than focusing on the monistic/pluralistic nature of
ideologies that activate conflict between different values, he embraces a wider contextual
influence in which the social interactions between people within a given context plays an
important facilitating role.
Durrheim emphasises the importance of social norms and values inherent in a particular
context. The moment individuals hold ideas that are non-normative or contrary to the norms,
they experience higher levels of value conflict, which in turn lead to using more complex and
flexible cognitive style strategies (Durrheim, 1995, 1998).
Tetlock's more recent work on accountability has more in common with Billig's ideas, as it
moves away from implying that the nature of the ideology (monistic/pluralistic) that a person
follows will determine their cognitive style strategies. However, it still recognises that a
monistic/pluralistic context can influence a person's use of cognitive style. For instance, if an
individual holds monistic views in a pluralistic context they will experience higher levels of
value conflict and therefore will need to be more tolerant of ambiguity in thinking about the
relevant issues than they would be in a monistic context. As such it also gives attention to the
actual impact that institutions and ideologies have on cognitive style and cognitive content.
Billig's ideas on audience effect are, to a certain extent similar to those of Tetlock's on
accountability, as cognitive style is influenced by the views of others in the context at hand.
However, Billig does not entertain the idea ofpeople being cognitive misers, and in this regard
he differs from Tetlock.
Durrheim suggests that by combining the ideas of these two authors tolerance of ambiguity
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becomes a cognitive manifestation of contextual value conflict. Tolerance of ambiguity can
therefore be seen as performance in context rather than a reflection of an innate personality
trait. If, as mentioned above, others whose views they endorse (e.g. Cialdini, et al., 1976), are
considered, the complexity of social and psychological reality is acknowledged. By
extending the concept of value conflict to that of contextual value conflict the importance of
social and contextual aspects impacting on individuals is also emphasised. This stance also
rejects one-dimensional understandings of the behaviour or cognitions of people in a given
context.
How this may manifest in a practical sense can be illustrated by looking to an historical moment
in time. A very good example of an ideologically monistic context would be that of the
Nuremberg rally where crowds of Nazi supporters were listening to the propagandistic speeches
delivered by Hitler. In this context, card-carrying members who accepted his views would not
have experienced value conflict, as their views would have been congruent with those that Hitler
was expressing. Because their views were not challenged but "confirmed" they would have been
intolerant of ambiguity in that context. However, other people in the audience, who were not
accepting ofHitler's values and who had serious misgivings about these would have experienced
a great deal ofvalue/cognitive conflict. Their views would have been challenged by the content
of his speeches, as well as by the support from the crowds. This would have activated high
levels of value conflict for them, and in order to deal with this effectively, they would have
resorted to using more flexible and complex cognitive styles by being more tolerant of
ambiguity.
Not only does this example illustrate Tetlock's original ideas of value conflict stemming from
monistic ideologies. It also illustrates the value conflict induced by the situation or context and
the norms or values prevalent in the given context. Even if the context did not provide the
opportunity to argue the matters hand there and then, the value conflict experienced there may
have evoked silent inner self-argumentation.
One of the major difficulties with accountability is that Tetlock would like to quantify it. At
present there is no way of determining this and the question of how to do so remains
unanswered at this point in time. A further question is how to quantify the level of contextual
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value conflict present in a particular context. The inability to do this currently leads to post-
hoc explanations, which is the most serious shortfall of this study. This aspect will be
discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
It was anticipated that the fmdings in the present study might follow the trend seen in
Durrheim's studies. The new understanding would be used to explain the findings of the
present study. As a conclusion to this chapter the expectations for the studies undertaken by
the researcher are briefly mentioned.
2.9 Expectations for the current study
If cognitive style is a personality trait it could be generalised to all content domains and would
show stability across context and content. However, if Tetlock and Billig were correct in their
assumption that it is not, both content and context would influence the use of a particular
cognitive style, which in turn would result in variability in cognitive style.
It was anticipated that both cross-content and cross-context variability in tolerance of
ambiguity would occur. It was thus expected that no single relation between cognitive content
and style would exist once content domain was considered. In the two studies undertaken by the
researcher cross-context variability could be examined closely, as the context was specifically
manipulated in order to determine more accurately its influence on cognitive style. Cross-
cultural variability was also anticipated. However, this could not be examined, as - contrary to
expectations - both sample groups turned out to be homogenous.
It was expected that the contextual nature of value conflict would tend to suggest that in
situations where there is high value conflict between contextual norms and personal beliefs,
higher degrees of tolerance of ambiguity would be expressed. In contrast, where personal and
contextual values are the same, subjects would be more intolerant of ambiguity (i.e. have either
just positive or just negative evaluations ofthe authorities in question).
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The expectations for the university study will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 and those
of the church study will follow in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
STUDY 1: THE UNIVERSITY STUDY
3.1 Objectives and Expectations
In general the study was designed mainly to investigate the stability versus the variability of
tolerance of ambiguity across different contexts in an attempt to critique the notion of cognitive
style being a personality trait.
Another objective was to examine the stability versus the variability of tolerance of ambiguity
across content domain. The proposition for this study is one of support for variability, which
would strengthen the opposition to a personality-based view ofcognitive style.
This study also examined the existence of a relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and
ideological belief and the nature of such a relationship. This was done in order to oppose the
contention that a direct, isomorphic relationship between these two exists. The alternative
proposition is that a variable relationship is evident, especially once content domain is
considered.
Another question was whether ideological commitment plays a consistent mediating role
between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological belief across all content domains. Support was
sought for the idea that ideological commitment plays a role only in certain content domains.
The first expectation is that no single relation between cognitive style and cognitive content
would be found across context. It is anticipated that the same individuals will express different
levels of ambiguity tolerance in two different contexts, therefore supporting the view that this
construct can no longer be seen as a stable personality trait. The anticipated variability is
predicted on the basis that the different contexts would present subjects with different levels of
value conflict, which in turn would influence their expression of tolerancelintolerance of
ambiguity. The higher the hypothesised value conflict between personal and contextual values
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in the particular situation, the higher would be the degree of tolerance of ambiguity expressed.
The lower the value conflict between personal beliefs and contextual norms in a specific
context, the lower would be the degree of tolerance of ambiguity evident.
Another expectation is that no single relation between cognitive content and style would exist
once content domain is considered. It is thus anticipated that expressions of tolerance of
ambiguity would vary across content domain. This is again predicted on the basis that different
content domains might hold different levels of value conflict for subjects, hence differences in
expressed levels of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. Tolerance of ambiguity in the political
domain, therefore, would differ from tolerance of ambiguity in the religious domain according to
the level of value conflict presented by the particular content domain. Higher levels of value
conflict in a particular content domain would manifest once again in higher degrees of tolerance
of ambiguity, but high levels of value conflict in one content domain would not necessarily be
associated with high levels ofvalue conflict in another domain.
A further expectation is that no single correlation would be evident between ideological
conservatism, ideological commitment and tolerance of ambiguity once content domain is
considered. It is foreseen that the mediating role of ideological commitment might be evident in
one content domain, but not necessarily in another.
It is predicted that all these variations that may occur would be related to the level of value
conflict that subjects would experience in a given situation. It is assumed that the two
different situations or contexts in which data was collected (i.e. that of rag and that of Bible
study) would present different levels of value conflict to different subjects. If the norms of a
given situation confirmed their beliefs in a particular content domain, they would experience
less conflict and therefore would be less tolerant of ambiguity. However, if the situation
challenged their beliefs regarding a particular content domain, they would experience more
value conflict and therefore express more tolerance of ambiguity towards that content domain.
For instance, if people were politically liberal and found themselves in a politically
conservative context, they would experience higher value conflict and therefore more
tolerance of ambiguity in that situation than would a politically conservative person in the
same context. It is also possible that the same person who is politically liberal may be
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conservative as far as religion is concerned. Therefore, not only are inter-individual
differences predicted; intra-individual differences are also foreseen.




The sample was selected from first year residential students who were registered at the
Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike Hoer Onderwys during 1998. The same sample
had to complete slightly different questionnaires in two different contexts. Of the initial 150
questionnaires handed out, only 104 could be used. Factors influencing the exclusion of some
questionnaires were (1) missing values in one or both questionnaires, (2) incomplete sections
in either of the questionnaires, but mainly (3) the absence of some individuals from the second
administration. Reasons for the absence varied from illness to the de-registration of some
students from the university between the first and second administration. All the
questionnaires completed in the first context were scored. It was evident that there were no
differences of any consequence in response between the first questionnaires of the participants
that only completed the first questionnaire, and those who completed both questionnaires. This
provides the justification that exclusion of certain questionnaires did not bias the results.
One of the main reasons for choosing this particular sample was that subjects could be
accessed in both contexts by utilising existing structures in the residential set-up at the
university. Activities for first years in this setting are "regulated" in the sense that participation
in preparation for rag is a compulsory activity. Furthermore, (religious) first year students also
attend structured Bible study in small groups (cell groups) in their residences once a week.
The cell leaders are second or third year students. The other reason was that it was anticipated
- on the basis of commonly-held beliefs and perceptions about the nature of this university -
that this sample would be more conservative than the sample used in the church study, and that
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this contrast could potentially yield varied and interesting results (see Chapter 4 for reasons for
this assumption).
The final sample was homogenous, consisting of 104 white subjects (80 females and 24 males),
with ages ranging between 18 and 21 (mean age = 18.25). All but six (English-speaking)
subjects were Afrikaans-speaking.
3.2.2 Context
The main thrust of the study was to investigate cross-context variations in expressions of
tolerance of ambiguity. In order to achieve this, the context was manipulated across the two
different sections of the study. The two different situations that were used were (1) at several
residences where students were busy building rag floats and (2) at the same residences in cell
groups immediately after Bible study.
The contexts were thus chosen to represent an overtly "ideological" context and another more
"neutral" context in which different dynamics would be evident and in which different levels of
value conflict would emerge. This was done, as already stated, in order to determine whether
different contexts would influence expressions of attitudinal ambiguity tolerance. It was
assumed that the religious forum of Bible study represented an overtly ideological context,
whereas the context of preparations for rag could be used as a more neutral context. These two
different contexts were anticipated to present subjects with different levels of value conflict in
the different content domains, which would lead to subjects expressing various levels of
tolerance / intolerance of ambiguity across the different contexts.
It is important to consider this university within the wider context of the new South Africa.
Traditionally it has been one of the most conservative universities in South Africa. It is the only
university that explicitly states that it follows a Christian-based approach, as reflected in its name
(Christelike Hoer Onderwys translates as Christian Higher Education). The social perception is
therefore that it endorses conservative values as far as both religion and politics are concerned.
This was anticipated to stand in contrast to the environment of the church study discussed in
Chapter 4, which is regarded socially to provide a much more liberal context.
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It was anticipated that, in the more overtly "ideological" context (i.e. during Bible study), high
levels of intolerance of ambiguity would be exhibited by those subjects whose views are in line
with those of the ideology. However, in the more "neutral" context (i.e. during preparations for
rag) it was predicted that these subjects would be more tolerant ofambiguity as their views might
be challenged by the norms of that context.
Subtle racism, authoritarianism and conservatism were used as indices to investigate ideological
belief/ideological conservatism, while various authority figures in different content domains (i.e.
familial, political and religious) were used to investigate cross-content variability in the AAT
scale. Subjects scoring high on subtle racism are expected to experience higher levels of value
conflict with regards to political authorities than religious authorities, while the opposite
would be true for highly religious subjects.
The prediction is that highly religious people would experience higher levels of value conflict
towards Christian authorities in the laissez faire context of rag, as the different contextual
norms might challenge their beliefs. Furthermore, in the context of rag, religious subjects
might be more tolerant of ambiguity towards non-Christian authorities, as accountability
towards others with different views might further increase the level of contextual value
conflict. For the same reasons politically conservative, as well as highly authoritarian
individuals, might experience more value conflict at rag towards liberal political authorities.
3.2.3 Procedure
The same sample completed a slightly different questionnaire (see Appendices A, B, C and D) in
two different contexts. Both questionnaires were available in Afrikaans and English, hence four
appendices (see "Measures" for a discussion of the translation). The translated versions are
given only for the questionnaires used in the university study as they are essentially the same as
those used for the church study.
In order to reduce the influence ofcarry over effects the two questionnaires were administered 16
weeks apart. Furthermore, the one scale (AAT) that was used in both questionnaires was
shortened on the second occasion. The reason for using a shortened version of the AAT scale
47
was to maximise the response rate.
The subjects were requested to provide their names for the purpose of matching the two
questionnaires. Due to the lack of anonymity, assurance of complete confidentiality was given to
subjects on both occasions. This was given both verbally by the researcher and her assistants, and
in a covering paragraph at the beginning of both questionnaires which stated that only the
researcher would have access to the information in the questionnaires.
The first questionnaire was completed voluntarily during preparation for rag (specifically during
the building of rag floats). The atmosphere was kept informal (e.g. music was playing in the
background) and students were in a relaxed mood, seemingly unconcerned with outside
pressures. Subjects were informed that the purpose of the study was to determine their personal
and social beliefs and opinions regarding a number of issues. A request was made for them not
to discuss their responses with other students and to complete the questionnaire without
pondering too much on each question. The average time to complete the questionnaires ranged
between 25 and 35 minutes. The researcher was present throughout the completion of the first
questionnaire, and procedures were standardised. The following measures were included in the
first questionnaire: socio-demographic variables, the Religiosity Scale, the Political Interest
Scale, the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance (AAT) Scale (45 items) and the Right-Wing
Authoritarian Scale (RWA).
The second questionnaire was completed voluntarily in the different Bible study cell groups. Cell
group leaders were used as research assistants for the administration and collection of
questionnaires at the end of one such meeting. Subjects returned the questionnaires to research
assistants in sealed envelopes in order to ensure confidentiality. They were also again assured of
confidentiality both verbally and in a covering paragraph at the beginning of each questionnaire.
The following measures were included in the second questionnaire: name and surname (for
matching proposes), a shortened version ofthe Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance (AAT) scale (36
items), the Subtle Racism Scale and the Conservatism Scale.
The researcher briefed her assistants (i.e. Bible study cell group leaders) beforehand and gave
clear instructions on standardised procedures to be followed. The importance of following these
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procedures was emphasised strongly. Although the researcher herself was not present during the
completion of the second questionnaires, feedback given by research assistants suggested that
standardised procedures had been followed.
3.3 Measures
The measures used in the questionnaires were based on those used in Durrheim's (1995) study,
since both the university and the church studies were extending his research and thus required
comparability with earlier results.
Both questionnaires were available in Afrikaans and English. The translation was done by the
researcher whose home language is Afrikaans and who is fully bilingual and therefore able to
capture the necessary nuances in translation. The translation was checked for accuracy by a
qualified, practising translator before the questionnaires were administered. Problems that were
experienced and uncertainties about some aspects ofthe translation were then sorted out.
Questionnaires consisted of a number of socio-demographic items as well as psychometric
scales, which measured different constructs of tolerance of ambiguity, ideological beliefs and
ideological commitment. Socio-demographic items collected background information on each
subject, including political party preference, age, etc.
3.3.1 Socio-demographic variables
Although other variables, such as year and field of study, etc. were asked in the first
questionnaire, only the following socio-demographic variables were used for descriptive and
explanatory purposes (see Appendices A and C, Section 1 and Section 2, questions 1 - 4):
1. Sex (coded male and female).
2. Age (in years).
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3. Political party preference (coded as New National Party, African National
Congress, Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, Inkatha Freedom Party, South African
Communist Party, Democratic Party, Azanian People's Organisation,
Conservative Party, Pan African Congress, Freedom Front, United Democratic
Movement and Other). Subjects were requested to indicate which party they were
"most likely" to support, and which party they were "least likely" to support.
4. Population group (coded as Black, White, Indian, Asian and Other - specify).
5. Home Language (coded as Afrikaans, English, Oriental language, Sotho - with
sub-categories Southern Sotho, Tswana and Northern Sotho/Pedi; Nguni - with
sub-categories Swazi, Ndebele, Xhosa and Zulu; Shangaan/Tsonga,
Venda/Lembe and Other - specify).
6. Self-ranked liberalism-conservatism (coded on a 7-point scale ranging from "very
liberal" [1] to "very conservative [7]).
Since the university has been opened to all races the researcher had anticipated that the sample
would be more representative of the broader society in terms of both population group and
language. However, this was not the case. A reason for this may be a lack of integration in
residences, a fact that underscored the conservative nature ofthe institution.
3.3.2 Ideological Conservatism
Since the measures of ideological conservatism were designed for use in the pre-democratic
South Africa, it was essential to closely investigate the psychometric properties of the scales
before they were used to test substantive hypotheses. Each measure was first factor analysed to
assess dimensionality. When responses to the scales were manifestly multidimensional,
subscales were constructed by summing the unweighted scores of all scale items that loaded
greater than Aa on each of the factors. Item total correlations were used to eliminate poor
items. Cronbach alpha coefficients were then calculated for each subscale to confirm the
internal consistency of the measures. These measures included the Subtle Racism Scale, the
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Right Wing Authoritarian Scale, the Conservatism Scale and a Self-Rating Scale.
3.3.2.1 Subtle Racism
Scores on the lO-item version of the Duckitt's (1991) Subtle Racism scale were submitted to
principal components factor analysis (see Appendices Band D, section 3 for the scale).
Although there were three factors with eigenvalues greater than one, the scree test indicated
that two factors could provide the most parsimonious solution. These factors - explaining
32.2 and 14.3 percentage of the total variance respectively - were rotated by the varimax
method, yielding the solution reported in Table 3.1. An inspection of the item content of the
two factors suggested that the first factor be named equality, and the second factor be named
political and economic control. The items that make up the equality factor concern issues
about how race groups should be treated. Public support for unequal treatment is taboo in
contemporary South African society. The items in the second factor are more concerned with
opinions about fairness as well as economic and political control. Social sanction (or the lack
thereof) regarding the latter factor seems more contested.
Table 3.1. Factor solution for the Subtle Racism Scale.
Item
Equality Control Communality
I. Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to .62 .40
perform as well as whites in any field.
2. It would be unfair if greater expenditure on black education were to be .75 .57
funded by the white taxpayer.
3. Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule .57 .40
could result in a stable, prosperous and democratic South Africa.
4. Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee .75 .57
social peace in this country.
5. The large-scale extension of political rights to blacks will inevitably lead .68 .49
to chaos.
6. The wealth of this country is almost entirely due to the hard work and .73 .55
leadership of the whites.
7. Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the .64 .53
stable development of the country that whites retain political control.
8. It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable .35 .13
division of wealth in this country.
9. If all races were permitted to mix freely they would probably live in .69 .51
peace.
10. It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not .59 .39 .51
be allowed.
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The items that loaded on each factor were then subjected to reliability analysis. Item 8 was
found to have a low item-total correlation with the equality factor and was eliminated. The
remaining five items had a Cronbach alpha coefficient of .71. The 4 items of the Control
subscale had a Cronbach alpha of .72. Item 10 was eliminated due to its low item-total
correlation with the control factor. The unweighted sum of the items was used as indices of
SR Control and SR Equal. A 9-point Likert-type scale, rated from 0 - 8, was used for all- -
items. The scores on S~Equal range from a lower limit of 0 (low subtle racism, equality) to an
upper limit of 40 (high subtle racism, equality). The scores on SR_Control range from a lower
limit of 0 (low subtle racism, control) to an upper limit of 32 (high subtle racism, control).
Two possible reasons for the two-dimensional nature of the subtle racism scale is hypothesised.
Firstly, due to the changes in the country (post apartheid) the consciousness and nature of
ideologies may have changed. Clearer differentiation between concepts within an ideology may
result in these becoming multi-dimensional. A second possibility is that, because the scales were
developed in the pre-democratic South Africa they are no longer valid. It must be emphasised
that the size of the sample was too small for any conclusive statements to be made. It is
suggested that future studies investigate the validity again to clarify this matter.
3.3.2.2 Right Wing Authoritarianism
Scores on the 14-item RWA scale (Duckitt, 1990) were submitted to principal components
factor analysis (see Appendices A and C, Section 5 for the scale). By means of the scree test,
three factors were extracted explaining 20%, 15%, and 10% of the total variance respectively.
The factors were rotated orthogonally by the varimax transformation, to yield the factor
structure reported in Table 3.2. The table reflects only loadings above .30. The items with
loadings stronger than 040 on each factor were then further analysed to determine whether their
shared intercorrelations were sufficient to consider the three factors reliable measures. The
internal consistency of Factor 2 (a= .52) and Factor 3 (a= 040) was unacceptably low. After
item 12 was dropped from Factor 1, the remaining 5 items had an internal consistency of a =
.70. The unweighted sum of these items was used as an index of authoritarianism. A 9-point
Likert-type scale, rated from 0 - 8, was used for all items. The scores range from a lower limit
of 0 (low authoritarianism) to an upper limit of 40 (high authoritarianism).
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Table 3.2. Factor solution for the RWA Scale.
Item F 1 F2 F3 Com
1. It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and .38 .25
religion, than to listen to the noisy rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create
doubt in people's minds.
.312. There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody being a homosexual. .49
3. The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we .55 .49
have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save
our moral standards and preserve law and order.
4. "Free speech" means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write .58 .37
books urging the overthrow of the government.
5. In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when .64 .42
dealing with agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up.
6. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get .64 .45
over them and settle down.
7. It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas are the .56 .52
lifeblood of progressive change.
8. The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the communists and their kind, who are .69 .57
out to destroy religion, ridicule patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine
our whole way of life.
9. The way things are going in this country, it is going to take a lot of "strong medicine" .72 .67
to straiten out the troublemakers, criminals and perverts.
10. It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants. .78 .64
11. Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past, which .37 .16
we should question very thoroughly before accepting.
12. Once the government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in .50 .46
our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stamp out the rot that is
poisoning our country from within.
13. The self-righteous "forces oflaw and order" threaten freedom in our country a lot .65 .46
more than most of the groups they claim are "radical" and "godless".
14. Students in high school and at university must be encouraged to challenge their .70 .51
parents' ways, confront established authorities, and in general criticise the customs and
traditions of our society.
3.3.2.3 Conservatism
Scores on the 32-item South African Conservatism scale (Durrheim & Foster, 1997) were
submitted to principal components factor analysis (see Appendices B and D, section 4 for the
scale). Three factors - explaining 11.6%, 7.7%, and 6.4% of the variance respectively _
were extracted on the basis of the scree plot. The factors were rotated both obliquely and
orthogonally in an attempt to achieve simple structure. The varimax solution was retained as
the final factor structure (see Table 3.3). The items with loadings stronger than .40 on each
factor were analysed to determine the internal consistency of each factor. The internal
consistency of Factor 1 (a = .71) was acceptable, while reliability of Factor 2 (a = .17) and
Factor 3 (a = .18) was unacceptably low. Unweighted sum of scores for tl;J.e items of Factor 1
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was used as a general index of conservatism. A 3-point scale, rated from 0 - 2, was used for all
items. The scores range from a lower limit of 0 (low conservatism) to an upper limit of 22
(high conservatism).
Table 3.3. Factor solution for the South African Conservatism Scale
Item F 1 F2 F3 Commun
1. Evolution theory .51 .31
2. School uniforms .40 .40 .32
3. Striptease shows .53 .28
4. Modem Art .45 .26
5. Military service .08
6. Socialism .04
7. Divine Law .13
8. Moral training .54 .32
9. Suicide .36 .24
10. Chaperons -.47 .33
11. Social welfare .59 .35
12. Legalised abortion .60 .37
13. Chastity .18
14. Female judges .08
15. Big Business .13
16. Conventional clothing -.60 .39
17. Nudist camps .69 .48
18. Mass Action .19
19. Church authority .47 .23
20. Disarmament .48 -.42 .44
21. Censorship .50 .34
22. Strict rules .39 -.36 .32
23. Social Equality .20
24. Casual Living .48 .24
25. Divorce .39 .24
26. Religious truth .42 .23
27. Legalising dagga .55 .31
28. Privatised health care .02
29. One person one vote .50 .39
30. Homosexuality .54 .35
31. Political radicalism .39 .33
32. Strikes .36 .17
3.3.3 Ideological Commitment
The scales that were used to determine ideological commitment included the Religiosity Scale
and the Political Interest Scale. They were employed to determine their potential influence as
variables that may mediate the relationship between cognitive style and ideological beliefs in
the religious and political domains.
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3.3.3.1 Religiosity
Religiosity as defmed by Rohrbaugh & Jessor (1975) is "an attribute of personality referring to
cognitive orientations about a transcendent reality and about one's relationship to it, orientations
which are directly implicated by the impact they have on daily, secular life, and by participation
in ritual practices. This conceptualisation enables a linkage between religiosity and control
against deviance which can be mediated in several different but converging ways" (p. 137).
The eight items of the Rohrbaugh and Jessor Scale (1975) were submitted to principal
components factor analysis; and in contrast to previous research (e.g., Nicholas & Durrheim,
1996; Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975), the scale was found to be multidimensional (see
Appendices A and C, Section 3 for the scale). Three factors with eigenvalues greater than
unity were rotated by the varimax procedure (see Table 3.4). Items that referred to people's
subjective feelings about God and religious devotion weighted on Factor 1 (R_Subjective),
whereas Factor 2 was made up of items that tapped objective information about the amount of
time spent at religious gatherings (R_Objective). The objective index was therefore related to
the frequency of attendance, prayer, etc., while the subjective index related more to the extent
to which religion is integrated into daily life, suggesting that religious values are more
internalised. Factor 3 was defined solely by item 8 of the scale, and this item and factor were
dropped from further analysis. Weighted factor scores for the first two factors were saved and
employed as objective and subjective indices of religiosity. The two factors explained 27.7%
and 16.2% of the variance respectively.
It is posited that, due to the conservative religious context of the university, as well as the
strong emphasis placed on religion (Christian Higher Education) some students may feel
pressurised to attend religious gatherings frequently even though they may not necessarily
internalise the values and teachings·of their religion. This may have resulted in two different
factors on this scale. These factors may therefore be a function of this particular overtly
religious university context. Again it should also be considered that the sample was quite
small, and therefore no definitive conclusions can be reached on the basis of the findings of
this particular sample group.
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Table 3.4. Factor solution for the Religiosity Scale.
Item Subiective Objective F3 Com
I. How often have you attended religious services in the last year? .60 .41
2. Which of the following best describes your practice of prayer or .72 .53
religious mediation?
.79 .733. When you have a serious problem, how often do you take religious
advice or teaching into consideration?
.594. How much influence would you say that religion has on the way that .61 .46
you choose to act and the way that you choose to spend your time each
day?
.525. During the past year, how often have you experienced a feeling of .57 .43
religious reverence or devotion?
6. Do you agree with the following statement? Religion gives me a great .66 .46
amount of comfort and security in life.
7. Which of the following statements comes closest to your belief about .60 .47
God?
8. Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief .90 .80
about life after death?
3.3.3.2 Political Interest
The items used by Durrheim to develop the Political Interest Scale "were based on Sidanius'
(1988b) measure of 'cognitive orientation toward politics', but also included emotive aspects
of political involvement" (Durrheim, 1995, p. 146).
The four items that make up the Political Interest Scale (see Appendices A and C, Section 2,
items 5 to 8) were found to have strong item total correlations and an alpha Cronbach alpha
coefficient of a = .78. The unweighted sum of these items was used as an index of political
interest. A la-point Likert-type scale, rated from 0 - 9, was used for all items. The scores
range from a lower limit of 0 (low interest) to an upper limit of27 (high interest).
3.3.4 Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance
Since tolerance of ambiguity and its measurement forms the central focus of the study, the
concept and various instruments attempting to measure it will be discussed in more detaiL
3.3.4.1 Background
Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) original definition of the concept tolerance of ambiguity described it
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as an attitudinal variable indicating that an individual can identify and integrate the presence of
both positive and negative qualities in one object or person. Her research was located in the
wider context of psychoanalytic personality theory, and regarded cognitive style as a personality
trait. The concept was regarded as a bipolar cognitive trait, with intolerance of ambiguity being
its inflexible counterpart on the opposite side of a rigid-flexible continuum.
In an attempt to operationalise the concept and to test its generalisability Frenke1-Brunswik
included non-evaluative and asocial measures to enable her to arrive at conclusions in a
deductive manner. If intolerance of ambiguity could be related to these non-evaluative and
asocial measures, generalisability of the construct could be assumed.
According to Bochner (1965), Frenkel-Brunswik described the concept of intolerance of
ambiguity in terms of 'criterion characteristics' or primary defining characteristics and
categorised it into a syndrome with other personality variables. These are: "(a) rigid
dichotomising into fixed categories - the 'need for categorisation'; (b) seeking for certainty and
avoiding ambiguity - 'need for certainty'; (c) inability to allow for the co-existence of positive
and negative features in the same object, e.g. 'good' and 'bad' traits in the same person; (d)
acceptance of attitude statements representing a rigid white-black view of life; (e) a preference
for the familiar over the unfamiliar; (f) a positive rejecting of the different or unusual; (g)
resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli;(h) the early selection and maintenance of
one solution in a perceptually ambiguous situation; (i) premature closure" (Bochner, 1965, p.
394).
Bochner (1965) postulated that attempts by other researchers to clearly define intolerance of
ambiguity have been thwarted by logical errors contained in the experimental procedures and
poor psychometric qualities of the measures that were used.
According to Durrheim (1995), the main reason for the subsequent misinterpretation of and
confusion surrounding the definition stemmed from two types of errors made by other
researchers: (1) they incorporated the operationalised aspects that Frenkel-Brunswik had used for
deductive testing as part of their descriptions or definitions of the concept and (2) they drew on
other research in the field which had distorted the original concept or had departed from it. This
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is evident in the error that Bochner (1965) had made when he included two non-evaluative,
asocial aspects in the cluster ofprimary criterion characteristics.
These errors ultimately led to a splitting between the content and style of cognition. Researchers
started measuring the concept "independently of emotions, social context and cognitive content"
(Durrheim, 1995, p. 68). Instead it was treated as a formal, pervasive property of individual
functioning. The association, that manifest intolerance of ambiguity was a reaction to
emotionally threatening contents and as such a defence against an underlying ego-weakness, had
disappeared. It was now defined instead as a stable, personality trait that is generalised across
content and context. Unverified assumptions were thus incorporated into its definition.
Several measures for the different constructs of cognitive style have been devised. However,
most instruments measure only a limited part of the concept, which in turn then lay down the
parameters of its definition.
3.3.4.2 Different measures ofTolerance ofAmbiguity
Three major types of operational techniques for measuring intolerance of ambiguity exist. The
first category gauges reactions to ambiguous stimuli; the second consists of scaling procedures,
while the third assesses evaluative categorisation (Durrheim 1995).
Two examples of measurements gauging reactions to ambiguous stimuli include the Rorschach
test and the autokinetic illusion. These measures looked at performance in ambiguous
(perceptual) tasks (the Rorschach test and the autokinetic illusion), as well as the liking/disliking
ofambiguous stimuli (Azzageddi test). However, none of these measures have yielded consistent
support for the relationship between cognitive style (intolerance of ambiguity) and ideological
beliefs, in this instance, authoritarianism (Durrheim, 1995).
Scaling measures usually consist of items that examine personal reactions to ambiguous or
uncertain events or situations. These types of scales include such instruments as the Budner
scale (1962) and the Norton scale (1975), both of which are scored by a Likert-type format as
well as the Rydell-Rosen Scale (1966), which consists of dichotomous true-false response
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categories. These measures have also not produced uniform findings confirming a direct
isomorphic relationship between cognitive style and cognitive content.
Evaluative categorisation-type instruments include the Paragraph Completion Test (Schroder et
a!., 1967) in which subjects have to complete several sentence stems (e.g. "When I am in
doubt...") with a short written paragraph. According to Schroder and colleagues the items
"represent the presentation of discrepancy, uncertainty, control or restraint, and therefore tend to
engage the subject in some form of 'resolution'" (Schroder et al., 1967, p. 190). This type of
instrument is performance-related.
Another example of this type of instrument is the one developed by Scott and colleagues (1979),
who designed a measurement consisting of several objects, followed by list of 20 adjectives. An
equal number of favourable and unfavourable adjectives were included in this list. Subjects
could assign any number of adjectives to each object contained in the scale. This enabled
subjects to ascribe both positive and negative evaluations to a single object, therefore examining
"object ambivalence". This instrument incorporated both the evaluative and social
characteristics that were included in Frenkel-Brunswik's definition of tolerance ofambiguity.
Although seen to be a step in the right direction, Durrheim (1995) regarded this instrument to be
problematic, since it was extremely difficult to determine whether the subjects' connotation to
the evaluative nature of these adjectives was similar to that of the researcher. Another problem
that Durrheim had with this measure was that Scott did not have a coherent theory of individual
variability in cognitive style, since intra-individual variability, according to him, is grounded in a
theory of individual difference. "His social learning theory has no way of explaining the
relationship between cognitive style and cognitive content which does not reduce to differential
experience" (Durrheim, 1995, p.84). This prevents him from explaining any general non-random
association between ideological contents and cognitive style.
The misinterpretations around the concept and measurement of tolerance of ambiguity resulted in
research methods that measured asocial, non-evaluative tasks to determine intolerance of
ambiguity. This was evident in the first two categories (i.e. gauging reactions to ambiguous
stimuli and scaling measures). Frenkel-Brunswik originally included these tasks purely to assess
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whether tolerance of ambiguity could be generalised from non-evaluative tasks to tasks assessing
emotional ambivalence, as this would provide support for the personality status of cognitive
style. However, subsequent researchers clung to these deductive measures as part of the
definition. To complicate the issue, clarity is not provided on what the link between such tasks
and the social evaluative concept of intolerance ofambiguity is.
All three categories of instruments (i.e. including evaluative categorisation) have resulted in the
development ofmeasures that assign single scores that place individuals on a continuum ranging
from tolerant to intolerant. Consequently it implicitly suggests that individual consistency exists,
and leaves no room for variability or change (Durrheim, 1995). In a study where variability is
anticipated such instruments would have obvious shortcomings.
A further criticism is that the measures often confound the style and content of beliefs, which
resulted in most of the measuring instruments assessing content and style simultaneously instead
of separating the two concepts methodologically. One such measure is the Budner Scale (1962).
The items in this scale purport to measure an attitudinal variable, but they are designed in such a
way that they actually relate to overall socio-political ideology, and as such cannot be regarded to
be a valid measure of tolerance of ambiguity (Sidanius, 1978a).
Other problems include a lack of internal consistency of some scales (Durrheim & Foster, 1997).
Furthermore, factor analyses have shown that tolerance of ambiguity is a multidimensional
construct and as such cannot be measured effectively by a unidimensional scale (Sidanius,
1978a, 1978b; Furnham, 1994).
In an attempt to address the various difficulties, Durrheim (1995) devised another measure, the
Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (AAT). This scale meets Rokeach's (1960) "first
requirement" in that it measures the underlying structure, rather than the content of cognitive
style. He operationalised ambiguity tolerance as an evaluative attitudinal variable that may reveal
different kinds of evaluative categorisation, thus measuring the concept as originally defmed by
Frenkel-Brunswik. The scale was designed in such a way that personality-based assumptions
were avoided and that potential cross-content variability in tolerance of ambiguity could be
assessed.
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3.3.4.3 The Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance Scale (AAT Scale)
The AAT scale was designed following the work of Seott and colleagues (1979), since Durrheim
had regarded their instrument to be problematic, but simultaneously to be an improvement on
previous scales. The AAT scale is based on Kaplan's (1972) Attitude Component Technique,
which employs a unipolar scaling procedure. Durrheim (1995) modified and developed this
instrument to measure attitudinal ambiguity tolerance.
Since authority figures are central to ideologies, subjects are requested to assess various (45)
authority figures across religious, political and familial domains on two independent 11-point
unipolar scales (see Appendices A and C, Section 4 for the full scale and Appendices B and D,
Section 2 for the shortened version). The one scale requires a rating by subjects on a scale from 0
to 10 that reflects the degree of respect (or liking) sometimes experienced towards each authority
figure. The other assesses the degree of disrespect (or disliking) sometimes felt towards the
same authority figures. This method provides subjects with the chance "to simultaneously
indicate both a favourable and an unfavourable attitude towards a given stimulus object"
(Kaplan, 1972, p. 362). As such it meets an essential requirement for a scale purporting to
measure ambivalence.
In discussions with him, Mr Aubrey Blecher from the Department of Mathematics at the
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, critiqued the formula used in the AAT scale.
Please see Appendix G for this critique and as well as his proposed improvement of the formula.
It is important to note that this critique was only done after the analysis of the data had been
completed.
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Figure 3.1. Instructions and fonnat of the Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance Scale
It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture of both likes
(respect) and dislikes (disrespect), given different situations. Give two scores for each of the
following authorities or authority figures, one indicating the level that you sometimes like
(respect) the authority, the other the level ofyour possible dislike (disrespect).
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your
personal opinion.
Example I: If on occasions you truly respect the American government and support their
decisions, but on other occasions you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer:
The American Government
Like/respect
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much
Example 2: If you respect John Major completely and support him at all times, then you may
answer:
Prime Minister John Major
Like/respect
Not at all 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very much
The following fonnula is used to give an estimate of the level of tolerance of ambiguity
expressed by a subject:
AAT 2L + I
L+H+2
AAT scores increase when (1) similar responses are given to both the positive and negative
scales (in other words, the extent to which H and L are alike, and (2) the maximum degree of
respect and disrespect are reached (i.e. as H and L both approach 10). When L = 0 and H = 10
the lower limit of AAT scores is reached. The scores range from an upper limit of 0.95
(ambivalent) to a lower limit of0.08 (unambivalent).
This scale overcomes several ofthe difficulties mentioned above in various ways. By measuring
the underlying structure and not the content of cognitive style, Durrheim does not assume the
existence of a specific relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological belief. He
also does not presume that tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity is a stable, generalised trait. The
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absence of these assumptions facilitates the testing of both cross-content and cross-context
variability in attitudinal ambiguity tolerance.
3.4 Results
In brief, expectations were that the level ofvalue conflict in a particular context, as well as in a
specific content domain, would influence the expression of tolerance/ intolerance of
ambiguity: the higher the conflict, the more tolerant of ambiguity subjects would be; the less
conflict experienced, the more intolerant of ambiguity subjects would be.
The results that were yielded in the university study are seen against the background of these
expectations and will be discussed below.
3.4.1 Factor Analysis
On the first occasion (rag) the full AAT scale (45 items) was used, while the shortened version
(36 items) was used on the second occasion (Bible study). Principal components factor
analysis of the AAT scale was conducted separately on both sets of scores (i.e. from both
occasions of measurement). The aim of the analysis was 1) to generate meaningful factors of
AAT responses, and 2) to ensure that the pattern of responses was similar on both occasions
on which the scale was completed. On the basis of the scree test, 6 factors were extracted from
the first set of scores and 4 factors were extracted from the second set. In each case, these
were rotated by the varimax transfonnation. As Durrheim and Foster (1997) reported,. factor
analysis clustered the scores on the items according to content domain.
The first set of scores was clustered into the following factors: religious (e.g. God, church
leader), non-Christian religious (e.g. Koran, Buddha, Mohammed), personal (e.g. own values,
friends), political (e.g. SA government, Nelson Mandela), and legal (e.g. the courts, the
police). Only three factors were replicated in the second set of scores, namely political,
religious, and non-Christian religion.
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Items that were common to these three factors in both the first and second data sets were
analysed to determine whether they formed reliable measures of the following constructs:
1. Attitudinal ambiguity tolerance towards Christian religious authorities (AAT_Chr). The
unweighted sum of the AAT scores for the items Jesus Christ, the Bible, God, Family, Parents.
The reliability of the measure was adequate for both the first (a = .71) and second (a = .80) set
of scores.
2. Attitudinal ambiguity tolerance towards non-Christian religious authorities (AAT_nChr).
The unweighted sum of the AAT scores for the items Mohammed, Buddha, and the Koran.
The reliability ofthe measure was adequate for both the first (a = .82) and second (a = .73) set
of scores.
3. Attitudinal ambiguity tolerance towards political authorities (AAT_Pol). The unweighted
sum of the AAT scores for the items SA government, Mandela, SACP, ANC, MK, OAD,
Buthelezi. The reliability ofthe measure was adequate for both the first (a= .74) and second (a
= .76) set of scores.
The first set of data (at rag) is referred to as AAT Chrl, AAT nChrl and AAT Poll whereas- - - ,
the second set (at Bible Study) is called AAT_Chr2, AAT_nChr2 and AAT_PoI2. If the
factor is not followed by a number (e.g. AAT_nChr) it refers to the difference scores between
the data responses on the two occasions.
3.4.2 Scale Statistics
Scores on all measures were more or less normally distributed. Means, standard deviations
and sample sizes for all indices used in the study were computed (see Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5. Summary of statistics measures used in Study 1
Cases Mean SD
Measure
Conservatism 103 20.1748 3.7870
RWA 104 29.0385 6.9295
PoI_Opinion 101 3.6832 1.1656
Pol Interest 104 13.5962 6.2869
R_Objective 102 -.0267 1.0159
R Subjective 102 .0858 .9539
SR_Equal 103 22.1068 7.3497
SR Control 103 21.6602 5.7216
AAT Chrl 103 .7199 .4182
AAT Chr2 99 .7836 .6555
AAT nChrl 103 .7270 .6900
AAT nChr2 99 .7881 .7585
AAT Chr 98 -.0505 .6409
AATnChr 98 -.0435 .6762
AAT Poll 103 3.9283 1.4481
AAT Pol2 99 3.8221 1.4922
AAT Pol 98 .1188 1.3776
3.4.3 Correlational analysis
3.4.3.1 Correlations between the indices ofideological conservatism
Scores on measures of conservatism, racism and right-wing authoritarianism are expected to
correlate strongly (Adorno, et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). However, the measures did not
reflect the expected correlations, neither, as mentioned above, were they unidimensional in this
study.
The pattern of correlations reported in Table 3.6 show only weak correlations between the two
indices of Subtle Racism and the Conservatism measure. The RWA scale correlated with neither
racism nor conservatism, suggesting that the RWA scale may no longer be a valid measure of
authoritarianism in contemporary South African society. The correlation between self-rated
liberalism-conservatism and the equality items of the Subtle Racism scale suggests that it is with
reference to their opinions about racial equality that the subjects judged their conservatism.
Opinions about fairness and political control were not considered, as attitudes with regard to
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these aspects seem to be much more ambiguous and not so clearly taboo.
Table 3.6. Intercorrelations between indices of ideological conservatism.
SR Control SR_Equal RWA Conservatism
SR_Equal .32***
RWA .00 .11
Conservatism .22* .29** .07
Selfrating .06 .25* .05 .16
Note. *** E< .001; ** E< .01; * E< .05
3.4.3.2 Correlations between the measures of ideological conservatism and ideological
commitment
Table 3.7 reports the correlations between the measures of ideological conservatism and
ideological interest. Political interest and the objective aspects of religiosity (R_Objective)
were not related to any of the indices of ideological conservatism. Ideological commitment, as
expressed in the experiential aspects of religiosity (R_Subjective), was related to conservatism
and support for racist inequalities. The religious teachings at this university are socially
perceived to be conservative. It is hypothesised that their religion may therefore, to a certain
extent, be seen to sanction these attitudes. Overall, it did not appear as though ideological
commitment could explain the attitudinal beliefs of the subjects.
Table 3.7. Correlations between indices of ideological conservatism and ideological


















Note. *** E< .001; ** E< .01; * E. < .05
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3.4.3.3 Correlations between AAT indices
Finally, scores on each of the AAT indices were correlated to detennine whether 1) AAT
scores for each domain of authority were stable across time, and 2) AAT scores for different
domains of authority were correlated.
The matrix in Table 3.8 shows that the first and second set of scores on each of the measures
correlated significantly, suggesting that the measures have test-retest reliability. Also, the
results indicate that attitudinal ambiguity tolerance toward Christian authorities was not
related to attitudinal ambiguity tolerance toward the other two domains of authority, whereas
AAT-non-Christian and AAT-Political were related. It is postulated that for this sample group
there may be no sharp distinction between these authority figures since the authorities in both
these domains may be regarded as "outgroups" in this religiously and politically conservative
environment. Judgement of these authorities would therefore not activate high levels of
conflict, as subjects would feel that their views are sanctioned by the larger university context
in which they operate. Subjects did, however, clearly distinguish Christian authorities from the
other two dimensions of authority, a result that is congruent with the religious context of the
university.
Table 3.8. Correlations between AAT indices
AAT AAT AAT AAT AAT
Chr 1 Chr2 nChr 1 nChr2 Poll
AAT Chr2 .36***
AAT nChr 1 .01 -.10
AAT nChr2 .05 .16 .58***
AAT Poll .09 -.11 .35*** .12
AAT Pol2 .12 .15 .35*** .32*** .57***
Note. *** ~ < .001; ** ~ < .01; * ~ < .05
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3.4.4 Regression Analysis
3.4.4.1 The relationship between ideological conservatism, ideological commitment and
tolerance ofambiguity
Polynomial regression analysis was performed to determine whether tolerance of attitudinal
ambiguity scores were related to the indices of ideological conservatism and commitment.
Each index of AAT was used as the dependent variable in a series of separate regression
equations that tested for linear and quadratic associations with the ideological conservatism
and commitment indices. In each equation, the linear term was entered first, followed by the
quadratic term (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
The pattern of associations is reported in Table 3.9. The results reiterate those of Durrheim
(1995, 1998). Once the researcher distinguishes between different content domains of
conservatism and expressions of AAT, there is no single relationship between attitudinal
conservatism and tolerance of ambiguity. Both positive and negative linear and quadratic
associations were recorded.
It was also apparent that the associations were patterned such that AAT scores were only
related to particular indices of ideological conservatism and commitment. In his earlier
research Durrheim (1995) noted that "whereas ambivalent evaluation of political authorities
was associated with political belief contents (radicalism-conservatism), similar evaluation of
religious authorities was associated with commitment to religion rather than any particular
religious contents (orthodoxy)" (p. 160). Similar results were manifest here. AAT_Christian
was related to religiosity and the index of ideological commitment, rather than attitudinal
belief content.
The remainder of the associations reported in Table 3.9 consist of positive linear associations
and negative quadratic associations.
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t = -2.97 p=.004
Lin 13= -0.49
t=-3.7, p=.0004
Quad 13 = -0.42
t=-3.1, p=.003
Lin 13= 1.15 Lin 13 = 1.09
t = 2.13, p=.04 t = 1.99, p=.05
Quad 13 = -1.24
t = -2.29, p=.02
Lin 13 = 1.22
t = 2.08, p=.04
Quad f3 = -1.34
t = -2.29, p=.02
Lin 13 = 0.89
t = 1.95, p=.05
Quad 13 = -0.98
t= -2.17, p=.03
The positive linear relationships are directly contrary to the predictions ofAdorno and colleagues
- and indeed all personality-based theories of the relationship between intolerance of ambiguity
and attitudinal conservatism, as there was no consistent, stable and invariable relationship
evident.
The different conditions under which the scale was completed appeared to have a substantial
impact on the results.
On the first occasion (at rag), more religious individuals expressed intolerance of ambiguity
towards Christian authorities, as evident from the negative linear relationship between
R_Subjective and AAT_Chrl, whereas on the second occasion (at Bible study) less religious
individuals expressed intolerance of ambiguity towards the same authorities. The latter is
evident from the positive linear relationship between R_Objective and AAT_Chr2. Both these
results are contrary to the contextual value conflict predictions made earlier.
Highly religious subjects who had internalised the values of their religious teachings
experienced lower value conflict around these authorities at rag. It is hypothesised that in
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view of the "permissive" spirit that they were faced with, these individuals may have wanted
specifically to take a stand for their religion and in this way experienced less value conflict.
This is in line with the view of Cialdini and colleagues (1976) that individuals may express
their views on issues that are of great importance to them in an uncompromising way when
confronted by opposing views.
Less religious individuals who may be inclined to attend Bible study for reasons of social
pressure and who have not internalised religious values seem to have experienced less value
conflict in the religious context. In this instance, being accountable to others whose views are
known to them, may have led these subjects to choose the "lazy" option of strategically
shifting their views to be in line with the contextual norms (Tetlock, 1993). On the other hand,
it is also possible that their views were in fact in agreement with those of the context, resulting
in decreased contextual value conflict.
The positive linear relationship between SR_Control and AAT_Poll means that high scorers on
subtle racism were more tolerant of ambiguity towards political authorities on the first occasion
(rag). This trend is in line with predictions around contextual value conflict. Being accountable
to others with opposing views seems to have raised the level of value conflict for these subjects
in this particular content domain (Tetlock, 1983a, 1993, 1994).
The positive linear relationship between SR_Control and AAT-nChr1 also means that high
scorers on subtle racism were more tolerant of ambiguity towards non-Christian authorities at
rag. Although not predicted by the researcher, this finding could be understood in similar terms
to those in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, also in line with Tetlock's (1994) views on
accountability the presence of the researcher, whose views were unknown to the subjects, may
have increased the level ofvalue conflict even more. This idea is also applicable to the previous
paragraph.
The positive linear relationship between RWA and AAT-PoI2 indicates that high scorers on
authoritarianism were more tolerant of ambiguity towards political authorities at Bible study.
This correlation is against the trend that was predicted by contextual value conflict, since the
views of these subjects were expected to be similar to those of their ideology. This fmding is
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difficult to explain.
The positive linear relationship between Conservatism and AAT_nChrl indicated that more
conservative subjects showed more tolerance of ambiguity towards non-Christian authorities on
the first occasion (rag). This is in line with the prediction around contextual value conflict, as it
seems as though the contextual norms of this group may have challenged the views of these
subjects, thus raising the contextual value conflict (Durrheim, 1995). Accountability to subjects
with opposing views may have increased the level of contextual value conflict further (Tetlock,
1993, 1994).
The negative linear relationship between R_Subjective and AAT_nChrl indicates that more
religious subjects showed less ambiguity tolerance towards non-Christian authorities on the
first occasion (rag). This is against the anticipated trend of contextual value conflict. Again it
is postulated that, in the face of opposing views, these individuals may have wanted to take an
unambiguous stance about these authorities (Cialdini et al., 1976), in order to confirm their
commitment to their own religion.
The negative quadratic terms indicate that the point of inflection was a maximum value,
suggesting that moderates expressed higher levels of attitudinal ambiguity tolerance than
extremists did. These findings are in agreement with Rokeach's extremism theory. However,
they do not support his theory, as these associations varied across content domain and were
not stable, generalisable or invariant.
From the above results it is clear that the value conflict in the different contexts emerged in
very complicated ways, much more so than predicted by the researcher. The findings also
indicate that it is extremely difficult to pre-define contextual value conflict. These issues will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
3.4.4.2 Cross context variations in Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance
Finally, the study aimed to investigate variations in responses to the AAT scale across the two
situations in which the scale was completed. First, a series of three repeated measures t-tests
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were conducted to determine whether the subjects as a whole scored higher or lower on the
second occasion. The t-tests were not significant for AAT_Christian (t = -.78, df =97, p
=.437), AAT_non-Christian (t = -.64, df=97, p =.526) and AAT_Political (t = -.85, df=97, P
=.396).
To explore variations across situation at the level of individuals, difference scores for each
AAT index were computed by subtracting the AAT scores in the second situation from the
scores for the first situation, i.e.:
• AAT_Chr = AAT_Chr 1 - AAT_Chr 2 (Mean = -.051, SD = .64)
• AAT_nChr = AAT:..-nChr 1 - AAT_nChr 2 (Mean = -.044, SD = .68)
• AAT_Pol = AAT_Poll - AAT_PoI2 (Mean = .119, SD = 1.38)
All three indices of difference scores were roughly normally distributed. High scores indicate
a decrease in AAT from the first to the second administration (i.e. from rag to Bible study),
whereas low scores indicated an increase from the first to the second administration.
Polynomial regression analysis was performed to determine whether the difference scores
were related to the indices of ideological conservatism and commitment. The procedure was
similar to the polynomial analysis outlined above. Each difference index was used as the
dependent variable in a series of separate regression equations that tested for linear and
quadratic associations with the ideological conservatism and commitment indices. The results
are reported in Table 3.10.
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t = -2.97, p=.004
Lin p= 0.84
t = 2.1, p=.03
Quad p= -0.91
t = -2.36, p=.02
AATnChr
Lin p= -0.32
t = -2.32, p=.02
Quad p= -0.52
t = -3.7, p=.0004
Lin p= 1.63
t = 2.78, p=.007
Quad p= -1.44
t = -2.46 p=.02
Except for the single relationship between conservatism and AAT_nChr, all the remaining
associations were between difference scores and ideological commitment variables. It appears
as though changes in expressing ambiguity tolerance were related to ideological commitment,
rather than attitudinal beliefs. This may explain the conflicting and contradictory findings of
the previous section.
The negative linear relationship between objective aspects of religiosity and AAT_Chr indicated
that for more religious subjects the AAT scores towards Christian authorities increased from the
first (rag) to the second (Bible study) occasion. The reason for this trend is not clear. However,
in line with the view of Cialdini and colleagues (1976) it is hypothesised that these subjects
might have taken an unambiguous stance at rag on an issue that is important to them.
The negative linear relationship between the subjective aspects of religiosity and AAT_nChr,
indicates that more religious subjects were more tolerant of ambiguity at Bible study,
suggesting that the level of contextual value conflict regarding non-Christian authorities
increased from the first (rag) to the second (Bible study) occasion. This finding is against the
anticipated trend predicted by the researcher and is very difficult to explain. The hypothesis
around taking an unambiguous stance in the face of opposing views is once again postulated as
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a possible explanation. However, it is not clear why increased levels of contextual value
conflict were experienced at Bible study.
The positive linear effect between Pol_Interest and AAT_Chr indicate that there was a
decrease from rag to Bible study in ambiguity tolerance towards Christian authorities by
subjects who were highly interested in politics. It is postulated that their views on these
authorities were similar to those of the religious context, resulting in reduced levels of conflict
in that context (Durrheim, 1995, 1998). Furthermore, in line with the audience effect (Billig,
1996), these individuals may have attempted at rag to emphasise common ground with others
in order to persuade them of their views more easily. This would have resulted in higher
levels of value conflict in that context. Also, in line with the concept of accountability
(Tetlock, 1993, 1994), the presence of the researcher, whose views were unknown to them,
may have increased the levels of contextual value conflict at rag as well.
Conservative subjects also expressed less AAT towards non-Christian authorities at Bible
study. This decrease in contextual value conflict from the first (rag) to the second (Bible
study) occasion is evident in the positive linear effect between Conservatism and AAT_non-
Christian. It is hypothesised that, at Bible study, the outgroup is clearly defined, resulting in
less contextual value conflict. The views of these subjects seem to have been in accordance
with the contextual norms, further lowering the level of contextual value conflict.
The negative quadratic effects show that, in addition to the linear effects, the regression line
curves in such a manner that both high and low scoring subjects show increased tolerance of
ambiguity in the second situation, whereas moderate scoring subjects show less tolerance of
ambiguity on the second occasion. This trend was evidenced towards both Christian and non-
Christian authorities. These findings are again in agreement with context theory (Sidanius,
1985, 1986; Sidanius & Lau, 1989) only to the extent that moderates showed less ambiguity
tolerance than extremists. However the findings do not support this theory, as Sidanius never
predicted any shifts across context.
From the above findings it is clear that the variability in correlations across both context and
content domain was much more complex than that anticipated by the researcher. This will be
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discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 when the results of both the university and the church
study are examined together.
An important limitation of the above interpretations is the post-hoc nature of these
explanations. This will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
The second study, the church study, will be discussed next, in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
STUDY 2: THE CHURCH STUDY
The chapter introduces the objectives, expectations and rationale for the church study. The
sample, context and procedure of the study are then discussed. Measures are not discussed
again, as they are similar to those used in the university study. The chapter concludes with the
results of the church study as well as a brief attempt at understanding these theoretically.
4.1 Objectives, Expectations and Rationale
Study 2, the church study, was a replication of the university study, using a different sample
group from a different context. The main objective was an attempt to obtain additional support
for the findings in the university sample.
It was decided to use a more mature sample that would be representative of broader society in
terms of variables such as age and life experience. In accordance with the researcher's personal
understanding of the church situation it was assumed that this context would provide different
kinds ofvalue conflict to its subjects. These properties will be discussed below under "Context".
The church study provided a context that was different from that of the university study. In terms
of societal perception the university discussed in Chapter 3 is regarded as a more conservative
milieu than the environment of the church discussed below (see "Context" below for reasons). It
was therefore felt that studies in these two environments might yield interesting and different
results and be illuminating for the overall results.
The first expectation is that expressions of tolerance of ambiguity will vary across context. It
is anticipated that the same individuals will express different levels of ambiguity tolerance in
two different contexts, according to the level of value conflict within the particular situation,
therefore supporting the view that this construct can no longer be seen as a stable personality
trait. The higher the level of conflict between norms and personal beliefs in the context, the
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higher would be the level of tolerance of ambiguity exhibited. The lower the level of conflict
in the context, the lower would be the level of tolerance of ambiguity.
A further expectation is that expressions of tolerance of ambiguity would vary across content
domain. This would again support evidence against the notion of regarding tolerance of
ambiguity as a stable personality trait. Again, the higher the level of conflict between norms and
personal beliefs in a particular content domain, the higher would be the level of tolerance of
ambiguity. The lower the level of conflict in a content domain, the lower would be the level of
tolerance of ambiguity. However, high levels of value conflict in one content domain would not
necessarily be related with high levels ofconflict in another content domain.
Another expectation was that no single invariant correlation would be evident between
ideological conservatism and tolerance of ambiguity. The variable of ideological commitment
was omitted for this sample. Reasons for this will be discussed under "Measures".
As in the university study, the prediction was again that all the expected variations would be
related to the level of contextual value conflict experienced by subjects in a particular situation
and content domain. It is assumed that the two different situations used in the church study (i.e.
that of the Alpha course and that of the home environment) would present different levels of
value conflict to different subjects. If the normative beliefs of a specific situation were
supportive of their beliefs regarding a certain issue, subjects would experience less contextual
value conflict and therefore would express higher levels of intolerance of ambiguity. If the
normative beliefs of a situation, however, stood in opposition to their views subjects would
experience higher levels ofvalue conflict, resulting in higher levels oftolerance ofambiguity.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Sample
The sample was selected from members of two church congregations who were attending a
course, the Alpha course, run by a minister active in both congregations on a regular basis. The
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members of one congregation are predominantly Afrikaans speaking. While the members of the
other congregation are predominantly English speaking, several other languages are also
represented in this congregation (however, not in the particular sample used). These languages
include German, Dutch, Greek, Afrikaans and Zulu, to name but a few. As was the case in the
university study, the same sample had to complete a slightly different questionnaire in two
different situations.
Of the initial 70 questionnaires handed out, only 30 could be used. Factors influencing the
exclusion of some questionnaires were (1) missing values in one or both questionnaires, (2)
incomplete sections in either of the questionnaires, but mainly (3) missing questionnaires that
were not returned from the second administration at home.
This particular sample was chosen as subjects could be accessed in an overtly religious,
"ideological" context ofwhich some of the properties were known to the researcher. It was also
possible to access the participants in their homes. It was assumed that the home environment
would serve as a more neutral context in which different levels of value conflict would be
experienced.
The final sample was homogenous, consisting of 30 white subjects (17 females and 13 males).
There were 21 Afrikaans-speaking subjects and 9 English-speaking ones. The age of the
respondents ranged from 28 to 72, with a mean of48.3 years (SD = 10.36).
4.2.2 Context
It is important to place the two congregations that were used in the broader context of South
African churches in general and Dutch Reformed churches in particular. Traditionally the Dutch
Reformed Church (DRC) in South Africa has been seen as an institution that sanctioned the
apartheid philosophy during its reign, and as such has always been regarded as one of the more
conservative denominations in the country.
One of the congregations used in this study, the Andrew Murray Dutch Reformed Church,
Johannesburg, however, has never endorsed the apartheid regime. It was established in 1960
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and since then its doors were always open to all population groups. Not only that. It has also
provided a "spiritual home" for many couples who come from different Christian denominations,
e.g. where one partner is Dutch Reformed and the other Catholic or Presbyterian, etc. A culture
of inclusion and tolerance for views and values different from, or even in conflict with one's
own, is thus prevalent in this environment.
Due to its adversarial stance with regard to both race and denomination, this congregation was
traditionally regarded as an outcast by the governing powers within the DRC structures.
Ministers associated with this church were also treated with the same contempt and were, to a
large extent, often ostracised by these powers.
A while before the changeover to a new, democratic South Africa, the DRC in the country re-
examined its views on apartheid. The church has subsequently repented its direct and indirect
contribution to the hardships experienced by so many people as a result of the apartheid
philosophy. It decided to open its doors to all people and to embrace a philosophy of inclusion
and reconciliation. This has not been an easy process for many people within the church. Their
beliefs, previously regarded by them to be justified by scripture, suddenly had to be challenged,
re-examined and adjusted. They have had to look for guidance regarding these matters. In this
sense, the once rejected congregation of Andrew Murray has suddenly become a leader that
could offer much to be learned from. What has been the norm in this congregation for years had
finally started spreading to the wider DRC in South Africa.
A few years ago an Afrikaans-speaking congregation, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk,
Johannesburg-Noord, amalgamated with Andrew Murray. The congregations are, in essence,
one but separate services - one in Afrikaans and the other in English - are held.
Although the ideology from the pulpit at present is not overtly political in nature, themes of
forgiveness and reconciliation do appear regularly. A "Beyers Naude"-type ideology of inclusion
and non-racism did feature more strongly before the dawning ofthe post-apartheid era. However,
even then the ideology tried to remain as "non-political" as possible, in an attempt to avoid
getting drawn into the political battlefield of the time. Instead it concentrated more on broader,
universal values that commented indirectly on the status quo.
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On the basis of the above-mentioned reasons this church context is socially perceived to be more
liberal than the university context used in the first study. Different levels of contextual value
conflict were therefore anticipated, especially as far as political authorities are concerned.
It is important to note that, although the church is seen to have liberal views with regard to
political matters and other Christian denominations, this is not extended to non-Christian
ideologies such as Buddhism. These other religions are, to a certain extent, seen to stand in
opposition to Christianity. These congregations also support the missionary work of the wider
Dutch Reformed Church that focuses on proselytising.
The contexts were manipulated to represent an overtly "ideological" context and another more
"neutral" context in which different dynamics would be evident. It was assumed that the
religious forum of the Alpha course could represent the overtly ideological context, whereas
the context of home could represent a more neutral context. The Alpha course is well known
in churches of different denominations and it deals with different aspects of the Christian faith
and their practical applications in daily life. These two contexts were anticipated to present
subjects with different levels of contextual value conflict in the different content domains,
which would lead to subjects expressing various levels of tolerance/ intolerance of ambiguity
across the different contexts.
It was anticipated that, in the "ideological" context, subjects whose views are in agreement
with the norms of the church might exhibit high levels of intolerance of ambiguity. Those who
disagree with the contextual norms may express high levels of tolerance of ambiguity in this
context. In the more neutral context at home it was predicted that this effect would not be
present.
The prediction was that in the context of the Alpha course subjects who scored high on subtle
racism, authoritarianism and conservatism would be more tolerant of ambiguity towards
(liberal) political authorities as the contextual norms of the church might challenge their own
values and views on these matters.
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4.2.3 Procedure
The same sample completed a slightly different questionnaire (see Appendices E and F for the
English version ofthese questionnaires) in two different contexts.
The main thrust of the church study was to provide extra support for certain findings in the
university sample. Due to time constraints for the completion of the questionnaire in the
church context, as well as a reluctance to send out a lengthy questionnaire for completion at
home, the questionnaires that were used for the church sample were reduced to the essential
elements. The shortened questionnaire was also used in an attempt to maximise response rate.
The sections that were omitted were those concerning ideological commitment. The
correlations between indices of ideological conservatism and ideological commitment could
therefore not be examined.
In order to reduce the influence ofcarry over effects the two questionnaires were administered 24
weeks apart. Furthermore, the one scale (AAT) was also shortened on the second occasion due
to time constraint concerns, and to maximise response rates.
The subjects were requested to provide their names for the purpose of matching the two
questionnaires. Due to the lack of anonymity, assurance of complete confidentiality was given to
subjects on both occasions. This was given both verbally by the researcher and in a covering
paragraph at the beginning of both questionnaires, which stated that, for this sample, only a
research assistant (and not the researcher) would have access to the information in the
questionnaires. It was stated that the researcher would only have access to the data in statistical
format. This procedure was followed since the researcher herself is a member of one of the
congregations.
The first questionnaire was completed voluntarily by 70 subjects immediately after one of the
sessions of the Alpha Course. Subjects were informed that the purpose of the study was to
determine their personal and social beliefs and opinions regarding a number of issues in a
religious context. A request was made for them not to discuss their responses with other
participants, to complete the questionnaire without pondering too much on each question, and to
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complete it without referring to previous responses in the same questionnaire. The average time
to complete the questionnaires ranged between 25 and 35 minutes. The researcher was present
throughout the completion ofthe first questionnaire, and procedures were standardised.
The second questionnaire was completed voluntarily by participants at home. Questionnaires,
together with a covering letter were sent to participants who then completed these at home. They
were requested to complete and return them within seven days of receiving it. Subjects were
informed that the purpose of the study was to determine their personal and social beliefs and
opinions regarding a number of issues in the home context. A request was made for them not to
discuss their responses with others, e.g. family members, to complete the questionnaire without
pondering too much on each question, and to complete it without referring to previous responses
in the same questionnaire. Subjects returned the questionnaires to the researcher in sealed
envelopes in order to ensure confidentiality. They were also assured of confidentiality both
verbally and in a covering paragraph at the beginning of each questionnaire. In addition, a
covering letter was sent with the second questionnaire, stating that a research assistant would
enter the data on computer, as this would ensure complete anonymity from the researcher. It was
stated that the assistant would use a numerical code unknown to the researcher for the purpose of
matching the two questionnaires and, as such the identity of the participants would remain
anonymous. The reason for sending this letter was because the researcher had detected a certain
level of reluctance from some members to submit their questionnaires. This reluctance seemed
to have stemmed from a fear of having their (private) attitudes revealed to a member of their
congregation. For personal reasons of their own, the thought of this possibility seemed to have
been somewhat intimidating, uncomfortable or even unacceptable to some members. Of the 70
questionnaires that were sent out, only 41 were returned, of which 11 could not be used due to
incomplete sections or missing values.
4.3 Measures
The same measures, with the exception of those regarding ideological commitment, which were
used in the university study, were used in the church study. This was done firstly due to time
constraints with regards the completion of the questionnaire in the church context. Furthermore,
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the researcher was reluctant to send out a lengthy questionnaire for completion at home since it
was hoped that a shortened questionnaire would maximise the response rate.
4.4 Results
Predictions were once again that the level of value conflict posed by a particular context or
content domain would influence the expression of tolerance/intolerance of ambiguity. It is
anticipated that for higher conflict, subjects would be more tolerant of ambiguity, while for
less conflict, subjects would be less tolerant of ambiguity.
The results that were yielded in the church study are seen against the backdrop of these
expectations and will be discussed below. Where relevant, similarities and differences with the
university study will be mentioned briefly.
4.4.1 Scale Statistics
The sample was too small to yield reliable factor structures for each of the scales, so the items
that proved to be reliable indicators of each construct in the university study were used in the
measures for the church study. Cronbach alpha coefficients were computed for each measure
to ensure that it has sufficient internal consistency. See Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Summary of statistics measures used in Study 2
Measure
Alpha Number of Mean SD
items
Conservatism .81 12 19.76 4.57
RWA .74 5 25.25 8.76
SR_Equal .72 5 18.82 8.73
SR Control .77 4 17.93 8.3
AAT Chr1 .80 4 .92 .93
AAT Chr2 .50 4 .53 .45
AAT nChr1 .79 3 1.16 .85
AAT nChr2 .71 3 1.09 .77
AAT Poll .73 6 2.8 1.11
AAT Po12 .62 6 2.8 1.02
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4.4.2 Correlational analysis
4.4.2.1 Correlations between indices ofideological conservatism
As mentioned in chapter 3, scores on measures of conservatism, subtle racism and right-wing
authoritarianism were expected to correlate strongly (Adorno et aI., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981).
The pattern of correlations reported in Table 4.2 shows no correlation between the two indices
of Subtle Racism and Conservatism, or between the RWA scale and the Conservatism scale.
. Conservatism for this group therefore seems to be unrelated to racism and authoritarianism.
This finding differs from that of the university study, where weak correlations between subtle
racism and conservatism were evident. This may be an indication that conservatism in the
rapidly changing context of South Africa is a complex construct with intricate and changing
correlations emerging between the different dimensions of ideological conservatism. However, it
must be noted that the sample groups in this study were very small, and that no conclusive
statements can be made about the results.
The RWA scale correlated with one aspect of racism, SR_Control, but not with S~Equal. It
suggests that for authoritarian subjects the taboo on unequal treatment still seems to hold
sway. However, the idea of giving up political and economic control is not so easy to accept. It
is perhaps not surprising that some correlation was found between authoritarianism and subtle
racism (regarding political and economic control), as authoritarianism was the foundation of
political ideology of apartheid in South Africa (Foster, 1991a). This finding is dissimilar from
that of the university study, where no correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and
subtle racism was found. This suggests some uncertainty regarding the validity of the RWA
scale in a changing South Africa.
The correlation between self-rated liberalism-conservatism and both indices of the Subtle
Racism scale suggests that it is with reference to their opinions about both racial equality, as
well as political and economic control, that the subjects of the church study judged their
conservatism. The finding in the university study was different in that self-rating correlated
only with the control factor of subtle racism.
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A strong correlation was found between the two indices of racism, suggesting that for this
particular group of subjects these factors were closely linked. This correlation was not evident
in the university study.
Table 4.2. Intercorrelations between indices of ideological conservatism.
SR Control SR_Equal RWA Conservatism
SR_Equal .59***
RWA .42* .20
Conservatism .01 .20 .14
Self-rating .47* .54** .06 .31
Note. *** £ < .001; ** £ < .01; * £ < .05
4.4.2.2 Correlations between AAT indices
Scores on each of the AAT indices were correlated to determine whether 1) AAT scores for
each domain of authority were stable across time, and 2) AAT scores for different domains of
authority were correlated.
The matrix in Table 4.3 shows that AAT responses are not generalised across content
domains. This result is against the expectations of Adorno and colleagues, and in fact, against
the predictions of all personality-based theories, as none ofthese predict such variability.
The first and second set of scores correlated significantly only on AAT_nChr and AAT_Pol,
suggesting that these measures were similarly patterned across context. It also suggests that
the measures have test-retest reliability. Contrary to expectations no correlation was found
between AAT_Chr on the two occasions, but this may be due to the low internal consistency
of the AAT Chr2.
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In the church sample none of the domains (AAT_Chr, AAT_nChr and AAT_Pol) were
correlated with each other. It seems to suggest that for this group there is a clear distinction
between these three domains, and each is evaluated differently from the other. This fmding
. differs from that of the university study, where students evaluated non-Christian and political
authorities in a similar way.
Table 4.3. Correlations between AAT indices
AAT AAT AAT AAT AAT
Chr 1 Chr2 nChr 1 nChr2 Poll.
AAT Chr2 -.08
AAT nChr 1 .37* -.08
AAT nChr2 .24 .03 .58***
AAT Poll .17 .13 .29 .19
AAT Pol2 -.21 .23 .15 .33 .60***
Note. *** ~ < .001; ** ~ < .01; * ~ < .05
4.4.3 Regression Analysis
4.4.3.1 The relationship between ideological conservatism and tolerance ofambiguity
Polynomial regression analysis was performed to determine whether tolerance of attitudinal
ambiguity scores were related to the indices of ideological conservatism. Each index ofAAT _
except AAT_Chr2, which had low internal consistency - was used as the dependent variable
in a series of separate regression equations, which tested for linear and quadratic associations
with the ideological conservatism indices. As in the university study, the linear term was
entered first in each equation, followed by the quadratic term (cf. Cohen & Cohen, 1983).
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t = -2.39, p=.02
AAT_
nChr2
Lin 13 = 2.43
t =2.59 , p=.02




Lin 13 = 1.99
t =2.06, p<.05
Quad 13 = -2.09
t=-2.16, p=.04
The negative linear relationship between SR_Equal and AAT_nChr indicated that subjects who
scored high on subtle racism (equality) were intolerant of ambiguity towards non-Christian
authorities at church. This trend suggests that lower levels of value conflict may have been
experienced at the Alpha course and is in line with predictions made around contextual value
conflict. It is hypothesised that their views on these authorities are similar to those preached by
the church, hence the lowered levels ofconflict there.
The positive linear relationship between RWA and AAT_nChr2 indicates that highly
authoritarian subjects were more tolerant of non-Christian authorities at home. This finding
was not predicted by the researcher and is difficult to explain. One hypothesis is that their
personal views regarding non-Christian authorities may be less conservative than those of the
church. At home, where subjects would perhaps allow themselves to question the authority of
the church, they may be more in touch with the discrepancy between their views and those of
the church, perhaps in the form of self-argumentation (Billig, 1996).
The positive linear relationship between RWA and Poll indicated that subjects who scored high
on authoritarianism were more tolerant of ambiguity towards liberal political authorities at the
Alpha course. This relationship seems to suggest that they experienced higher conflict at the
Alpha course around political conservatism. As such it is in accordance with predictions
regarding contextual value conflict, since it suggests that the views of these subjects were
different from those normative in the church context. It is postulated that, because the church is
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a religious authority they might feel free to question the church on political but not on religious
matters. This would explain the different patterns of association between the content domain of
political authorities and that ofnon-Christian authorities. These results seem to provide evidence
for variability across content domain.
The negative quadratic associations between RWA and AAT_nChr2 as well as RWA and
AAT_Poll indicate that the point of inflection was a maximum value, suggesting that
moderates expressed higher levels of attitudinal ambiguity tolerance than extremists did.
These findings are in agreement with Rokeach's extremism theory. However, they do not
support his theory, as these associations varied across content domain and were not stable,
generalisable or invariant.
4.4.3.2 Cross context variations in Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance
The study aimed to investigate variations in responses to the AAT scale across the two
situations in which the scale was completed. First, a series of three repeated measures t-tests
were conducted to determine whether the subject group as a whole scored higher or lower on
the second occasion. The t-test AAT_Christian was significant (t = 2.07, df = 29, p = .048),
indicating that the sample showed less tolerance of attitudinal ambiguity on the second
occasion (M = .53) than on the first (M = .92). The differences were not significant for
AAT_non-Christian (t = .55, df =29, p = .59) and AAT_Political (t = -.42, df =29, p =.68).
Although the significant difference may be attributed to the change in context, it may also be
attributed to the low internal consistency of the AAT_Chr2 index.
To explore variations across situation at the level of individuals, difference scores for each
AAT index were computed by subtracting the AAT scores in the second situation from the
scores for the first situation, i.e.:
• AAT_Chr = AAT_Chr 1 - AAT_Chr 2 (Mean = .38, SD = 1.02)
• AAT_nChr = AAT_nChr 1 - AAT_nChr 2 (Mean = .07, SD = .72)
• AAT_Pol = AAT_Poll - AAT_PoI2 (Mean = -.08, SD = .99)
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All three indices of difference scores were roughly normally distributed. High scores indicate
a decrease in AAT scores from the first (church) to the second (home) occasion.
Polynomial regression analysis was performed to determine whether the difference scores
were related to the indices of ideological conservatism and commitment. The procedure was
similar to the polynomial analysis outlined above. Each difference index was used as the
dependent variable in a series of separate regression equations that tested for linear and
quadratic associations with the ideological conservatism and commitment indices. The results
are reported in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5. Linear and quadratic effects for AAT difference indices.
RWA
AAT nChr
Lin 13 = -1.69
t = -2.29, p=.03
Quad 13 = 1.74
t = 2.36, p=.03
Lin 13 = -1.77
t = -2.88, p=.OI
Quad 13= 1.69
t = 2.74, p=.OI
AAT]ol
Lin 13 = 2.29
t =2.41, p=.02
Quad 13= -2.26
t =-2.38 , p=.02
The relationship between the Subtle Racism indices and AAT_nChr includes negative linear
and positive quadratic effects.
The negative linear effect indicated that subjects who scored low on the Subtle Racism indices
were more intolerant of ambiguity towards non-Christian authorities at home. This finding is
difficult to explain. It is postulated that the views of these non-racist subjects regarding non-
Christian authorities may be less conservative than those held by the church. This resulted in
higher levels of value conflict at the Alpha course, since the contextual norms and their
personal beliefs on this issue were different. In the absence of contradictory views, these
subjects experienced lower levels of contextual value conflict in the home environment.
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The positive quadratic effects show that, in addition to the linear effects, the regression line
curves in such a manner that both high and low scoring subjects show decreased tolerance of
ambiguity in the home situation, whereas moderate scoring subjects show more tolerance of
ambiguity at home. This result is partially similar to the prediction of Rokeach's extremism
theory, but because he does not anticipate that the trend will change across context, the
findings do not support this theory.
The relationship between RWA and AAT-Pol includes a positive linear effect and a negative
quadratic effect. The positive linear effect indicated that high scoring authoritarian subjects were
more intolerant of ambiguity at home. This indicates that higher levels of value conflict were
experienced at the Alpha course where liberal political authorities are supposed to be tolerated.
This is in line with contextual value conflict predictions since it was anticipated that their
political views would be conservative. This resulted in heightened value conflict at the Alpha
course, where the political norms are liberal.
The negative quadratic effects show that, in addition to the linear effects, the regression line
curves in such a manner that both high and low scoring subjects show increased tolerance of
ambiguity at home, whereas moderate scoring subjects show less tolerance of ambiguity in the
home environment. Insofar as moderates were more intolerant of ambiguity than extremists,
there is partial support for context theory. However, since variations across content domain
and context were not predicted fmdings do not support this theory.
These results have suggested that it is also important to distinguish between various contexts, as
both context and content domain seem to mediate the shape as well as the direction of the variant
relationships. However, the researcher did not predict this complexity of variability. Possible
reasons for this will be explored in Chapter 5 in an attempt to extrapolate relevant theoretical
underpinnings.
Linked to the difficulty of the unpredicted complexity of variability is one of the most important
limitations of the study, namely the post-hoc nature of the explanations given, especially for




5.1 Summary of aims and expectations
The study was designed mainly to investigate the variability of tolerance of ambiguity across
different contexts and different content domains. Furthermore, it examined the variable nature of
the relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological belief. It also explored the
mediating role that ideological commitment plays between tolerance of ambiguity and
ideological belief in certain content domains.
Predictions were that where contextual norms were similar to the personal values of subjects,
lower levels of value conflict would be present. If, however, contextual norms and personal
values differed, subjects were expected to experience higher levels of value conflict and
express this in increased ambiguity tolerance or ambivalence.
It is important to note that the assumptions about the nature of the different contexts and the
anticipated levels of value conflict were a simplification of the actual situations measured.
Also, it proved to be extremely difficult to pre-define the specific contextual value conflict.
These aspects will be discussed under "Limitations".
5.2 Major Findings
5.2.1 Measures of ideological conservatism and ideological commitment
Two expectations from prevIOUS studies regarding the different measures of ideological
conservatism and ideological commitment were contested by the results of the current study.
The first concerned the dimensionality of two of the scales that were used, while the other was
related to the anticipated intercorrelations between the indices of ideological conservatism.
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Through factor analysis it was discovered that, unlike previous studies (Duckitt, 1991, 1993;
Durrheim, 1995, 1998), subtle racism no longer performed as a unidimensional construct.
Instead it was two-dimensional. The strong correlation between these in the church group was
absent for the university sample. Also in contrast to previous studies (Durrheim, 1995;
Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; Nicholas & Durrheim, 1996), religiosity no longer presented as
unidimensional. Instead, through factor analysis two different indices were uncovered. A
shortcoming of this study is the omission of this scale for the second sample group (i.e., the
church sample), as such findings may have assisted in clarifying the matter. Possible
explanations for both these results were discussed in chapter 3.
The current findings question the validity of these scales in contemporary South African
society. However, due to the small sample size no conclusive statements can be made and it is
recommended that future research attempt to clarify these issues.
As mentioned earlier, previous research suggested that all the measures of ideological belief
would be related to each other.
Following research guided by the theory of authoritarianism the constructs of conservatism,
right-wing authoritarianism and racism are all expected to be related as they form a cluster of
beliefs about the world that is a manifestation of a personality trait (Adomo, et al., 1950).
Rokeach (1960) and Sidanius (1984) also expect correlations between these aspects, since their
theories are personality-based. Tetlock hypothesises ideological monism for conservative
ideology, and since conservatism, authoritarianism and racism implicate similar conflicting
values he would anticipate a correlation.
These assumptions about intercorrelations between the different measures were confirmed in
previous studies by, among others, Duckitt (1989, 1993) and Ray (1988) who found a strong
correlation between racial attitudes and right-wing authoritarianism.
Factor analyses of the different indices ofideological conservatism in the current study, however,
showed that the whole battery ofmeasures no longer operated as a coherent unit.
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Weak correlations between the two indices of subtle racism and that of conservatism were
found in the university study but not in the church study. Some correlation between the
control factor of subtle racism and right-wing authoritarianism was evident in the church
sample but not the university sample. No correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and
conservatism was found in either sample group.
The social meanings attached to each dimension of ideological conservatism seem to have
played a significant role in the development of new patterns of associations, and disprove
assumptions from the personality-based theories that all the measures of ideological
conservatism would be unidimensional and intercorrelated. The findings also generate support
for the assumption that complex correlations are emerging in a changing context. As such the
findings ofDurrheim (1995, 1998) are reiterated here. The "simple" picture that the personality-
based theorists like Adorno and colleagues as well as others had proposed has become
complicated, in that ideological conservatism is now seen as a multidimensional, complex
construct with different patterns ofintercorrelations between the various dimensions thereof.
5.2.2 Properties of the AAT scale
Results pertaining to the AAT scale, which was both valid and reliable, confirmed certain
important findings from Durrheim's (1995, 1998) studies. Apart from AAT_Chr in the church
study both test -retest and internal consistency statistics indicated that the scale could be
considered reliable. Construct validity was evident as the scale measures tolerance of ambiguity
in accordance with Frenkel-Brunswik's (1949) original definition, as it acknowledges both the
evaluative and social aspects of the concept. It also does not confound cognitive style and
content as it separates these concepts methodologically. Furthermore, it distinguished between
the levels of ambiguity tolerance across different content domains. For instance, through factor
analysis different dimensions of the scale, namely the political, Christian and non-Christian
domains were identified. The findings also showed that subjects' responses to the scale were
meaningfully related to the content domains of the different authorities. These findings
contradict the stance that tolerance of ambiguity is a generalised stable personality trait.
Scores on each of the AAT indices were correlated to ascertain whether stability across time
93
was evident for each domain of authority. Results from the university sample show that the
first and second set of scores on each of the measures (Christian, non-Christian and political)
correlated significantly, but for the church sample this was only evident for non-Christian and
political authority figures.
An analysis was then made to determine whether AAT scores for different domains of
authority were interrelated, or whether each domain was evaluated independently. In the
university sample tolerance of ambiguity towards non-Christian and political authorities was
related, but no such correlation existed with Christian authorities. A clear distinction between
all three domains was found in the church study. Attitudinal ambiguity tolerance responses
therefore do· not seem to be generalised across content domain.
These findings were basically similar to those found in Durrheim's (1995, 1998) studies. They
have specific implications for our understanding of cognitive style and in particular the
concept of tolerance of ambiguity. The variability that was found indicates that tolerance of
ambiguity can no longer be seen as a generalised personality trait that is stable across content
domain and context (Adorno, et al., 1950; Rokeach, 1960; Sidanius, 1988a, 1988b). It can
also not be seen, in accordance with the cognitive-centred approach, as a learned cognitive
disposition (Schroder et aI., 1967). Instead, because it tends to be much more variable across
context and content domain, a fluid understanding of tolerance of ambiguity as performance in
context needs to be adopted.
5.2.3 Ambiguity tolerance, ideological conservatism and ideological
commitment
An important focus of the studies was to examine the patterns of association between ambiguity
tolerance, ideological conservatism and ideological commitment. The studies also investigated
whether ideological conservatism could be a predictor ofambiguity tolerance.
Both Rokeach and Sidanius postulated that ideological commitment would play a role in
mediating tolerance / intolerance of ambiguity and proposed that this aspect ought to be related
to personality. The other theorists do not comment on this issue.
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As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, correlations between tolerance of ambiguity and the
measures of both ideological conservatism and ideological commitment were only examined
in the university study. Correlations were such that attitudinal ambiguity tolerance scores were
only related to particular indices of ideological commitment. A distinction between the religious
and political domains was found in that ideological commitment, rather than specific religious
contents or ideologies, was related to tolerance of ambiguity in the religious domain (specifically
towards Christian authorities). Two exceptions in the university study included a single
relationship between conservatism and tolerance of ambiguity towards non-Christian authorities,
and one between subtle racism (control) and ambiguity tolerance towards the same authorities. In
contrast to these findings ideological positioning in terms ofconservatism or liberalism mediated
attitudinal ambiguity tolerance towards the political domain in the university study. These results
provide significant confirmation of similar fmdings from Durrheim's (1995) research. Since the
mediating role of ideological commitment was not generalised across different content domains
(thus not personality-based), the findings do not support the theories of either Rokeach or
Sidanius. This, however, stood in contrast to findings from the church sample, which showed
that changes in ambiguity tolerance were related to attitudinal beliefs, in particular
authoritarianism, but also in some cases subtle racism. This occurred in both the political and
the religious domains, but in the latter it was restricted to non-Christian authorities. It must be
remembered, though, that ideological commitment was not investigated in the church study.
In terms of ideological conservatism, authoritarianism in the church sample was an important
predictor of tolerance of ambiguity, with subtle racism playing an insignificant role. This could
be understood in that racism is taboo in contemporary South Africa, but authoritarian values of
submission and conformism are still somewhat prevalent. Foster (199la) stated that this is not
surprising, since authoritarianism was the cornerstone of the apartheid philosophy. However, the
role that authoritarianism plays in mediating both the shape and the direction of the relationship
varied across content domain and context, suggesting that context does play a role in the variable
relationship between tolerance of ambiguity and ideological conservatism. This seemed to have
been linked to the meaning a particular content domain had within the context at hand, and the
accompanying levels of value conflict that this had caused. For instance, it seemed as though the
political domain was perceived to be a domain that could be contested within the context of the
Alpha course, whereas that was not so for the religious domain.
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The findings regarding the form of the relationship between ambiguity tolerance and ideological
conservatism reiterated those of Durrheim (1995, 1998). No single relationship between
attitudinal conservatism and tolerance of ambiguity was evident across different content domains
of conservatism. Instead, results for both the university and the church study yielded several
positive and negative linear and quadratic associations between these constructs.
In contrast to the predictions of the four major theories discussed in chapter 2, this supports the
notion that there is no isomorphic link between specific ideological beliefs and tolerance of
ambiguity. It also contradicts the generalised personality status of tolerance of ambiguity.
None of the theories predicted as much variability as was found in the two studies undertaken
by the researcher.
Despite this, limited support for all the theories was found and these will be summarised below.
(For interpretations of the various relationships mentioned in the following discussion, refer to
the relevant sections in chapters 3 and 4).
Research supportive of the theory of authoritarianism stated that cognitive style is a
personality trait and that the relationship between ideological belief and cognitive style would
be stable across context and content domain. It predicted that authoritarians would
characteristically use a rigid cognitive style, such as intolerance of ambiguity. One correlation
from the university that supported the idea of conservative subjects being intolerant of
ambiguity included the negative linear relationship between R_Subjective and AAT_Chrl
(Table 3.9), while the negative linear relationship between SR_Equal and AAT_nChrl (Table
4.4) in the church study also partially supported this. Due to the fact that neither of these
trends was consistent across content domain, they did not confirm the theory of
authoritarianism.
The theory of extremism also suggested that there is a stable, invariant relationship between
ideological belief and cognitive style. However, it proposed that the content of the belief (i.e.
liberalism or conservatism) is not as important a determining factor of cognitive style as the
extremism thereof. Accordingly, both liberalism and conservatism would be characterised by
intolerance of ambiguity, while moderates would be tolerant of ambiguity. Some support was
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evident in the university study, namely the negative linear relationship between R_Subjective
and AAT_Chrl, as well as the positive linear relationship between R_Objective and AAT_Chr2
(Table 3.9). In the church study the negative linear relationship between SR_Equal and
AAT_nChrl (Table 4.4) provided further support. All the negative quadratic equations in Table
3.9 (university study) and Table 4.4 (church study) are also in partial agreement with
Rokeach's extremism theory. However, none of these verify Rokeach's (1960) theory, as these
associations varied across content domain and were not stable, generalisable or invariant.
Evidence against the two theories (Adomo et al., 1950; Rokeach, 1960) was found in both the
university and the church sample where highly authoritarian subjects were tolerant of ambiguity
towards political authorities in the "ideological" context (i.e. Bible study and the Alpha course).
Context theory suggested that moderates would use a rigid cognitive style such as intolerance of
ambiguity while extremists would be flexible in their thinking, and therefore tolerant of
ambiguity. The university study conformed to this prediction in the positive linear relationships
between SR_Control and AAT_nChrl, Conservatism and AAT_nChrl, RWA and AAT-PoI2 as
well as SR_Control and AAT_Poll respectively (see Table 3.9). In the church study the positive
linear relationships between RWA and AAT_nChr2 and RWA and Poll, as well as the negative
linear effect between SR and AAT_nChr2 (Table 4.4) also was in line with the prediction.
However, these results do not support the theory of Sidanius, as the associations varied across
content domain and were not stable, generalisable or invariant.
Value pluralism vacillated between, on the one hand, linking monistic ideologies with
intolerance of ambiguity and on the other hand, proposing no direct link between a certain
kind of ideology and cognitive style, as the latter will depend on the value conflict that the
subject is confronted with. The value conflict proposed by Tetlock's earlier studies in
particular was, however, linked to the monistic/pluralistic nature of the issue at hand, and
therefore more limited than that of contextual value conflict.
The predictions of value pluralism were of variability. There was evidence for this in the
findings, but the partial personality basis was not confirmed. Furthermore, even though
Tetlock had predicted variability, he never anticipated such wide diversity of associations
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which is contrary to his theory.
Billig (1985, 1996; Billig et aI., 1988) sees value conflict as rooted in context, and suggests
that the style of arguing and thinking that individuals adopt is dependent upon the value
conflict associated with thinking about particular ideological contents in a particular context.
Durrheim (1995) takes this idea one step further, suggesting that the nature of a particular
context would present people with a specific level of contextual value conflict, depending on
whether the norms of that situation oppose or support their views regarding the issue at hand.
As such he postulates that no isomorphic link exists between cognitive style (e.g. intolerance
of ambiguity) and a specific type of ideology or personality. He moves completely away from
the concept that certain ideologies would attract people with a particular cognitive style and
regards cognitive style as being fluid in nature.
The position of contextual value conflict predicts that tolerance of ambiguity would be related to
the level of contextual value conflict that subjects experience. The higher the conflict, the higher
the level of ambiguity tolerance. Conversely, the lower the conflict, the higher would be the
level of intolerance of ambiguity (or the lower would be the level of ambiguity tolerance). An
examination of the results as they relate to these predictions revealed that some confirmation for
this theory was found. However, the support is by no means conclusive. Examples that provide
verification include the positive linear relationships in the university study between
SR_Control and AAT_Poll, SR_Control and AAT-nChr1 as well as Conservatism and
AAT_nChr (Table 3.9). All these relationships confirmed that the context of rag which
presented these subjects with norms different to their own, raised contextual value conflict for
them. Moreover, accountability to others with different views further raised the value conflict.
Also, in the church study confirmation was found in the negative linear relationship between
SR_Equal and AAT_nChr and the positive linear relationship between RWA and Poll (Table
4.4). Since it was postulated that the contextual norms would differ from the values of these
subjects in these content domains, raised levels of conflict (and ambiguity tolerance) were
predicted, while in the absence of contextual value conflict subjects would express intolerance
of ambiguity.
However, a number of findings were not supportive of the predictions of contextual value
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conflict. These comprise the negative linear relationship between R_Subjective and
AAT Chrl, the positive linear relationship between R_Objective and AAT_Chr2 as well as
the positive linear relationship between RWA and AAT-Po12 (Table 3.9) in the university
study. In the church study the positive linear relationship between RWA and AAT_nChr also
went against the anticipated trend. These findings suggest that, for certain content domains,
high levels of contextual value conflict occurred in unexpected situations. For instance, at
home, where no contextual value conflict was predicted, .authoritarian subjects expressed
tolerance of ambiguity and implicitly experienced high levels of value conflict at home. The
reasons for these contradictory results are not clear.
When trying to understand why certain domains of ambiguity tolerance only correlate to
certain aspects of attitudinal conservatism, it seems as though the relationship is partially
influenced by differential meanings that subjects attach to the various dimensions of
conservatism. Only those dimensions that are salient and meaningful to a particular domain
mediate the associations. The multiple patterns of association between the conservatism
indices and the different indices of ambiguity tolerance should be understood in the light of the
influence of contextual value conflict, as well as the meaning attached to the specific content
domain.
It is therefore clear that no single theory, especially none of the personality-based theories, were
able to explain the findings adequately. However, the theory that seems to have come closest to
predicting the results was the extended contextual value conflict theory that predicted the
greatest level of variability of all the theories. Although this was the case, it is apparent that it
has its limitations.
5.2.4 Cross context variations in Attitudinal Ambiguity Tolerance
Cross-content variation was examined to investigate contextual differences in value conflict
and the impact of these on shifting expressions of ambiguity tolerance. This analysis was
undertaken to challenge the stance that tolerance of ambiguity is a stable, generalised
personality trait. Instead it attempted to find evidence in favour of the fluid nature of cognitive
style as performance in context.
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Despite the fact that there were no significant t-test differences in scores of the first and the
second occasions, results for both sample groups yielded cross-context variations at an
individual level. These individual contextual shifts were then examined in more detail.
The only position that predicted cross context variations in tolerance of ambiguity was that of
contextual value conflict. Inherent in this stance is the idea that each context within which
people function, would present them with different levels of contextual value conflict. This
would be dependent on the contextual norms of the given situation, and its relationship to the
views and values of the people involved (see chapters 3 and 4 for a more extensive account of
the predictions).
The positive linear effects between Pol_Interest and AAT_Chr, as well as Conservatism and
AAT_non-Christian (Table 3.10) indicate that there was a decrease from the first (rag) to the
second (Bible study) occasion in ambiguity tolerance. The positive linear effect between RWA
and AAT_Pol in the church study also suggested a decrease in ambiguity tolerance from the first
(the Alpha course) to the second (home) occasion.
The negative linear relationships between R_Objective and AAT_Chr as well as R_Subjective
and AAT_nChr (Table 3.10) indicated increased tolerance of ambiguity from the first (rag) to
the second (Bible study) occasion. The positive linear relationship between RWA and
AAT_nChr2 (Table 4.5) in the church study also indicates an increase in ambiguity tolerance
from the first (the Alpha course) to the second (home) occasion. To the extent that these
results showed changes in ambiguity tolerance across context, they confirm the predictions of
contextual value conflict. However, the directions of these changes were not all predicted, and
this makes interpretations quite difficult. A post hoc approach to interpreting the results
therefore had to be followed. This is one of the major limitations ofthe study.
From the above findings it is clear that the variability in correlations across both context and
content domain is more complex that that anticipated by the researcher. These results have
confirmed the importance of distinguishing clearly between various contexts and content
domains, as both ofthese seem to mediate the shape and direction ofthe relationships.
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5.3 Limitations of the research
The results found in the two studies were more varied than that anticipated by the researcher. No
consistency was evident in the shape or direction of the relationship between variables. This
makes interpretation difficult. Although some support for the contextual value theory was
evident, it was by no means conclusive. The researcher has attempted to make sense of the
findings which contradict the anticipated associations, but these are only tentative explanations
because of their post hoc nature.
What is apparent from the two studies is that the context did not present subjects consistently
with the kind of contextual value conflict that was predicted. For instance, the home
environment in the church study seems to have presented high levels of value conflict for
authoritarian subjects as far as non-Christian authorities were concerned, while the context of rag
in the university study presented highly religious student with low levels of conflict concerning
Christian authorities. This suggests that there were uncontrolled variables and underlying
processes other than those related to contextual value conflict that informed the cognitive style
used by subjects. The post hoc explanations used in attempting to understand these results are a
serious shortfall of this study.
The findings also indicate that it is extremely difficult to pre-define and quantify the nature of
contextual value conflict. One of the main reasons for this is that, at present, no independent
measurement exists that could quantify the level of contextual value conflict at play in various
different situations. Different instruments measuring personal individual beliefs and contextual
nonnative beliefs need to be developed, as these may further assist in measuring the level of
contextual value conflict implicit in a given context.
Another area requiring clarification that would assist an understanding of underlying processes
in attitudinal ambiguity tolerance is that of accountability (Tetlock, 1983a, 1993, 1994). No
independent instrument for quantifying the level of accountability exists. This is a crucial area
to focus on in future studies.
In the absence of such instruments introducing qualitative investigations of these aspects may
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have assisted the researcher to determine more precisely what were the nature of the
underlying dynamics. However, both time and practical constraints prohibited the researcher
from introducing this aspect into the research. The time constraints involved interviewing all
the subjects, while there were practical constraints in tracing the participants, particularly those
in the university sample, as the final interpretations of the results took place a long time after
the collection ofdata.
Another limitation was the omission of the measures of ideological commitment in the church
study, because this may have shed some light on the two-dimensional nature of the religiosity
scale as occurred in the university study. It could also have clarified the mediating role of
ideological commitment in relation to tolerance of ambiguity in the church sample. It is
recommended that future studies explore this matter in more depth.
Furthermore, the role of the researcher as data collector in the church study may have played a
stronger role than anticipated, and that her presence might account for some of the contradictory
findings of that particular sample group. This hypothesis is based on informal feedback from a
few subjects long after the execution of the study, as well as the subjects' perception that the
researcher, in her position as deacon of Andrew Murray, was seen as an authority figure
representing the views of the church. If a member of a particular sample group or context
undertakes future studies, attempts should be made to control more carefully for the role this may
play in influencing the results.
It is also important to consider that, due to the small sample· size in both the university and the
church study (but especially in the latter), the results of these studies should be treated with
caution.
Finally, it may be hypothesised that the attempts to control the contextual variability in these two
studies were overridden by the greater variability introduced in the rapidly changing South
African situation. For example, within the time span between the administration of the two
different sets of questionnaires within each study, changing external realities may have been
prevalent in the rapidly moving South African situations. It is therefore suggested that the design
ofrepeat studies should include explicit attempts to control for these variables.
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5.4 Recommendations for future studies
Following the limitations the most important recommendation for future studies is that an
attempt should be made to determine more carefully and more precisely the nature and level of
contextual value conflict and accountability in the different situations used in each study. One
way of addressing this issue would be to develop independent measuring instruments to pre-
define and quantify these variables. Also, developing distinct measuring instruments for
personal individual beliefs on the one hand, and contextual normative beliefs on the other,
may provide additional assistance to determine the level of contextual value conflict implicit
in a given context. Furthermore, future studies could also make use of controlled experiments,
which manipulate levels of value conflict in order to address these limitations.
Another suggestion, in the absence of such instruments, would be to consider a qualitative
analysis into the nature of these variables. Future studies should also explore the nature of each
context much more carefully by building into its design better controls for various variables they
might feel may skew results.
Studies using the Subtle Racism scale should explore whether more than one dimension on this
scale would be evident again. Researchers should perhaps also consider extending the existing
scale to investigate the possible existence of more than two factors. Including in the measure
issues of, for instance, job equality or sport rather than just generalised equality might achieve
this. Also, some measure ofacceptability ofsocial integration might be useful.
Considering that ideological commitment was not explored in the church study, and that the
sample group for the university study was too small to make conclusive statements about its
mediating role in relation to tolerance of ambiguity, it is suggested that future studies re-
examine this matter. It would also be important to examine the Religiosity scale in contexts
with varying degrees of overt and covert religious underpinning to see whether the degree of
religiosity implicit in a particular context does play a role in producing more than one
dimension on this scale.
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5.5 Conclusion
The AAT scale developed by Durrheim (1995) was used as measunng instrument for
attitudinal ambiguity tolerance. The scale was found to be valid and reliable, and different
dimensions similar to those found in Durrheim's study were evidenced. These included the
political and religious domains.
Although the multiple relations, including positive and negative, linear and quadratic correlations
between the different variables in both the university and the church study cover predictions
from all of the personality-based theories, no single one of them could explain the intricate
variations across context and content domain. For reasons mentioned previously, the position
that came closest to providing a more comprehensive theoretical understanding for the results
seems to be that ofcontextual value conflict.
Results have indicated that it is important to distinguish between the various dimensions of
ideological conservatism and those of attitudinal ambiguity tolerance, as the shape and direction
of the relationship between these depend on both these aspects.
The investigation into the mediating role of ideological belief and ideological commitment
indicated that there is no isomorphic link between cognitive style and cognitive content.
Although several results in the church study (and two in the university study) showed that
ambiguity tolerance towards non-Christian authorities was also related to some indices of
ideological belief they do not confirm the predictions of the personality-based theories, as these
correlations were not stable and generalisable. Furthermore, despite some contradictions, results
from the university study provided convincing support for Durrheim's findings that ideological
beliefwas mainly related to ambivalent evaluation in the political domain.
Consequently the personality based-theories were refuted by the variability in both the form and
the direction of the relationship between ideological belief, ideological commitment and
cognitive style. These findings are in line with those ofDurrheim (1995, 1998) and suggest that a
different theoretical framework, which would be able to accommodate the multidimensionality
ofconstructs and multiply patterned associations, needs to be introduced.
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It seems as though the relationship between the style and content of cognition is manifest only
when a meaningful connection exists between a particular set of beliefs and a specific content
domain with its specific domain of authority. Furthermore, the level of contextual value conflict
that was to an extent linked to the meanings attached to these variables seemed to have
influenced the tolerance of ambiguity evidenced in the findings. The presence or absence of
normative support for individual beliefs of subjects in a given context, influenced the level of
contextual value conflict for subjects and this in turn resulted in the various levels oftolerance of
ambiguity that subjects expressed. Context therefore did play a mediating role in attitudinal
ambiguity tolerance of subjects.
Contextual value conflict has managed better to account for the vast variability in patterns of
associations more extensively than any of the four major theories discussed in chapter 2.
Nevertheless it also cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for all the relationships. This
suggests that contextual value conflict is difficult to pre-define and that future studies need to
address this shortfall by finding ways of determining more efficiently the nature of contextual
value conflict inherent in different situations. Overall, therefore, even though the contextual
value conflict theory was not confirmed without contradiction, some evidence in its favour was
found
Despite the fact that underlying dynamics and processes informing the multiple patterns of
association were not always clear, results do seem to confirm that a fluid understanding of
tolerance ofambiguity as performance in context needs to be adopted.
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APPENDIX A
First Questionnaire: University (English)
The following is a study of what university students think and feel about a number of important social and personal
questions. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; no matter what your answer to the various
questions, you can be sure that many people will feel the same as you
As this questionnaire is the first component of a two-part study, you are requested to provide your name. You are assured of
the STRICTEST CONFIDENTIALITY. The questionnaire will be read by THE RESEARCHER ONLY. This is a scientific
investigation independent of all political, religious and other ideological persuasions. You are encouraged to answer all
questions openly. Thank you for your co-operation. Please answer all questions.
Section 1






4) Age (in years)
5) Year of study (e.g. 1,2,
Hons, etc.)
6) Field of study (e.g. BSc,
Hons in Maths, etc.)
7) Do you participate in any religious activities (e.g. Bible Study, Transcendental Meditation, etc.) on campus or elsewhere?
State Yes or No:
8) Do you participate in any political activities on campus, or are you a member of any political movement (e.g. Cosas, NP Youth
Branch, etc.) on campus or elsewhere?
State Yes or No:
Section 2
Please answer the following by placing a cross [X] in the appropriate boxes.
I) Which Political Party would you most likely and least likely support? (select only one party in the "most likely" column and





African National Congress (ANC)
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWE)
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
South African Communist Party (SACP)
Democratic Party (DP)
Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO)
Conservative Party (CP)
Pan African Congress (PAC)
Freedom Front (FF)
United Democratic Movement (UDM)
Other (specify):




















5) How strongly do you hold your political views?
~OnglY
6) How much interest do you take in politics (e.g. reading political news, discussing political issues)?
llEJUCh
7) How much interest did you take in the negotiation process which took place just before the 1994 elections (e.g., following
news reports, discussions with friends, etc.)?
8) Would you have taken part in demonstrations and strikes if you felt the negotiation process was biased or unfair?
Section 3
I) How often have you attended religious services in the last year?
Never
Once or twice
TIrree to six times a year
Once or twice a month
Once a week
Two or three times a week
2) Which of the following best describes your practice ofprayer or religious mediation?
Prayer is a regular part ofmy daily life.
I usually pray during times of stress or need, but rarely at any other time.
I pray only during formal ceremonies.
Prayer has little importance in my life.
I never pray.
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4) How much influence would you say that religion has on the way that you choose to act and the way that you choose to spend
your time each day?
No influence
A small influence
A fair amount of influence
A large influence












6) Do you agree with the fol
7) Which one ofthe following statements comes closest to your belief about God?
I am sure that God really exists and is active in my life.
Although I sometimes question God's eXistence, I do believe in God's existence and that God knows me
as a person.
I don't know if there is a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of some kind.
I don't know if there is a personal God or a higher power of some kind, and I'm not sure that I will ever
know.
I don't believe in a personal God or a higher power.
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8) Which one of the following statements comes closest to your belief about life after death?
I believe in a personal life after death, a soul existing as a specific individual.
I believe in a soul existing after death as part of a universal spirit.
I believe in life after death ofsome kind, but I really don't know what it would be like.
I don't know whether there is any kind of life after death, and I don't know if I will ever know.
I don't believe in any kind of life after death.
Section 4
It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture ofboth likes (respect) and
dislikes (disrespect), given different situations. Give two scores for each of the following authorities or
authority figures, one indicating the level that you sometimes like (respect) the authority, the other the level
ofyour possible dislike (disrespect).
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your personal
opinion.
Example 1: Ifon occasions you truly respect the American government and support their decisions, but on
other occasions you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer:
The American Government
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 1 23456789 10 Very much
Example 2: If you respect Prime Minister John Major completely and support him at all times, then you
may answer:
Prime Minister John Major
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 12345678910 Very much
1) The South African Government
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
2) Buddha
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
3) The Courts
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
no
4) Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
5) The family
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
6) God
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
7) Chris Rani
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
8) The Conservative Party (CP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
9) Your Church
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
10) Bishop Desmond Tutu
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
11) President Nelson Mandela
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
12) The Pope
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
13) Doctors
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect




Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
15) Parents
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
16) The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
17) Friends
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
18) Personal Conscience
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
19) The Army
Like/respect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
20) Your Church Leader
Like/respect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
21) Science
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
22) The Democratic Party (DP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
23) The University
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect




Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
25) The South African Communist Party (SACP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
26) Mohammed
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
27) Lawyers
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
28) The African National Congress (ANe)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all oI 23456789 10 Very much
29) The Bible
Like/respect
Not at all oI 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
30) F. W. de Klerk
Like/respect
Not at all oI 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
31) The Law
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
32) The Police
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
33) Umkhonto weSizwe
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
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34) The Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
35) The United Nations (UN)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
36) The Koran
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
37) Your School Principal
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
38) Eugene Terreblanche
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
39) Your Teacher
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
40) Your Professors
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
41) Your Partner/Spouse
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
42) Your Own Values
Like/respect
Not at all o I 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
43) Mangosuthu Buthelezi
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect





















Please answer the following questions by indicating your reactions to each statement by placing a
cross [X] in the appropriate cell according to the following scale:
VSD ifyou very strongly disagree with the statement.
SD ifyou strongly disagree with the statement.
MD if you moderately disagree with the statement.
sD ifyou slightly disagree with the statement.
sA ifyou slightly agree with the statement.
MA if you moderately agree with the statement.
SA ifyou strongly agree with the statement.
VSA if you very strongly agree with the statement.
Ifyou feel precisely neutral about the statement, place a cross in the cell marked with a "N".
I) It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion, than to listen to the noisy
rabble rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
I,--V_SD_I,--s_D_I_M_D---J'_S_D_1_N_--,I,--s_A_I MA I_SA_I VSA
2) There is nothing immoral or sick in somebody being a homosexual.
I_V_SD_I,--S_D_I_MD_--,I,--S_D_I N I MA I_S_A---JI,--V_SA---J
3) The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant
groups and troublemakers ifwe are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
I_V_SD_IL.-S_D _I_MD_--l...-Is_D_-,-I_N_--LI_SA__Il...-_MA_I_s_A---JI,--V_SA_
4) "Free speech" means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow of the
government.
I_V_SD_IL.-S_D _'_MD_--,I,--S_D_I N I MA I_S_A---JI,--V_SA_
5) In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with agitators and revolutionaries




6) Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
I'--V_SD_L.-IS_D_I_MD_---'IL....---s_D _I_N_---l-I_sA_--,-I_MA__I_s_A_IL--V_SA_
7) It is best to treat dissenters with leniency and an open mind, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change.
I_VS_D-----'-I_SD_I'--MD_--'-I_SD_--'-I_N_I_SA_-..I.I_MA_--'-I_SA_.........I_VS_A_
8) The biggest threat to our freedom comes from the communists and their kind, who are out to destroy religion, ridicule
patriotism, corrupt the youth, and in general undermine our whole way oflife.
IVSD I SD I MD I_SD_-'-I_N_I_SA_I_MA_.........I_SA_I VSA
9) The way things are going in this country, it is going to take a lot of "strong medicine" to straiten out the troublemakers,
criminals and perverts.
IVSD SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
10) It is important to protect fully the rights of radicals and deviants.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
11) Rules about being "well-mannered" and respectable are chains from the past which we should question very thoroughly
before accepting.
IVSD I SD I MD I'--SD_--'-I_N_--L..I_SA_I MA_--'-I_SA_1 VSA
12) Once the government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every
patriotic citizen to help stamp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.
I VSA--_--1._---I,--S_D--,-I_MD_...&-Is_D----L1_N_.....L-I_sA_1 MA ISAIVSD
13) The self-righteous "forces oflaw and order" threaten freedom in our country a lot more than most of the groups they claim
are "radical" and "godless".
IVSD '_S_D_IL--MD__I_SD_---JIL--N__I_SA__I_MA_---JIL--S_A_I VSA
14) Students in high school and at university must be encouraged to challenge their parents' ways, confront established
authorities, and in general criticize the customs and traditions of our society.




First Questionnaire: University Study (Afrikaans)
Hierdie is 'n navOTsingsprojek wat universiteitstudente se menings en gevoelens omtrent 'n aantal belangrike sosiale en
persoonlike vrae ondersoek. Ons het probeer om soveel moontlik verskillende en teenstrydige standpunte in te sluit. Wees
verseker: dit maak nie saak watjou antwoorde op die verskillende vrae is nie, dliar sal definitiefbaie mense wees wat net soos
jy voel!
Aangesien hierdie vraelys die eerste deel van 'n tweeledige projek is, vra ons jou om asseblief jou naam te verskaf. Ons wil
dit beklemtoon dat die inligting ABSOLUUT KONFIDENSIEEL IS! NIEMAND BEHALWE DIE NAVORSER sal toegang
he tot die inligting wat jy hierin verskaf nie.
Die projek is 'n wetenskaplike ondersoek wat onafhanklik is van alle politieke, religieuse en ander ideologiese oortuigings. Jy
word aangemoedig om alle vrae so openhartig moontlik te beantwoord. Voltooi asseblief AL die vrae op die vraelys. Baie
dankie vir jou deelname en samewerking. Ons waardeer dit baie!! -
Afdeling 1










BA Tale, BSc, ens.)
7) Neemjy deel aan enige religieuse bedrywighede (bv. Bybelstudie, Transendentele Meditasie, ens.) op kampus of erens anders?
Se JaofNee:
8) Neem jy deel aan enige politieke bedrywighede op kampus, of is jy lid van enige politieke beweging (soos by. Cosas, NP-




Beantwoord asseblief die volgende deur 'n kruisie [X] in die toepaslike blokkie te trek.
1) Watter politieke party sal jy mees waarskynliks en mins waarskynliks ondersteun? Kies slegs een party in die kolom vir
"mees waarskynliks" en een party in die kolom vif"mins waarskynliks ".
Mees Waar- Mins Waar-
skynliks skynliks
Nasionale Party (NP)
African National Congress (ANC)
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)
Inkatha Vryheidsparty (IVP)
Suid-Afrikaanse Kommunistiese Party (SAKP)




United Democratic Movement (UDM)
Pan African Congress (PAC)
Ander (spesifiseer):




















5) Hoe sterk staan jy by jou politieke sieninge?
Gladnie Baie sterk
6) Hoe ge'interesseerd is jy in die politiek (bv. lees jy politieke mius, bespreek jy politieke sake)?
Baie min Baie intens
7) Hoe geYnteresseerd was jy in die onderhandelingsproses (bv. nuusberigte gevolg, besprekings met vriende, ens.) net voor
die 1994 verkiesings?
Baiemin Baie intens
rTJ 7_1 8 ',--? 1_1O_
8) Sou jy deelgeneem het aan demonstrasies en stakings indien jy gevoel het dat die onderhandelingsproses onregverdig of
partydig was?
Baie beslis
I 5 1~,--7_I 8
Afdeling 3
Baie beslis nie
I 9 1 10
1) Hoe gereeld gedurende die afgelopejaar hetjy religieuse bedrywighedelbyeenkornste (bv. kerkdienste) bygewoon?
Nooit
Een of twee keer
Drie tot ses keer per jaar
Ben of twee keer per maand
Ben keer per week
Twee or drie keer per week
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2) Watter een van die volgende stellings beskryfjou deelname aan gebed ofreligieuse meditasie die beste?
Gebed is 'n gereelde deel van my daaglikse lewe.
Ek bid gewoonlik tydens tye van spanning of noOO, maar selde andersins.
Ek bid slegs gedurende formele byeenkomste.
Gebed is van min belang in my lewe.
Ek bid nooit me.























7) Watter een van die volgende stellings beskryfjou gelooften opsigte van God die beste?
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Ek is seker dat God werklik bestaan en aktiefbetrokke is in my lewe.
Alhoewe1 ek God se bestaan soms bevraagteken, glo ek in God se bestaan en dat God my persoonlik ken.
Ek weet nie ofdaar 'n persoonlike God is nie, maar ek glo in een of ander tipe Hoer Mag.
Ek weet nie ofdaar 'n persoonlike God of een of ander Hoer Mag is nie, en ek is nie seker of ek ooit sal weet nie.
Ek glo nie aan 'n persoonlike God of in een of ander Hoer Mag nie.
8) Watter een van die volgende stellings beskryfjou ge100ften opsigte van die lewe na die dood die beste?
Ek glo aan 'n persoonlike lewe na die dood, aan 'n wese wat as spesifieke individu bestaan.
Ek glo aan 'n wese wat na die dood as universele gees bestaan.
Ek glo aan een of ander tipe lewe na die dood maar ek weet werklik nie watter vorm dit sal aanneem nie.
Ek weet nie of daar enige soort lewe na die dood is nie, en ek weet nie of ek ooit sal weet nie.
Ek glo nie aan enige tipe lewe na die dood nie.
Afdeling 4
Ons veronderste1 hier datjou houding teenoor enige gegewe gesaglowerheid 'n mengse1 van voorkeure (respek)
en afkere (minagting) is, afhangende van verskillende situasies. Verskaftwee tellings vir elk van die volgende
owerhede of gesagsfigure. Die een moet aandui tot watter mate jy die gesag soms respekteer, en die ander tot
watter mate jy dit moontlik kan minag.
Omkring assebliefdie toepaslike syfers. Gee assebliefjou onmiddellike reaksie. Daar is geen regte of
verkeerde antwoorde nie. Die beste antwoord is jou persoonlike mening!
Voorbeeld 1: As jy die Amerikaanse regering onder sekere omstandighede respekteer en hulle besluite
ondersteun, rnaar hulle op ander geleenthede minag, sou jy soos volg antwoord:
Die Amerikaanse Regering
Goedkeur/Respekteer
Gladnie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Baie
AfkeurlMinag
Glad nie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . Baie
Voorbeeld 2: As jy Eerste Minister John Major ten volle respekteer en horn te alle tye ondersteun, sou jy soos
volg antwoord:
Eerste Minister John Major
Goedkeur/Respekteer
Gladnie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Baie
AfkeurlMinag
Glad nie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Baie
I) Die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering
Goedkeur/Respekteer
Gladnie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AfkeurlMinag















Gladnie 0 I 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 10
AfkeurlMinag
Glad nie 0 I 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 10
4) Inkatha Vryheidspaity (IVP)
Goedkeur/Respekteer
G1adnie 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AfkeurlMinag



















Glad nie 012345678910 Baie









Glad nie 012345678910 Baie




Glad nie 012345678910 Baie

























Glad nie 012345678910 Baie































22) Die Demokratiese Party (DP)
Goedkeur/Respekteer
Gladnie 01 234 5 6 7 8 910 Baie
Atkeur/Minag










Glad nie 012345678910 Baie
























Glad nie 012345678910 Baie













Gladnie o I 23456789 10 Baie
AtkeurlMinag
Glad nie 012345678910 Baie




Glad nie 012345678910 Baie




Glad nie 012345678910 Baie





























Glad nie 012345678910 Baie




Glad nie 012345678910 Baie
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BaieGlad nie 01234 5 6 7 8 910
44) Die Talmoed
Goedkeur/Respekteer
Gladnie 01234 5 6 7 8 910 Baie
AfkeurlMinag
Gladnie 012345678910 Baie






Beantwoord asseblief die volgende vrae deur jou reaksie tot elk van die stellings aan te dui deur 'n kruisie
[Xl in die toepaslike blokkie te trek. Gebruik asseblief die volgende skaal:
BSV as jy baie sterk verskil van die stelling.
SV as jy sterk verskil van die stelling.
RV as jy redelik verskil van die stelling.
EV as jy effens verskil van die stelling.
ES as jy effens saamstem met die stelling.RS as jy redelik saamstem met die stelling.
SS as jy sterk saamstem met die stelling.
BSS as jy baie sterk saamstem met die stelling.
As jy heelternal neutraal voel oor die stelling, trek 'n kruisie in die blokkie waarin daar 'n "N" is.
2) Daar is niks immoreels of "sieks" aan iemand wat homoseksueel is nie.
IBSV l_sv__I_R_V--....-.-J1,--E_V_I_N_---JI'--E_S_1--1_RS_I-s-s--....-.-J1,--B_8S_
3) Die feite oor rnisdaad, seksuele onsedelikheid en die onlangse openbare wanorde, dui alles daarop dat ons baie strenger moet
optree teen afwykende groepe en rusverstoorders indien ons ons morele standaarde wil red, en wet en orde wil handhaaf.
IL..-B_8V_--L.1_8V__I_R_V--....-.-JI,--E_V_I_N_·--....-.-JI,--E_S_1_RS__1_8_S_1,--B_8S_
4) "Vryheid van spraak" beteken dat mense selfs toegelaat moet word om toesprake te hou en boeke te skryf wat die
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omverwerping van die regering aanpor.
IBSV l,--s_V_I_R_V_I,--E_V_I_N_----JI'--E_S_1,--RS__I_s_s_IL-B_SS_
5) In hierdie moeilike tye moet wette genadeloos afgedwing word, veral op revolusioneres en oproeriges.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
6) Jongmense kry soms rebelse idees, maar namate hulle ouer word, behoort hulle dit te oorkom en tot bedaring te kom.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
7) Dit is beter om afgewekenes (mense wat nie met die meerderheid saamstem nie) sagkens en met In oop gemoed te hanteer,
aangesien nuwe idees die lewensaar van progressiewe verandering is.
IBSV I_S_V_I,---R_V_I,--E_V_I'---_N_I,--E_S_I_R_S_I,---s_s_I BSS
8) Die grootste bedreiging vir ons vryheid kom van die kommuniste en soortgelyke tipes, want hulle is slegs daarop uit om
religie te vernietig, patriotisme belaglik te maak, die jeug te verlei en ons hele lewenswyse te ondermyn.
IBSV I,--S_V_,---I_Rv_I,--~_v_,---I_N_.&.-IE_s_I,--RS_--I.--1S_S_I BSS
9) Met die huidige stand van sake gaan hierdie land In groot dosis "sterk medisyne" benodig om die rusverstoorders, kriminele
en perverte te orden en te beheer.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
10) Dit is belangrik om die regte van radikales en afgewekenes ("deviants") ten volle te beskerm.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
11) Reels rondom "goeie maniere" en fatsoenlikheid is kettings van die verlede wat ons baie deeglik behoort te bevraagteken
alvorens ons dit aanvaar.
IBSV _S_V__I_R_V_----JI....._E_V__I_N__-JI....._E_S__I_R_S__I_SS__-JIL...._B_S_S_....J
13) Die eieregtige "magte van wet en orde" bedreig die vryheid in ons land baie meer as die meeste groepe wat volgens hulle
"radikaal" en "goddeloos" is.
IBSV I_s_v_I,---R_V_'_E_V_IL..-N__I,--E_S_I_RS__I,---s_s_,---IB_SS_
14) Studente op hoerskool en aan die universiteit moet aangemoedig word om hulle ouers se oortuiginge te betwis, gevestigde





Second Questionnaire: University (English)
The fol1owing is a study of what university students think and feel about a number of important social and personal
questions. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; no matter what your answer to the various
questions, you can be sure that many people wil1 feel the same as you.
As this questionnaire is the second component of a two-part study, you are requested to provide your name. You are assured
of the STRlCfEST CONFIDENTIALITY. The questionnaire will be read by the researcher ONLY. The information
obtained here wil1 be used for research purposes ONLY.
This is a scientific investigation independent of al1 political, religious and other ideological persuasions. You are encouraged
to answer al1 questions openly. Thank you for your participation. Please answer ALL questions. Your cooperation is highly
appreciated. --
Section 1




It is assumed here that your attitude toward any given authority is a mixture ofboth likes (respect) and dislikes (disrespect),
given different situations. Give two scores for each of the following authorities or authority figures, one indicating the level
that you sometimes like (respect) the authority, the other the level ofyour possible dislike (disrespect).
Please circle the appropriate figures. Give your immediate reaction. The best answer is your personal opinion.
Example 1: If on occasions you truly respect the American government and support their decisions, but on other occasions
you hold them in contempt. Then you could answer:
The American Government
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 12345678910 Very much
Example 2: Ifyou respect Prime Minister John Major completely and support him at all times, then you may answer:
Prime Minister John Major
Like/respect
Not at all 0 1 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0 1 23456789 10 Very much
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1)The South African Government
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
2) Buddha
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
3) The Courts
Like/respect
Not at all o123456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
4) Inkatha Freedom Party (!FP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
5) The family
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
6) God
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
7) The Conservative Party (CP)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 0123456789 10 Very much
8) Your Church
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
9) Bishop Desmond Tutu
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
10) President Nelson Mandela
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect





























14) The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)
Like/respect
Not at all 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dislike/disrespect
















































20) The South African Communist Party (SACP)
Like/respect
Not at all 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dislike/disrespect













22) The African National Congress (ANC)
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
23) The Bible
Like/respect
Not at all o1 23456789 10 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
24) F. W. de Klerk
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
25) The Law
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
26) The Police
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
27) Umkhonto weSizwe
Like/respect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910 Very much
28) The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Like/respect
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dislike/disrespect
Not at all 012345678910
Very much
Very much










































































Please answer the following questions by indicating your reactions to each statement by placing a
cross [X] in the appropriate cell according to the following scale:
VSO ifyou very strongly disagree with the statement.
SO if you strongly disagree with the statement.
MD if you moderately disagree with the statement.
sO if you slightly disagree with the statement.
sA if you slightly agree with the statement.MA ifyou moderately agree with the statement.
SA if you strongly agree with the statement.
VSA if you very strongly agree with the statement.
If you feel precisely neutral about the statement, place a cross in the cell marked with a "N".
1) Given the same education and opportunities, blacks should be able to perform as well as whites in any field.
IVSO I SO I MD I_SD_....L..I_N_I_SA_I_MA_....L..I_SA_I VSA
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2) It would be unfair ifgreater expenditure on black education were to be funded by the white taxpayer.
IVSD I_SD_I_MD_.........I_Sd_1 N I MA I_S_A_IL--V_SA_
3) Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that black majority rule will result in a stable, prosperous and democratic
South Africa.
IVSD I SD I MD I SD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
4) Only equality between black and white can in the long run guarantee social peace in this country.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
5) The large-scale extension ofpolitical rights to blacks will inevitably lead to chaos.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
7) Although black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the country that whites
regain political control.
IVSD SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
8) It is important that drastic steps be taken to ensure a far more equitable division of wealth in this country.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
9) Ifall races mixed freely they would probably live in peace.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
10) It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages should not be allowed.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
11) An expert who does not come up with a defmite answer probably does not know too much.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
12) I would like to live in a foreign country for a while.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
13) There is really no such thing as a problem that cannot be solved.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
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14) People who fit their lives into a schedule probably miss most of the joy ofliving.
I I I I I I I VSAIVSD I SD MD sD N sA MA SA
IS) A good job is one where what is to be done and how it is to be done are always clear.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA
16) Often the most interesting people are those who do not mind being different and original.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA
17) People who insist on a yes or a no answer just do not know how complicated things are.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA MA I SA I VSA
18) In the long run it is possible to get more done by tackling small, simple problems rather than large, complicated ones.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
19) What we are used to is always preferable to what is unfamiliar.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
20) Many ofour most important decisions are based upon insufficient information.
IVSD I SD I MD ISD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
21) A person who leads an even, regular life in which few surprises or unexpected happenings arise, really has a lot to be
grateful for.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD I N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
22) I like parties where I know most of the people more than ones where all or most of the people are complete strangers.
I,---V_SD_I,---S_D_I_M_D_IL...-S_D _I_N_--JI,--S_A_.L-I_MA_I_s_A_I,--V_SA_
23) Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments give a chance for one to show initiative and originality.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD N I sA I MA I SA VSA
24) The sooner we all acquire similar values and ideals the better.
IVSD I SD I MD I sD N I sA I MA I SA I VSA
25) A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about your way of looking at things.
IVSD I SD I MD I_SD_---I....-N__I_SA_--1IL..-MA_-.L..1S_A_I VSA
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26) It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem than to solve a simple one.
I_V_SD_IL--S_D_I_MD__IL--S_D_I,--N__I_SA__IL--MA_--,--IS_A_I VSA
Section 4
Which of the following do you favour or believe in? Circle "Yes" or "No". Ifyou are absolutely
uncertain, circle "?". There are no right or wrong answers. Just give your FIRST REACTION. Please
answer ALL questions.
I) Evolution theory Yes ? No
2) School uniforms Yes ? No
3) Striptease shows Yes ? No
4) Modem art Yes ? No
5) Military service Yes ? No
6) Socialism Yes ? No
7) Divine Law Yes ? No
8) Moral training Yes ? No
9) Suicide Yes ? No
10) Chaperons Yes ? No
11) Social welfare Yes ? No
12) Legalized abortion Yes ? No
13) Chastity Yes ? No
14) Female judges Yes ? No
15) Big Business Yes ? No
16) Conventional clothing Yes ? No
17) Nudist camps Yes ? No
18) Mass Action Yes ? No
19) Church authority Yes ? No
20) Disarmament Yes ? No
21) Censorship Yes ? No
22) Strict rules Yes ? No
23) Social Equality Yes ? No
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24) Casual Living Yes ? No
25) Divorce Yes ? No
26) Religious truth Yes ? No
27) Legalizing dagga Yes ? No
28) Privatized health care Yes ? No
29) One person, one vote Yes ? No
30) Homosexuality Yes ? No
31) Political radicalism Yes ? No




Second Questionnaire: University (Afrikaans)
Hierdie is 'n navorsingsprojek wat universiteitstudente se menings en gevoelens omtrent 'n aantal belangrike sosiale en
persoonlike vrae ondersoek. Ons het probeer om soveel moontlik verskillende en teenstrydige standpunte in te sluit. Wees
verseker: dit maak nie saak watjou antwoorde op die verskillende vrae is nie, daar sal definitiefbaie mense wees wat net soos
jy voel!
Aangesien hierdie vraelys die tweede deel van 'n tweeledige projek is, vra ons jou om asseblief jou naam te verskaf. Ons wil
dit beklemtoon dat die inligting ABSOLUUT KONFIDENSIEEL IS! NiEMAND BEHALWE DIE NAVORSER sal toegang
he tot die inligting wat jy hierin verskaf nie.
Die projek is 'n wetenskaplike ondersoek wat onafhanklik is van alle politieke, religieuse en ander ideologiese oortuigings. Jy
word aangemoedig om alle vrae so openhartig moontlik te beantwoord. Voltooi asseblief AL die vraeop die vraelys. Baie
dankie vir jou deelname en samewerking. Ons waardeer dit baie!! -
Afdeling 1
Verskaf assebliefdie volgende besonderhede.
I) Van
2)Voomaam
Mdeling 2 (AAT SCALE)
PLEASE SEE APPENDIX C, SECTION 4 FOR THE ENGLISH VERSION OF THE
SHORTENED FORM OF THE ATTITUDINAL AMBIGUITY TOLERANCE SCALE
USED HERE. FOR A TRANSLATION OF THE ITEMS, PLEASE SEE APPENDIX B,
SECTION 4.
Afdeling 3
Beantwoord assebliefdie volgende vrae deur jou reaksie tot elk van die stellings aan te dui deur 'n
kruisie [Xl in die toepaslike blokkie te trek. Gebruik asseblief die volgende skaal:
BSV as jy baie sterk verskil van die stelling.
SV as jy sterk verskil van die stelling.
RV as jy redelik verskil van die stelling.
EV as jy effens verskil van die stelling.
ES as jy effens saamstem met die stelling.
RS as jy redelik saamstem met die stelling.
SS as jy sterk saamstem met die stelling.
BSS as jy baie sterk saamstem met die stelling.
As jy heeltemal neutraal voel oor die stelling, trek 'n kruisie in die blokkie waarin daar 'n "N" is.
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1) Indien swartmense dieselfde opvoeding en geleenthede gebied word, behoort hulle op enige gebied net so goed soos
witmense te presteer.
I_BS_V--JI"-S_V_1_R_V_IL.-E_V_I_N_--L..I_ES_---lI'--RS_--L..I_ss_---lI_B_SS_
2) Dit sal omegverdig wees indien groter uitgawes vir swart onderwys deur blanke belastingbetalers bemiddel moet word.
IBSV Isv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
3) Onder gunstige ornstandighede is dit heel moontlik dat 'n swart meerderheidsregering Suid-Afrika tot 'n stabiele,
voorspoedige en demokratiese staat kan lei.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
4) Die enigste langtermyn waarborg vir sosiale vrede in hierdie land is totale gelykheid tussen wit en swart.
IBSV I_s_v_-LI_R_V_I_E_V_-LI_N__I_E_S_I_RS_----L.I_S_S_I BSS
5) Die grootskaalse uitbreiding van politieke regte vir swartmense is besig om op onafwendbare chaos afte stuUT.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS SS I BSS
6) Die rykdom van hierdie land is feitlik totaal te danke aan die harde werk en leierskap van die blankes.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS SS I BSS
7) Alhoewel swartmense se lewensornstandighede verbeter behoort te word, is dit essensieel vir die stabiele ontwikkeling van
die land dat blankes politieke beheer moet herwin.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
8) Dit is belangrik dat drastiese stappe geneem moet word om die rykdom in die land meer regverdig tussen almal te verdeel.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
9) As alle rasse vrylik sou meng, sal hulle waarskynlik in vrede leef.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
10) Dit sal feitlik ongetwyfeld beter vir almal wees as gemengde huwelike nie toegelaat word nie.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS SS I BSS
11) 'n Deskundige wat nie 'n definitiewe antwoord kan verskaf rue, weet waarskynlik nie eintlik veel nie.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS SS I BSS
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12) Ek sal graag vir 'n ruk in 'n vreemde land wil bly.
IL....B_S_V _.L.I_s_v _I_R_V__L..-E_V__IL...._N _-l...I_E_S__..L1_R_S__I,--s_s__L.I_B_S_S__
13) Daar is regtig nie so iets soos 'n prob1eem wat nie opge!os kan word nie.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
14) Mense wat volgens 'n vaste skedule lewe, mis waarskynlik die meeste vreugdes van die lewe.
IBSV SV RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
15) 'n Goeie werk is die soort waar 'n mens altyd seker is wat gedoen moet word en hoe dit gedoen moet word.
IBSV SV RV I EV I N I ES RS I SS BSS
15) Die mees interessante en stimulerende mense is dikwels die wat nie omgee om anders en oorspronklik te wees nie.
IBSV l_sv__..........I_R_V__I_E_V__L.I_N IL...._E_S__I_RS__.........._S_S__L....-B_S_S_....J
17) Mense wat op 'n "ja-" of "nee"-antwoord aandring besef net nie hoe gekompliseerd dinge regtig is nie.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS SS I BSS
18) Op die 1ange duur is dit moontlik om meer gedoen te kry deur klein, eenvoudige probleme te take! as om groot,
gekompliseerdes aan te durf.
IBSV I sv I RV EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
19) Die bekende is altyd verkieslik bo die onbekende.
IBSV I sv I RV EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
20) Baie van ons be!angrikste besluite is gebaseer op onvoldoende inligting.
IBSV I sv I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
21) 'n Persoon wat 'n reelmatige, gewone lewe lei met min verrassings of onverwagte gebeure, het regtig baie om voor dankbaar
te wees.
I_B_SV_IL..-S_V_.l.-1_RV_'_E_V_IL-..N__I_E_S_L..-I_RS_.l.-1s_s_1 BSS
22) Ek hou meer van partytjies waar ek die meeste mense ken as van partytjies waar almal of arnper almal totale vreemdelinge
is.
IL-..B_SV_l--1S_V_IL-..R_V_~IE_v_IL-..N_-.l-..1E_S_.1-1_RS_..l-I_ss_...LI_BS_S_
23) Onderwysers of supervisors wat vae opdragte gee, gee 'n mens die kans om inisiatief en oorspronklikheid aan die dag te le.
IBSV l_s_v__I_R_V_---...JIL...._E_V N IL...._E_S__..L.I_RS__I_ss IL.._B_S_S__
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24) Hoe gouer ons almal dieselfde waardes en ideale het, hoe beter.
I BSV I SV I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
25) 'n Goeie onderwyser is iernand watjou laat wonder oor die manier waarop jy dinge benader ofbekyk.
I BSV I SV I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
26) Dit is lekkerder om 'n gekompliseerde probeem aan te durf as om 'n eenvoudige een op te los.
I BSV I SV I RV I EV I N I ES I RS I SS I BSS
Mdeling4
Is jy ten gunste van die elk van die volgende of glo jy daaraan? Omkring "Ja" of "Nee".
As jy heeltemal onseker is, omkring "?" Daar is geen regte of verkeerde antwoorde nie.
Gee net jou EERSTE REAKSIE. Beantwoord asseblief AL die vrae.
1) Die evolusieteorie Ja ? Nee
2) Skooluniforms Ja ? Nee
3) Ontkleedanse Ja ? Nee
4) Moderne kuns Ja ? Nee
5) Militere diensplig Ja ? Nee
6) Sosialisme Ja ? Nee
7) Goddelike Reg Ja ? Nee
8) Morele bewusmaking/Sedeleer Ja ? Nee
9) Selfmoord Ja ? Nee
10) Chaperons (Begeleiers vir verliefdes) Ja ? Nee
11) Die Welsyn Ja ? Nee
12) Wettige aborsie Ja ? Nee
13) Kuisheid la ? Nee
14) Vroulike regters la ? Nee
15) Die Wereld van Groot Sake Ja ? Nee
16) Konvensionele kleredrag Ja ? Nee
17) NUdistekarnpe Ja ? Nee
18) Massa-aksie Ja ? Nee
19) Kerkgesag Ja ? Nee
20) Ontwapening Ja ? Nee
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21) Sensuur la ? Nee
22) Streng reels la ? Nee
23) Sosiale ge1ykheid la ? Nee
24) 'n Onverskillige lewenstyl la ? Nee
25) Egskeiding la ? Nee
26) Ge100fswaarheid la ? Nee
27) Wettiging van dagga la ? Nee
28) Geprivatiseerde gesondheidsorg la ? Nee
29) Een mens, een stem la ? Nee
30) Homoseksualiteit la ? Nee
31) Politieke radikalisme la ? Nee




First Questionnaire: Church (English)
Thank you very much for participating in this research project. Your cooperation is highly appreciated.
The following is a study of social attitudes and opinions in a religious context. We have tried to cover many different and
opposing points of view; no matter what your answer to the various questions, you can be sure that many people will feel the
same as you.
You are assured of the STRICTEST CONFIDENTIALITY. The questionnaire will be read by the RESEARCH ASSISTANT
ONLY and the information obtained here will be used for research purposes ONLY. The researcher herself will have access
to the information ONLY IN STATISTICAL FORM. It will therefore remain anonymous.
This is a scientific investigation independent of all political, religious and other ideological persuasions. We would like to
assure you that this study is in no way whatsoever subversive to your church activities or beliefs.
You are encouraged to answer all questions openly. Please answer ALL questions.
Section 1












Section 2 (AAT SCALE)
PLEASE SEE APPENDIX A, SECTION 4 FOR THE FULL VERSION OF THE
ATTITUDINAL AMBIGUITY TOLERANCE SCALE THAT WAS USED HERE.
Section 3 (RWA SCALE)
PLEASE SEE APPENDIX A, SECTION 5 FOR THE RIGHT WING
AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE USED HERE.
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APPENDIXG
Critique and Improvement of the Formula used in the
AAT Scale
Hereis the table corresponding to this graph where the horizontal rows
represent the values of aat as 1 increases from 0 to 10 and the vertical
columns represent the aat values as d increases from 0 to 10.
0.5 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.1 0.091 0.083
0.33 0.75 0.6 0.5 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.3 0.27 0.25 0.23
0.25 0.6 0.83 0.71 0.62 0.56 0.5 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.36
0.2 0.5 0.71 0.88 0.78 0.7 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.5 0.47
0.17 0.43 0.62 0.78 0.9 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.6 0.56
0.14 0.37 0.56 0.7 0.82 0.92 0.85 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.65
0.13 0.33 0.5 0.64 0.75 0.85 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.72
0.11 0.3 0.45 0.58 0.69 0.79 0.87 0.94 0.88 0.83 0.79
0.1 0.27 0.42 0.54 0.64 0.73 0.81 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.85
0.091 0.25 0.38 0.5 0.6 0.69 0.76 0.83 0.89 0.95 0.9
0.083 0.23 0.36 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.9 0.95
A problem with this measure of ambiquity tolerance is that as the values of
1 = d change from 0 to 10 the increment in aat is a huge .25 (from 0 to 1)
and only .02 or less foreachunitincrementfrom3 to 10. This is possibly an
undesirable distortion of what we should expect from a measure of ambiquity
tolerance. To improve the measure in a way which intuitively accords with
reality the following formula for ambiquity tolerance and its associated
graph is suggested.




Here is the formula that has been used to measure the variable tolerance of
ambiguity.
2 Min[l, d] + 1
aat = --------
1+d+2
Unlike its original form, here its dependence on the measurements of
like (1) and dislike (d) has been made explicit. This serves two purposes.
It eliminates the need for a separate calculation of both the maximum
and minimum values (previously called Hand L) . Secondly it makes
transparent how the variable ambigui ty tolerance is symmetrically
dependent on the variables 1 and d .
The three dimensional graph of this formula for tolerance of














And as before we plot the table corresponding to this graph where the
horizontal rows represent the values of aat as 1 increases from 0 to 10
and the vertical columns represent the aat values as d increases
from 0 to 10.
0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0
0.45 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2
0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3
0.3 0.4 0.5 0'.6 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4
0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6 0.55 0.5
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.75 0.7 0.65 0.6
0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.8 0.75 0.7
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.85 0.8
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 0.9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.
As can be seen from both the graph and the table all the desirable properties of the
ambiguity tolerance measure are retained. These are namely that when 1 =d =0, the
aat value is .5 . Also when 1 and d differ by the maximum of 10, the aat value is O.
And when 1 = d = 10, the aat value is the maximum of 1. And for any particular 1 value,
the maximum aat value occurs where d =l. Furthermore several possible improvements
are now apparent. These are an evenly spaced increase in the maximum values
when 1 =d. The increment is now uniformly. 05 and the graph is linear on either side
of the maximal ridge. This means that: as the land d values increase,
so does the aat (ie aat is linearly dependent on 1 + d) ; which is as it should be since
increase in affect of the responses should increase the aat; also aat is linearly
dependant on the difference between land d which is also as it should be .
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